Dara Duong

CRUEL AND IRONIC TWISTS OF FATE AND A SETBACK FOR The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)

2011-05-22T16:24:00.000-07:00

Jeffrey S. Brand

It may have taken only 13 days to dismantle decades of work to hold accountable those responsible for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. From April 29 to May 11, 2011, an order from the ECCC and dueling press releases from ECCC International Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley and National Co-Prosecutor Chea Lang, punctuated by the tragic death of ECCC Chief of Public Affairs Reach Sambath, brought into sharp focus the inherent contradictions of a tribunal process that had managed to achieve significant successes despite its flaws. Now, in a cruel twist of fate, the prospect of making further progress on that difficult road may have dimmed significantly.

On April 29, 2011 the Co-Investigating Judges – You Bunleng of Cambodia and Siegfried Blunk of Germany – shut down their investigation of Cases 003 and 004 amid charges that the prosecutors had cursorily interviewed witnesses, made perfunctory visits to crime scenes, conducted a “sham desk study” and caved to political pressure. . On May 10, Mr. Cayley, issued a press release that appeared to buttress some of those charges, stating that evidence of additional grave crimes likely existed and demanding additional investigation of crime scenes and interviewing of witnesses. The Cambodian co-prosecutor, Chea Lang, issued a response within 24 hours (and without advance notice to the international co-prosecutor) supporting the judges’ conclusion that any further investigation would exceed the intended scope of the tribunal to only prosecute “senior leaders” and those “most responsible”. The following day, Reach Sambath suddenly died from a massive stroke. Some observers commented that pressures from the court may have contributed to the death of the highly respected, Columbia University School of Journalism graduate and former reporter.

The consequences of this sad chain of events may be all too evident. Indeed, the attitude of the Cambodian co-prosecutor in combination with the attitude of the judges bodes ill for the future of the tribunal. The structure of the tribunal is complex and the result of political compromises along the way. Inherent in that compromise is a decision-making process that is likely to thwart any further proceedings in Cases 003 and 004 or, perhaps, any other cases at all.

To be sure, there is the right of potential civil parties – a term of art within the ECCC process – to apply to become parties to the proceedings. But, they must do so within 15 days of the date on which the co-prosecutors were notified of the co-investigating judges’ order, in this case May 18. Even if that date had not come and gone, the limited time to make application, the minimal information made public about the facts of Cases 003 and 004, and the difficulty of disseminating information in Cambodia in the best of circumstances, would have made the time frame too short to yield a significant response. Add to that the fact that the co-investigating judges are given broad discretion to determine whether civil parties may intervene, and the result of any such application is likely pre-ordained by the judges’ April 29 order. Moreover, the right of appeal to the Pre-Trial Chamber is not likely to alter the result in light of the broad discretion that the Chamber gives to the judges’ orders.

Alarmingly, the events of the past month are well on their way to yielding the most bizarre result yet. On May 18 (ironically the same date that the time for victims to intervene expired), a subsequent order from the co-investigating judges confirmed speculation in the Cambodian press that contempt actions might be brought against the international co-prosecutor based on his continuing requests to investigate Cases 003 and 004. In its May 18 order, the judges concluded that Co-International Prosecutor Cayley’s statements “violated [the ECCC’s] Rule of Confidentiality” and “lacked legal basis”. The judges ordered Cayley “to retract the parts of the statement” that violated the rules. Can a contempt order be far behind? Should that come to pass, the unthinkable would have happened: a tribunal that was set up to hold accountable those responsible for the horrific crimes of the Khmer Rouge will have turned the proceedings against the co-prosecutor seeking to investigate the crimes. Could there be a more unimaginable and depressing result?

The tangled maze of ECCC process is little known to those not familiar with the history of the tribunal or its progress to date. Ultimately, however, the world beyond Cambodia’s borders may need to understand only one fact: the voices of the victims may be forever silenced and the effort, belated as it may be, to hold responsible those accountable may be forever foreclosed by the judges’ ruling. The conviction of Duch and whatever may come to pass in Case 002 being the sole concrete results of the ECCC effort; important results to be sure, but results that fall far short of what might have been. The International Co-Prosecutor, Mr. Cayley understood this bleak reality in his press release when he noted that he would “request the deadline be extended”, but also reminded potential civil parties that under the law “the deadline for Civil Party applications now falls on Wednesday, 18 May 2011 at 4 p.m.”

Only we lawyers can reduce the victims of the Khmer Rouge crimes to its minimalist clinical definition which Andrew Cayley recites, as he must, in his press release: “a natural person or legal entity that has suffered physical, material or psychological injury as a direct consequence of at least one of the alleged crimes.” How many victims fall into that category we may never know given the legal bind that those who suffered at the hands of the Khmer Rouge now find themselves: Unaware of deadlines to plead for further investigation that would likely have uncovered the very victims the tribunal was established to redress. Only a cynic would support such an unseemly result or claim it consistent with the spirit in which the tribunal was established. The victims of the events of the past several weeks go far beyond those defined in the ECCC statute and include all who support the rule of law and believe that holding those accountable for mass human rights violations is the surest path to establishing it.

Which brings us to Reach Sambath’s sad, untimely death. It is a cruel metaphor and ironic twist of fate for what has gone on these past weeks at the Court. By all accounts, Reach Sambath was a courageous voice seeking to educate and inform. The week before his death, however, the Court acted in a way to silence the voices of the international co-prosecutor and the victims. At the same time, the most important public voice on the Court – Reach Sambath – is now silent as well. How sad for us all.

Jeffrey S. Brand is Dean and Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco School of Law and Chair of the law school’s Center for Law and Global Justice. He has worked extensively in Cambodia since 1994.
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18 May 2011
STATEMENT FROM THE CO-INVESTIGATING JUDGES

The Co-Investigating Judges of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have noted the press release entitled “Statement by the International Co-Prosecutor Regarding Case File 003” (the Statement) dated 09 May 2011.

The Statement contained, among other things, information about crimes that according to the opinion of the International Co-Prosecutor required to be judicially investigated, thereby mentioning in detail as part of Case 003 alleged crimes, crime bases and criminal scenarios. Furthermore, the Statement also contained information about intended future actions by the International Co-Prosecutor related to the investigative process.

The International Co-Prosecutor lacked legal basis for making the above mentioned information public, and he also violated the Rule of Confidentiality. For these reasons, the Co-Investigating Judges have issued a reasoned Order whereby the International Co-Prosecutor has been ordered to retract the parts of the Statement containing this information within three working days.

The Order can be read in its entirety on the ECCC web site:
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/D14_EN.PDF

REACH SAMBATH -- HERO IN MY HEART by Ker Munthit

2011-05-22T16:22:00.001-07:00

This week, many of us, Cambodians and foreigners alike, find ourselves having a big lump in our throats as we come together to mourn the death of our dearest friend: Reach Sambath. His passing breaks our hearts and leaves us asking: is it real? We have just lost a rare breed of journalist in Cambodia, a professional journalism trainer, a very close friend and a dedicated pursuer of justice in the Khmer Rouge crimes.

I happened to know Sambath in 1992. Cambodia was still pretty much in turmoil. We both were apprentices of journalism, constantly chasing stories - big, small and odd - and trying to get the "scoop." Sambath often scooped everyone else, including me. As time went by so our friendship grew stronger, both professionally and personally. I wish I could recount all the memories that we shared in our career, but because of how difficult it is to write this recollection, let me just share some of them.

In late March or early April 1994, when the government's troops captured Pailin from the Khmer Rouge, Sambath and I joined a bunch of journalists and foreign military attaché in trekking through the jungle (very dense then) from Battambang province to Pailin. We wanted to witness the victory with our own eyes and to report on it for our respective organizations. It was late in the afternoon and raining. Pailin was nowhere in sight. We were wet and cold. As we stopped to camp out for the night, I tried to open a sardine can to eat with bread for dinner. My hand slipped, and I accidentally cut my finger. Sambath said to me: "You can just urinate on the wound to stop the bleeding." I did - and the bleeding ceased. After dinner we jumped into our respective hammocks, hung between trees, to sleep. Sambath brought his own hammock from home but I did not and I ended up renting one from a soldier's wife for $15 for the night. It was outrageously expensive, but I had no choice. I was shivering. Sambath gave me more advice: "Put your hands under your pants and between your legs to get warmed up." I did and it worked - I fell asleep. At dawn we got up, packed our gear and continued our journey to Pailin - on foot. In the jungle, we came across abandoned rifles, bullets and rocket launchers. We could have stepped on land mines too since this was part of the frontline zone, but luckily all of us reached the destination safely. We got there 12 hours later completely exhausted. We woke up the next day to rumble through Pailin to do reporting.

There was never a shortage of big items to cover. Another was a protest against toxic waste dumping in Sihanoukville (now Preah Sihanouk province), in around December 1998. Local residents were fleeing for fear of the impact of the waste on their health. Many others were marching in protest through the town. We followed them wherever they went to make sure that we wouldn't miss any interesting episode. When the crowd approached a house of a senior local official, a man started unleashing bullets from his machine gun into the air. The sound was deafening. The crowd ran for their lives. Sambath and I jumped on a motorbike taxi to flee. At a local government office far away from the shooting scene, we stopped to catch our breath. Sambath apparently didn't know that something had gone wrong with his outfit as we were running for safety. Only when he sat down at this latest location did he realize that the rear side of his pants was ripped apart, revealing his underwear. We laughed!

It may sound strange to talk about what seems to be funny at a time of enormous grief. But I want to share the lighter moments that enriched our bonds with Sambath. As we grieve, we also celebrate his life achievements by cherishing all the memories, big and small, that we have experienced with him. They will stay with us forever and also remind us of the man whose generous and open heart, professionalism and integrity had an enormous impact on so many people from different walks of life: politicians, friends, journalists, students, relatives - you name it. No word can fully describe the larger-than-life Reach Sambath. He now rests in peace - and he will be missed profoundly.

Ker Munthit is a former journalist for the Associated Press and a friend to Reach Sambath for the past 20 years. He and Sambath attended the Columbia University School of Journalism together, graduating in 2001. He currently lives in Phnom Penh.

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/2011051349066/National-news/cayley-in-the-crosshairs.html

Cayley in the crosshairs
FRIDAY, 13 MAY 2011 15:03 JAMES O’TOOLE

The Khmer Rouge tribunal’s investigating judges are considering initiating contempt-of-court proceedings against British co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley, a move observers said would deal a potentially critical blow to the reputation of a court already hobbled by allegations of political interference.

A source at the court said yesterday that co-investigating judges Siegfried Blunk and You Bunleng were “seriously” considering the move in relation to Cayley’s disclosure earlier this week of details of their investigation in the court’s third case.

The judges announced the conclusion of this investigation last month, though they provided no details about the case to the public, including the crime sites being investigated and the identities of the suspects, over the course of their work.

On Monday, Cayley therefore took the unique step of issuing his own statement detailing crime sites in the investigation and inviting victims to join the case as civil parties, as the judges had not done.

As he is permitted to do under court rules, Cayley also said he would request that the judges perform a series of additional – and seemingly basic – investigative steps in the case that had not been undertaken. These steps included the examination of potential crime scenes and the interviewing of the suspects, who were not even questioned by the judges over the 20 months that the investigation was open.

The identities of these suspects remain officially confidential, though court documents reveal them as former KR navy commander Meas Muth and air force commander Sou Met.

Yesterday, it emerged that rather than focusing their energies on these two former cadres, the judges were instead contemplating the initiation of contempt-of-court proceedings against Cayley himself.

“These proceedings are being seriously considered by the co-investigating judges,” a source at the court said yesterday, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

Under the rules of the tribunal, the judges may handle such proceedings internally or refer the matter to domestic authorities or the United Nations. The potential penalty facing Cayley was thus unclear yesterday, though any punishment handed down against him would almost certainly result in his departure from the court.

United Nations court spokesman Lars Olsen said yesterday that he had no information on the matter.

“The general principle is that the court will never make a comment about whether or not it is considering certain judicial decision,” he said.

Case 003 and the still-pending Case 004 have run up against stiff opposition from Cambodian officials, with Prime Minister Hun Sen declaring last year that they “will not be allowed”. The
limited investigation in the third case and the concealment of information about it has fuelled allegations that the judges have planned its dismissal in advance in the face of such pressure.

Proceedings against Cayley could have a potentially devastating impact on the legacy of a court set up with the goal of providing a model to the Cambodian justice system, said Clair Duffy, a trial monitor with the Open Society Justice Initiative.

“The really concerning thing about this kind of action is what it says about the potential repercussions for someone fulfilling an obligation and acting independently,” she said. “The example is that someone seeking to act with integrity but running contrary to political whims will be punished.”

Copyright © 2011 The Phnom Penh Post. All Rights Reserved.

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http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/frequently-asked-questions-about-case-003

Frequently asked questions about Case 003
Posted 3 days ago Updated 3 days ago
This document has been prepared by the ECCC Public Affairs Section for the purpose of providing the general public information about the ongoing judicial proceedings. It is not an official document.

What does it mean when the Co-Investigating Judges issued a notice of conclusion of investigation in Case 003?
The issuance of a notice of conclusion of investigation is a procedural step, where the Co-Investigating judges formally notify the parties and the public that they consider the investigation initiated by the Co-Prosecutors Introductory Submission to be concluded.

Any victim who wishes to apply to become a civil party must submit an application within 15 days after the notice of conclusion of investigation. With regards to Case 003 the deadline is 18 May 2011.

Does the notice of conclusion mean that the case is closed, and that a decision on whether or not the case will be sent for trial has been made?
No, the notice is a procedural step, not a substantive judicial decision. Following the notice of conclusion of investigation, the Co-Prosecutors have 15 days to request any further investigative action they may deem necessary.

If the Co-Prosecutors request further investigative action, the Co-Investigating Judges must either carry out the requested investigative action or reject the request through a reasoned judicial decision.

What happens if the Co-Investigative Judges reject request(s) for further investigative action?
The Co-Prosecutors can appeal a rejection from the Co-Investigating Judges to the Pre-Trial Chamber within 30 days after a decision has been made by the Co-Investigating Judges.

The Pre-Trial Chamber has through its jurisprudence established that Co-Investigating Judges have broad discretion to decide requests for investigative actions, and the Pre-Trial Chamber can only overturn their decision if the appellant can demonstrate that the decision made by the Co-Investigating Judges was based on grave errors .

What happens after requests for investigative actions have been carried out or rejected, or in case of appeals, when all appeals have been decided by the Pre-Trial Chamber?
The Co-Investigating Judges will transfer the case file to the Co-Prosecutors, who will have 3 months to make their Final Submission to the Co-Investigating Judges. The Co-Prosecutors may in their Final Submission either request the Co-Investigating Judges to make indictments and send a case for trial, or to dismiss the case.

What happens after the Co-Prosecutors have made their Final Submission?
The Co-Investigating Judges, who are not bound by recommendations in the Co-Prosecutors’ Final Submission, will issue a Closing Order. By definition, the Closing Order could be an Indictment sending the case for trial or a Dismissal Order, which would close the case.

Is there any possibility to appeal the Closing Order?
Yes, the Co-Prosecutors can appeal both kinds of Closing Orders to the Pre-Trial Chamber.

Why have the Co-Investigating Judges not provided more information to the public about Case 003?
Investigations before the ECCC are confidential by law. This is to protect both the integrity of the investigation, and to protect the presumption of innocence.

The legal system applied at the ECCC is based on a two-tiered system:
1. The investigations are confidential
2. If the investigations lead to indictments and trial, the trial will be conducted in public.

How can the public trust that the investigation is credible and impartial when only limited public information has been made available?
Investigations are confidential by law and the sole responsibility of the Investigating Judges. The public has no say in the investigations, and the public is not party to them. The Co-Prosecutors, representing the public interest, have as a party to the investigation an ample opportunity to examine whether the investigations were “credible and impartial” after the case has been forwarded to them, which has to be done on 2 occasions (during one of them, they can examine the investigations for a full 3 months before making their Final Submission).

When the whole investigative process has been completed, the Co-Investigating Judges will issue a Closing Order, which will either send the case for trial, or dismiss the case for lack of evidence or jurisdiction. The Closing Order will be a reasoned judicial decision, which will be made public. This way anyone can scrutinize and assess the work conducted by the Co-Investigating Judges.

In Case 002, information on the scope of investigation was released prior to the notice of conclusion of investigation. Why was no information on the scope of the investigation in Case 003 released before the notice of conclusion of investigation?
The situation in Case 003 is different to that in Case 002. By the time the scope of the investigation in Case 002 was made public, all defendants had been arrested and charged with crimes, and the investigation had been ongoing for more than two years while the defendants were held in provisional detention. In such a situation the Co-Investigating Judges found that to release limited information about the scope of investigation would not compromise the investigation.

In Case 003 no one has at this point been formally charged with crimes or been arrested. Consequently, it would be difficult to make public the scope of investigation without incurring the risk of compromising the future legal process of this case.

Are the names of alleged suspects in Cases 003 and 004 reported in media correct?
By law, it is only the Co-Investigating Judges who can release information about the investigation to the public, including the name of defendants. The Co-Investigating Judges are the only official channel of information, so any other information alleged by named persons or anonymous sources should not be treated as facts.

The names of the alleged suspects in Case 003 and 004 reported in the media are therefore speculative.

Why has the ECCC not actively invited Civil Parties to submit their applications in Case 003?
The experience from Case 002 showed that a substantive number of the Civil Party applicants were deemed by the Co-Investigating Judges to fall outside of the scope of investigation, and hence their applications were rejected. Most of the rejected Civil Party Applications had been filed before the scope of the investigation had been made public.

Since the scope of investigation in Case 003 at this point has not been made public, it would be a risk that most Civil Party Applications filed would fall outside of the scope of the investigation. To encourage the filing of Civil Party Applications in a situation as such, could potentially lead to the creation of unrealistic expectations for victims who might want to file an application to become a Civil Party.

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9 May 2011

PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL CO-PROSECUTOR

REGARDING CASE FILE 003

The International Co-Prosecutor, Andrew Cayley, makes this public statement pursuant to ECCC Internal Rule 54, to ensure that the public is duly informed about ongoing ECCC proceedings, and in particular with regard to the International Co-Prosecutor’s Introductory Submission in Case File 003. In providing this information the interests of victims and witnesses, the rights of suspects, and the requirements of the investigation have been taken into account, as required under the Rules.

Following directions given by the Pre-Trial Chamber, on 7 September 2009, the International Co-Prosecutor submitted to the Co-Investigating Judges two Introductory Submissions opening judicial investigations into various crimes in Cases 003 and 004. These submissions named a total of five (5) suspects who the Co-Prosecutor believes are responsible for the alleged crimes and fall within the jurisdiction of the ECCC. Under the ECCC Internal Rules, the Co-Investigating Judges are required to investigate the criminal allegations contained in these submissions.

The Case 003 Introductory Submission addresses alleged crimes of murder, extermination, torture, unlawful imprisonment, enslavement, persecution and other inhumane acts. If proven, these acts would constitute crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code.

Crimes required to be judicially investigated as part of Case 003 took place at several crime sites and criminal episodes covered by Case 002, including the S-21 Security Centre, the Kampong Chhnang Airport Construction Site, purges of the East, Central and New North Zones, and incursions into Vietnam, as well as the following new crime sites and criminal episodes:

(1) S-22 Security Centre in the Phnom Penh area;

(2) Wat Eng Tea Nhien Security Centre in Kampong Som Province;

(3) Stung Hav Rock Quarry forced labour site in Kampong Som Province;

(4) Capture of foreign nationals off the coast of Cambodia and their unlawful imprisonment, transfer to S-21 or murder; and

(5) Security centres operated in Rattanakiri Province.

On 29 April 2011, the Office of the Co-Prosecutors received notification that the Co-Investigating Judges considered the investigation in Case 003 to be concluded. Having carefully reviewed the Case File, the International Co-Prosecutor intends to request further investigative actions regarding the alleged crimes, within the 15 day period specified in ECCC Internal Rule 66 (1). Among other things, the International Co-Prosecutor will request the Co-Investigating Judges to:

1. Summon and question the suspects named in the Case File 003 Introductory Submission, and notify them that they are under investigation;
2. Interview additional individuals who have been identified as potential witnesses thus far;
3. Interview or re-interview witnesses identified in Case File 002, focusing on the specific allegations contained in the Case File 003 Introductory Submission;
4. Examine further the crime sites (including by searching for mass grave locations);
5. Place additional evidence on the Case File, including by transferring further evidence from Case File 002 to Case File 003; and
6. Further investigate the involvement of the Case 003 suspects in the crimes, including the transfer of prisoners under their control to S-21, their receipt of “confessions” taken from prisoners murdered at S-21, and their involvement in further arrests.

The International Co-Prosecutor will request these actions as he is of the view that the crimes alleged in the Introductory Submission have not been fully investigated. He has a legal obligation under the Internal Rules and the Law of the ECCC to identify and request all reasonable investigative actions which should be taken by the Co-Investigating Judges before a decision is made as to the whether or not any individuals should be indicted and sent for trial.

Notification to Potential Civil Parties in Case File 003

Pursuant to Internal Rule 23bis, individuals who wish to apply to become Civil Parties in Case File 003 must submit applications no later than 15 days from the date on which the Co-Investigating Judges notified the Co-Prosecutors that they consider the investigation to be concluded. Applying the relevant legal provisions, the International Co-Prosecutor is of the view that the deadline for Civil Party applications now falls on Wednesday, 18 May 2011 at 4 pm.

Considering that the crime sites under investigation have not previously been made public, the International Co-Prosecutor will request the Co-Investigating Judges to extend the deadline for a further six weeks in order to allow reasonable time for victims to submit Civil Party applications. However, at present, the only guarantee that a Civil Party application will be considered by the Co-Investigating Judges is by having it filed by 18 May 2011 at 4.00pm. In the event that the Co-Investigating Judges extend the deadline the public will be notified.

Under Internal Rule 23bis (1) and Article 3.2 of the Practice Direction on Victim Participation, a victim is defined as a natural person or legal entity that has suffered physical, material or psychological injury as a direct consequence of at least one of the alleged crimes.

Victims wishing to apply should contact the ECCC Victims Support Section, fill out and file a Victim Information Form this week. The office is open Monday to Friday except on public holidays. The address is:

Victims Support Section, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
National Road 4
Chaom Chau, Dangkao
PO Box 71
Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Town office:
House No. 6A
Street 21, Sangkat Tonle Basac I, Khan Chamcarmon
Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Phone: 023 214 291; or 097 742 4218 (helpline)

Notification to Potential Complainants in Case File 003

Individuals in possession of information regarding the crimes under investigation may submit that information to the Co-Prosecutors. Under Rule 49 (2), complaints or information may be lodged with the Co-Prosecutors by any person, organisation or other source who witnessed or was a victim of the alleged crimes, or who has knowledge of the alleged crimes.

Rule 49 places on the Co-Prosecutors an ongoing duty to evaluate complaints or information alleging commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ECCC. Where the Co-Prosecutors receive complaints or information relevant to an ongoing judicial investigation, they may forward such complaints or information to the Co-Investigating Judges to be placed on the case file as evidence. Complaints or information may be submitted through the Victims Support Section, or to the Office of the Co-Prosecutors directly. While there is no specified deadline for the filing of complaints, the International Co-Prosecutor encourages victims or witnesses who wish to make a complaint about the crimes described in Case File 003 to do so as soon as possible.

____________________________________

10 May 2011
PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE NATIONAL CO-PROSECUTOR REGARDING CASE FILE 003

The National Co-Prosecutor, CHEA Leang, makes this public statement pursuant to ECCC Internal Rule 54 regarding Case File 003.

In view of the first preliminary investigation by the International Co-Prosecutor and the latest investigation leading to the closure of investigation by the Co-Investigating Judges, the National Co-Prosecutor thoroughly examined and maintained that the suspects mentioned the Case File 003 were not either senior leaders or those who were most responsible during the period of Democratic Kampuchea.

In accordance with the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (the “ECCC Law”) and the preamble of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (“UN-RGC Agreement”) dated 18 December 2002 and the recognition by the United Nations General Assembly of the legitimate concern of the Royal Government of Cambodia and the people of Cambodia in the pursuit of justice and national reconciliation, stability, peace and security, the selection of two categories of suspects were made: senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of the Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.

Further, the National Co-Prosecutor opines that priorities should be given to the prosecution of the Accused in the custody of the ECCC Detention Facility. In light of the UN-RGC Agreement and the ECCC Law that envisaged the prosecution of a limited number of people.

For the reasons given, the National Co-Prosecutor maintains that the named suspects in Case File 003 do not fall within the jurisdiction of the ECCC to be brought to trial and that the Tribunal’s mandate can be adequately fulfilled through the prosecution of the Accused persons in the ECCC Detention Facility.

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11 May 2011
Press Release
Chief of Public Affairs of the ECCC passed away

Further to the press release earlier today, we sadly confirm that Mr. Reach Sambath, Chief of the Public Affairs Section of the ECCC, passed away at 8:45 pm at the Calmet Hospital. He was 47 and survived by his wife and 3 childrens.

Our deep condolences lie with his family at this difficult time.

For more information, please contact:
Lars Olsen
Legal Communications Officer
Mobile: +855 (0) 12 488 023
Land line: +855 (0) 23 219 814 ext. 6169
Email: olsenl@un.org

Dim Sovannarom
Press Officer
Mobile: +855 (0) 12 488 094
Email: dim.sovannarom@eccc.gov.kh

Yuko Maeda
Public Affairs Officer
Mobile: +855 (0) 12 488 319
Land line: +855 (0) 23 219 814 ext. 6139
Email: maeday@un.org

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Cayley in the crosshairs

2011-05-22T16:19:00.001-07:00

FRIDAY, 13 MAY 2011 15:03 JAMES O’TOOLE

The Khmer Rouge tribunal’s investigating judges are considering initiating contempt-of-court proceedings against British co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley, a move observers said would deal a potentially critical blow to the reputation of a court already hobbled by allegations of political interference.

A source at the court said yesterday that co-investigating judges Siegfried Blunk and You Bunleng were “seriously” considering the move in relation to Cayley’s disclosure earlier this week of details of their investigation in the court’s third case.

The judges announced the conclusion of this investigation last month, though they provided no details about the case to the public, including the crime sites being investigated and the identities of the suspects, over the course of their work.

On Monday, Cayley therefore took the unique step of issuing his own statement detailing crime sites in the investigation and inviting victims to join the case as civil parties, as the judges had not done.

As he is permitted to do under court rules, Cayley also said he would request that the judges perform a series of additional – and seemingly basic – investigative steps in the case that had not been undertaken. These steps included the examination of potential crime scenes and the interviewing of the suspects, who were not even questioned by the judges over the 20 months that the investigation was open.

The identities of these suspects remain officially confidential, though court documents reveal them as former KR navy commander Meas Muth and air force commander Sou Met.

Yesterday, it emerged that rather than focusing their energies on these two former cadres, the judges were instead contemplating the initiation of contempt-of-court proceedings against Cayley himself.

“These proceedings are being seriously considered by the co-investigating judges,” a source at the court said yesterday, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

Under the rules of the tribunal, the judges may handle such proceedings internally or refer the matter to domestic authorities or the United Nations. The potential penalty facing Cayley was thus unclear yesterday, though any punishment handed down against him would almost certainly result in his departure from the court.

United Nations court spokesman Lars Olsen said yesterday that he had no information on the matter.

“The general principle is that the court will never make a comment about whether or not it is considering certain judicial decision,” he said.

Case 003 and the still-pending Case 004 have run up against stiff opposition from Cambodian officials, with Prime Minister Hun Sen declaring last year that they “will not be allowed”. The
limited investigation in the third case and the concealment of information about it has fuelled allegations that the judges have planned its dismissal in advance in the face of such pressure.

Proceedings against Cayley could have a potentially devastating impact on the legacy of a court set up with the goal of providing a model to the Cambodian justice system, said Clair Duffy, a trial monitor with the Open Society Justice Initiative.

“The really concerning thing about this kind of action is what it says about the potential repercussions for someone fulfilling an obligation and acting independently,” she said. “The example is that someone seeking to act with integrity but running contrary to political whims will be punished.”

Copyright © 2011 The Phnom Penh Post. All Rights Reserved.

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http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/frequently-asked-questions-about-case-003

Frequently asked questions about Case 003
Posted 3 days ago Updated 3 days ago
This document has been prepared by the ECCC Public Affairs Section for the purpose of providing the general public information about the ongoing judicial proceedings. It is not an official document.

What does it mean when the Co-Investigating Judges issued a notice of conclusion of investigation in Case 003?
The issuance of a notice of conclusion of investigation is a procedural step, where the Co-Investigating judges formally notify the parties and the public that they consider the investigation initiated by the Co-Prosecutors Introductory Submission to be concluded.

Any victim who wishes to apply to become a civil party must submit an application within 15 days after the notice of conclusion of investigation. With regards to Case 003 the deadline is 18 May 2011.

Does the notice of conclusion mean that the case is closed, and that a decision on whether or not the case will be sent for trial has been made?
No, the notice is a procedural step, not a substantive judicial decision. Following the notice of conclusion of investigation, the Co-Prosecutors have 15 days to request any further investigative action they may deem necessary.

If the Co-Prosecutors request further investigative action, the Co-Investigating Judges must either carry out the requested investigative action or reject the request through a reasoned judicial decision.

What happens if the Co-Investigative Judges reject request(s) for further investigative action?
The Co-Prosecutors can appeal a rejection from the Co-Investigating Judges to the Pre-Trial Chamber within 30 days after a decision has been made by the Co-Investigating Judges.

The Pre-Trial Chamber has through its jurisprudence established that Co-Investigating Judges have broad discretion to decide requests for investigative actions, and the Pre-Trial Chamber can only overturn their decision if the appellant can demonstrate that the decision made by the Co-Investigating Judges was based on grave errors .

What happens after requests for investigative actions have been carried out or rejected, or in case of appeals, when all appeals have been decided by the Pre-Trial Chamber?
The Co-Investigating Judges will transfer the case file to the Co-Prosecutors, who will have 3 months to make their Final Submission to the Co-Investigating Judges. The Co-Prosecutors may in their Final Submission either request the Co-Investigating Judges to make indictments and send a case for trial, or to dismiss the case.

What happens after the Co-Prosecutors have made their Final Submission?
The Co-Investigating Judges, who are not bound by recommendations in the Co-Prosecutors’ Final Submission, will issue a Closing Order. By definition, the Closing Order could be an Indictment sending the case for trial or a Dismissal Order, which would close the case.

Is there any possibility to appeal the Closing Order?
Yes, the Co-Prosecutors can appeal both kinds of Closing Orders to the Pre-Trial Chamber.

Why have the Co-Investigating Judges not provided more information to the public about Case 003?
Investigations before the ECCC are confidential by law. This is to protect both the integrity of the investigation, and to protect the presumption of innocence.

The legal system applied at the ECCC is based on a two-tiered system:
1. The investigations are confidential
2. If the investigations lead to indictments and trial, the trial will be conducted in public.

How can the public trust that the investigation is credible and impartial when only limited public information has been made available?
Investigations are confidential by law and the sole responsibility of the Investigating Judges. The public has no say in the investigations, and the public is not party to them. The Co-Prosecutors, representing the public interest, have as a party to the investigation an ample opportunity to examine whether the investigations were “credible and impartial” after the case has been forwarded to them, which has to be done on 2 occasions (during one of them, they can examine the investigations for a full 3 months before making their Final Submission).

When the whole investigative process has been completed, the Co-Investigating Judges will issue a Closing Order, which will either send the case for trial, or dismiss the case for lack of evidence or jurisdiction. The Closing Order will be a reasoned judicial decision, which will be made public. This way anyone can scrutinize and assess the work conducted by the Co-Investigating Judges.

In Case 002, information on the scope of investigation was released prior to the notice of conclusion of investigation. Why was no information on the scope of the investigation in Case 003 released before the notice of conclusion of investigation?
The situation in Case 003 is different to that in Case 002. By the time the scope of the investigation in Case 002 was made public, all defendants had been arrested and charged with crimes, and the investigation had been ongoing for more than two years while the defendants were held in provisional detention. In such a situation the Co-Investigating Judges found that to release limited information about the scope of investigation would not compromise the investigation.

In Case 003 no one has at this point been formally charged with crimes or been arrested. Consequently, it would be difficult to make public the scope of investigation without incurring the risk of compromising the future legal process of this case.

Are the names of alleged suspects in Cases 003 and 004 reported in media correct?
By law, it is only the Co-Investigating Judges who can release information about the investigation to the public, including the name of defendants. The Co-Investigating Judges are the only official channel of information, so any other information alleged by named persons or anonymous sources should not be treated as facts.

The names of the alleged suspects in Case 003 and 004 reported in the media are therefore speculative.

Why has the ECCC not actively invited Civil Parties to submit their applications in Case 003?
The experience from Case 002 showed that a substantive number of the Civil Party applicants were deemed by the Co-Investigating Judges to fall outside of the scope of investigation, and hence their applications were rejected. Most of the rejected Civil Party Applications had been filed before the scope of the investigation had been made public.

Since the scope of investigation in Case 003 at this point has not been made public, it would be a risk that most Civil Party Applications filed would fall outside of the scope of the investigation. To encourage the filing of Civil Party Applications in a situation as such, could potentially lead to the creation of unrealistic expectations for victims who might want to file an application to become a Civil Party.

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9 May 2011

PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL CO-PROSECUTOR

REGARDING CASE FILE 003

The International Co-Prosecutor, Andrew Cayley, makes this public statement pursuant to ECCC Internal Rule 54, to ensure that the public is duly informed about ongoing ECCC proceedings, and in particular with regard to the International Co-Prosecutor’s Introductory Submission in Case File 003. In providing this information the interests of victims and witnesses, the rights of suspects, and the requirements of the investigation have been taken into account, as required under the Rules.

Following directions given by the Pre-Trial Chamber, on 7 September 2009, the International Co-Prosecutor submitted to the Co-Investigating Judges two Introductory Submissions opening judicial investigations into various crimes in Cases 003 and 004. These submissions named a total of five (5) suspects who the Co-Prosecutor believes are responsible for the alleged crimes and fall within the jurisdiction of the ECCC. Under the ECCC Internal Rules, the Co-Investigating Judges are required to investigate the criminal allegations contained in these submissions.

The Case 003 Introductory Submission addresses alleged crimes of murder, extermination, torture, unlawful imprisonment, enslavement, persecution and other inhumane acts. If proven, these acts would constitute crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code.

Crimes required to be judicially investigated as part of Case 003 took place at several crime sites and criminal episodes covered by Case 002, including the S-21 Security Centre, the Kampong Chhnang Airport Construction Site, purges of the East, Central and New North Zones, and incursions into Vietnam, as well as the following new crime sites and criminal episodes:

(1) S-22 Security Centre in the Phnom Penh area;

(2) Wat Eng Tea Nhien Security Centre in Kampong Som Province;

(3) Stung Hav Rock Quarry forced labour site in Kampong Som Province;

(4) Capture of foreign nationals off the coast of Cambodia and their unlawful imprisonment, transfer to S-21 or murder; and

(5) Security centres operated in Rattanakiri Province.

On 29 April 2011, the Office of the Co-Prosecutors received notification that the Co-Investigating Judges considered the investigation in Case 003 to be concluded. Having carefully reviewed the Case File, the International Co-Prosecutor intends to request further investigative actions regarding the alleged crimes, within the 15 day period specified in ECCC Internal Rule 66 (1). Among other things, the International Co-Prosecutor will request the Co-Investigating Judges to:

1. Summon and question the suspects named in the Case File 003 Introductory Submission, and notify them that they are under investigation;
2. Interview additional individuals who have been identified as potential witnesses thus far;
3. Interview or re-interview witnesses identified in Case File 002, focusing on the specific allegations contained in the Case File 003 Introductory Submission;
4. Examine further the crime sites (including by searching for mass grave locations);
5. Place additional evidence on the Case File, including by transferring further evidence from Case File 002 to Case File 003; and
6. Further investigate the involvement of the Case 003 suspects in the crimes, including the transfer of prisoners under their control to S-21, their receipt of “confessions” taken from prisoners murdered at S-21, and their involvement in further arrests.

The International Co-Prosecutor will request these actions as he is of the view that the crimes alleged in the Introductory Submission have not been fully investigated. He has a legal obligation under the Internal Rules and the Law of the ECCC to identify and request all reasonable investigative actions which should be taken by the Co-Investigating Judges before a decision is made as to the whether or not any individuals should be indicted and sent for trial.

Notification to Potential Civil Parties in Case File 003

Pursuant to Internal Rule 23bis, individuals who wish to apply to become Civil Parties in Case File 003 must submit applications no later than 15 days from the date on which the Co-Investigating Judges notified the Co-Prosecutors that they consider the investigation to be concluded. Applying the relevant legal provisions, the International Co-Prosecutor is of the view that the deadline for Civil Party applications now falls on Wednesday, 18 May 2011 at 4 pm.

Considering that the crime sites under investigation have not previously been made public, the International Co-Prosecutor will request the Co-Investigating Judges to extend the deadline for a further six weeks in order to allow reasonable time for victims to submit Civil Party applications. However, at present, the only guarantee that a Civil Party application will be considered by the Co-Investigating Judges is by having it filed by 18 May 2011 at 4.00pm. In the event that the Co-Investigating Judges extend the deadline the public will be notified.

Under Internal Rule 23bis (1) and Article 3.2 of the Practice Direction on Victim Participation, a victim is defined as a natural person or legal entity that has suffered physical, material or psychological injury as a direct consequence of at least one of the alleged crimes.

Victims wishing to apply should contact the ECCC Victims Support Section, fill out and file a Victim Information Form this week. The office is open Monday to Friday except on public holidays. The address is:

Victims Support Section, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
National Road 4
Chaom Chau, Dangkao
PO Box 71
Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Town office:
House No. 6A
Street 21, Sangkat Tonle Basac I, Khan Chamcarmon
Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Phone: 023 214 291; or 097 742 4218 (helpline)

Notification to Potential Complainants in Case File 003

Individuals in possession of information regarding the crimes under investigation may submit that information to the Co-Prosecutors. Under Rule 49 (2), complaints or information may be lodged with the Co-Prosecutors by any person, organisation or other source who witnessed or was a victim of the alleged crimes, or who has knowledge of the alleged crimes.

Rule 49 places on the Co-Prosecutors an ongoing duty to evaluate complaints or information alleging commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ECCC. Where the Co-Prosecutors receive complaints or information relevant to an ongoing judicial investigation, they may forward such complaints or information to the Co-Investigating Judges to be placed on the case file as evidence. Complaints or information may be submitted through the Victims Support Section, or to the Office of the Co-Prosecutors directly. While there is no specified deadline for the filing of complaints, the International Co-Prosecutor encourages victims or witnesses who wish to make a complaint about the crimes described in Case File 003 to do so as soon as possible.

____________________________________

10 May 2011
PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE NATIONAL CO-PROSECUTOR REGARDING CASE FILE 003

The National Co-Prosecutor, CHEA Leang, makes this public statement pursuant to ECCC Internal Rule 54 regarding Case File 003.

In view of the first preliminary investigation by the International Co-Prosecutor and the latest investigation leading to the closure of investigation by the Co-Investigating Judges, the National Co-Prosecutor thoroughly examined and maintained that the suspects mentioned the Case File 003 were not either senior leaders or those who were most responsible during the period of Democratic Kampuchea.

In accordance with the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (the “ECCC Law”) and the preamble of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (“UN-RGC Agreement”) dated 18 December 2002 and the recognition by the United Nations General Assembly of the legitimate concern of the Royal Government of Cambodia and the people of Cambodia in the pursuit of justice and national reconciliation, stability, peace and security, the selection of two categories of suspects were made: senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of the Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.

Further, the National Co-Prosecutor opines that priorities should be given to the prosecution of the Accused in the custody of the ECCC Detention Facility. In light of the UN-RGC Agreement and the ECCC Law that envisaged the prosecution of a limited number of people.

For the reasons given, the National Co-Prosecutor maintains that the named suspects in Case File 003 do not fall within the jurisdiction of the ECCC to be brought to trial and that the Tribunal’s mandate can be adequately fulfilled through the prosecution of the Accused persons in the ECCC Detention Facility.

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11 May 2011
Press Release
Chief of Public Affairs of the ECCC passed away

Further to the press release earlier today, we sadly confirm that Mr. Reach Sambath, Chief of the Public Affairs Section of the ECCC, passed away at 8:45 pm at the Calmet Hospital. He was 47 and survived by his wife and 3 childrens.

Our deep condolences lie with his family at this difficult time.

For more information, please contact:
Lars Olsen
Legal Communications Officer
Mobile: +855 (0) 12 488 023
Land line: +855 (0) 23 219 814 ext. 6169
Email: olsenl@un.org

Dim Sovannarom
Press Officer
Mobile: +855 (0) 12 488 094
Email: dim.sovannarom@eccc.gov.kh

Yuko Maeda
Public Affairs Officer
Mobile: +855 (0) 12 488 319
Land line: +855 (0) 23 219 814 ext. 6139
Email: maeday@un.org

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Frequently asked questions about Case 003

2011-05-22T16:16:00.000-07:00

This document has been prepared by the ECCC Public Affairs Section for the purpose of providing the general public information about the ongoing judicial proceedings. It is not an official document.

What does it mean when the Co-Investigating Judges issued a notice of conclusion of investigation in Case 003?
The issuance of a notice of conclusion of investigation is a procedural step, where the Co-Investigating judges formally notify the parties and the public that they consider the investigation initiated by the Co-Prosecutors Introductory Submission to be concluded.

Any victim who wishes to apply to become a civil party must submit an application within 15 days after the notice of conclusion of investigation. With regards to Case 003 the deadline is 18 May 2011.

Does the notice of conclusion mean that the case is closed, and that a decision on whether or not the case will be sent for trial has been made?
No, the notice is a procedural step, not a substantive judicial decision. Following the notice of conclusion of investigation, the Co-Prosecutors have 15 days to request any further investigative action they may deem necessary.

If the Co-Prosecutors request further investigative action, the Co-Investigating Judges must either carry out the requested investigative action or reject the request through a reasoned judicial decision.

What happens if the Co-Investigative Judges reject request(s) for further investigative action?
The Co-Prosecutors can appeal a rejection from the Co-Investigating Judges to the Pre-Trial Chamber within 30 days after a decision has been made by the Co-Investigating Judges.

The Pre-Trial Chamber has through its jurisprudence established that Co-Investigating Judges have broad discretion to decide requests for investigative actions, and the Pre-Trial Chamber can only overturn their decision if the appellant can demonstrate that the decision made by the Co-Investigating Judges was based on grave errors .

What happens after requests for investigative actions have been carried out or rejected, or in case of appeals, when all appeals have been decided by the Pre-Trial Chamber?
The Co-Investigating Judges will transfer the case file to the Co-Prosecutors, who will have 3 months to make their Final Submission to the Co-Investigating Judges. The Co-Prosecutors may in their Final Submission either request the Co-Investigating Judges to make indictments and send a case for trial, or to dismiss the case.

What happens after the Co-Prosecutors have made their Final Submission?
The Co-Investigating Judges, who are not bound by recommendations in the Co-Prosecutors’ Final Submission, will issue a Closing Order. By definition, the Closing Order could be an Indictment sending the case for trial or a Dismissal Order, which would close the case.

Is there any possibility to appeal the Closing Order?
Yes, the Co-Prosecutors can appeal both kinds of Closing Orders to the Pre-Trial Chamber.

Why have the Co-Investigating Judges not provided more information to the public about Case 003?
Investigations before the ECCC are confidential by law. This is to protect both the integrity of the investigation, and to protect the presumption of innocence.

The legal system applied at the ECCC is based on a two-tiered system:
1. The investigations are confidential
2. If the investigations lead to indictments and trial, the trial will be conducted in public.

How can the public trust that the investigation is credible and impartial when only limited public information has been made available?
Investigations are confidential by law and the sole responsibility of the Investigating Judges. The public has no say in the investigations, and the public is not party to them. The Co-Prosecutors, representing the public interest, have as a party to the investigation an ample opportunity to examine whether the investigations were “credible and impartial” after the case has been forwarded to them, which has to be done on 2 occasions (during one of them, they can examine the investigations for a full 3 months before making their Final Submission).

When the whole investigative process has been completed, the Co-Investigating Judges will issue a Closing Order, which will either send the case for trial, or dismiss the case for lack of evidence or jurisdiction. The Closing Order will be a reasoned judicial decision, which will be made public. This way anyone can scrutinize and assess the work conducted by the Co-Investigating Judges.

In Case 002, information on the scope of investigation was released prior to the notice of conclusion of investigation. Why was no information on the scope of the investigation in Case 003 released before the notice of conclusion of investigation?
The situation in Case 003 is different to that in Case 002. By the time the scope of the investigation in Case 002 was made public, all defendants had been arrested and charged with crimes, and the investigation had been ongoing for more than two years while the defendants were held in provisional detention. In such a situation the Co-Investigating Judges found that to release limited information about the scope of investigation would not compromise the investigation.

In Case 003 no one has at this point been formally charged with crimes or been arrested. Consequently, it would be difficult to make public the scope of investigation without incurring the risk of compromising the future legal process of this case.

Are the names of alleged suspects in Cases 003 and 004 reported in media correct?
By law, it is only the Co-Investigating Judges who can release information about the investigation to the public, including the name of defendants. The Co-Investigating Judges are the only official channel of information, so any other information alleged by named persons or anonymous sources should not be treated as facts.

The names of the alleged suspects in Case 003 and 004 reported in the media are therefore speculative.

Why has the ECCC not actively invited Civil Parties to submit their applications in Case 003?
The experience from Case 002 showed that a substantive number of the Civil Party applicants were deemed by the Co-Investigating Judges to fall outside of the scope of investigation, and hence their applications were rejected. Most of the rejected Civil Party Applications had been filed before the scope of the investigation had been made public.

Since the scope of investigation in Case 003 at this point has not been made public, it would be a risk that most Civil Party Applications filed would fall outside of the scope of the investigation. To encourage the filing of Civil Party Applications in a situation as such, could potentially lead to the creation of unrealistic expectations for victims who might want to file an application to become a Civil Party.

Search the Site© 2011 ECCC (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia)
National Road 4, Chaom Chau Commune, Dangkao District, Phnom Penh
P.O. BOX 71, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: (855) 23 219 814 | Fax: (855) 23 219 841
Email: info@eccc.gov.kh
Webmail: Sign in (staff only) [ + ] Feedback
----------------

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Renowned Cambodian journalist Reach Sambath passes away after a long and distinguished career

2011-05-22T16:13:00.000-07:00

Reach Sambath, 1964-2011
May 12, 2011
By Luke Hunt

As a war correspondent, Reach Sambath was among the bravest. Throughout the 1990s, he earned his stripes as the journalist ‘who got on the chopper first’ when Cambodia’s warring factions went into battle. Later on, he emerged alongside his most affable compatriots as his country began stitching together a peace. Sambath, sadly, passed away Wednesday after a massive stroke. He was 47 (we think).

When I began as bureau chief for Agence France-Presse (AFP) in Cambodia on July 1, 2001, Sambath’s exploits had already lent him an air of superiority. With his great friend Ker Munthit at Associated Press, the pair had formed the formidable local backbone of the international press corps in Cambodia. They survived the Khmer Rouge, and got themselves educated in Cambodia and abroad before going on to tell the noble truth.

By the time I arrived, Sambath had just returned from the United States where he had completed a scholarship for advanced journalists at Columbia University. He held the best contact book in Cambodia and a love for the job that was unsurpassed, matched only by the size of his big Khmer heart.

On only our third day on the job together, a bomb was detonated inside the Hong Kong Hotel on Monivong Boulevard. It was a wet and miserable day and Monivong was then a bog of red clay. We arrived just minutes before a second bomb went off about 130 feet away.

Sambath didn’t flinch as others dropped into the mud. Fastidiously clean, the idea of ruining a perfectly pressed shirt just wasn’t acceptable to him. Two people were dead and another seven wounded. Quickly and calmly, Sambath led our small group to shelter in case there was a third bomb.

Such stories were common among my predecessors Matthew Lee, who helped build the roof on Sambath’s family home, and Sheri Prasso, who initially hired him back in 1992.

That calmness, however, often masked a heightened sensitivity.

At times, Sambath was deeply frustrated by the asinine coverage of Cambodia that was occasionally offered by journalists looking for a sensational headline to please an editor and a by-line from the Killing Fields to appease his or her ego.

The same could be said for editors in Hong Kong and Bangkok, who liked to think Cambodia was simply an extension of Thai foreign policy and were prone to making horribly wrong assumptions. That thinking is evident in the coverage of the conflict at Preah Vihear today. They lacked respect.

Sambath even once chided Hun Sen for not giving him enough respect. They met for the first time after his return from the United States and Sambath told me within earshot of a standoffish prime minister: ‘He thinks I’ve been tainted by foreign influences.’

Nothing could have been further from the truth.

Sambath could be prickly as he juggled a family life with the hard and fast dictates of a wire service while also moonlighting as a university lecturer and for some of the world’s great mastheads.

His favourite gigs were with Seth Mydans at The New York Times, although the list of journalists with whom he shared a cold beer, many more laughs and his political insights, was endless. Among them: Michael Hayes, Hurley Scroggins and Seth Meixner—all of The Phnom Penh Post at some point—and The Cambodia Daily’s long-serving editor, Kevin Doyle.

In the early days, the idea of a Khmer Rouge tribunal scared Sambath. He wasn’t opposed to the idea of justice—both his parents were killed by Pol Pot, and he loathed the Khmer Rouge who orphaned him. As a result, I don’t think Sambath ever knew his real birthday or his true age.

This is a point too often lost on Cambodians who grew up abroad, and long time observers whose incessant and sometimes hysterical demands of the tribunal to deliver on their sense of justice scare the daylights out of the very people they claim to represent.

Sambath genuinely feared a tribunal would lead his devastated country back to war, and revenge was never in his book. He spent a disproportionate amount of his time getting journalists out of trouble and was the only person I knew who could calm and cajole an irate Hok Lundy, the much feared bully and former National Police Commissioner.

His attitude to the tribunal, like many Cambodians, did eventually change after years of arduous negotiations evolved into the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the surviving leaders of Pol Pot’s 1975-79 rule were charged and remanded. In time, Sambath warmed to the ECCC and eventually embraced it whole-heartedly.

He would leave AFP and work an array of media institutions including the New York-based Independent Journalism Foundation, before joining the ECCC as Case 001 got underway with Kaing Guek Eav, also known as Duch, in the dock.

As the fortunes of justice fluctuated, Sambath rose to the occasion, serving the courts as chief of public affairs. I will always cherish the smile on Sambath’s face that day last year when Duch was found guilty and jailed for crimes against humanity and the extermination of his compatriots.

Sambath was a man of many moods, happiest and best when taking charge of his students at the Royal University of Phnom Penh or spending an afternoon as host for the thousands of men and women who were trucked from remote kampongs to the ECCC, where they witnessed the trial process first hand.

In his final hours, doctors were preparing him for a medical evacuation to Thailand. But in the end, Sambath died where he belonged—in Cambodia. He leaves behind a wife, Chhoy Chanthy, three children—Champaradh, Rithvong and Samboreak—an indebted nation and a generation of young Cambodian journalists who he inspired. He was also my friend, and I will miss him.

http://the-diplomat.com/asean-beat/2011/05/12/reach-sambath-1964-2011/For inquiries, please contact The Diplomat at info@the-diplomat.com

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Why April's the right month for genocide awareness

2011-04-23T16:45:00.000-07:00

April 21, 2011

By Ellen J. Kennedy

It was in April 1915 that the Ottoman government began rounding up and murdering leading Armenian politicians, businessmen and intellectuals, a step that led to the extermination of more than a million Armenians.

In April 1933, the Nazis issued a decree paving the way for the "final solution," the annihilation of 6 million Jews of Europe.

In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge entered Cambodia's capital city and launched a four-year wave of violence, killing 2 million people.

In April 1992, the siege of Sarajevo began in Bosnia. It was the longest siege in modern history, and more than 10,000 people perished, including 1,500 children.

In April 1994, the plane carrying the president of Rwanda crashed and triggered the beginning of a genocide that killed more than 800,000 people in 100 days.

In April 2003, innocent civilians in Sudan's Darfur region were attacked; 400,000 have been killed and 2.5 million displaced in a genocide that continues today.

April is the cruelest month.

The world has witnessed nearly a century of genocides that all began in April. Millions of people perished; cultures were destroyed; communities and nations were ruined.

What can we do to pay tribute, to honor those who suffered unimaginable tragedy, and to prevent future atrocities?

This month, the Minnesota Legislature passed a remarkable resolution that designates April as Genocide Awareness and Prevention Month. The resolution was sponsored by DFLers and Republicans, men and women, legislators whose constituents include survivors and descendants of those who perished, and constituents whose families have lived peacefully in this country for generations.

More than 800 Minnesotans signed letters to their elected officials supporting this effort. What does it mean to have a month designated for genocide awareness and prevention?

Most people don't know much about genocide. The word didn't even exist until it was coined in the 1940s by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who fled from the Holocaust. Although he found refuge in the United States, his entire extended family, 49 in all, perished at Auschwitz.

Lemkin believed there had to be a word to describe what happened in Europe and a law to prevent its recurrence. He wrote the Genocide Convention, an international treaty to prevent the extermination of people based on their race, religion, ethnicity or national origin. This treaty, passed in the United Nations in 1948, wasn't ratified by our country until 1988, fully 40 years later, and then only through heroic efforts by the late Sen. William Proxmire of Wisconsin. Proxmire gave 3,211 speeches on the floor of the Senate, a speech a day for 19 years, urging passage of the Genocide Convention.

Even though we have the word to describe it, and the law to prevent and punish it, genocide continues. Genocide has no boundaries in time, geography or target. It has happened on every continent and to people of widely different backgrounds and identities. It can happen anywhere -- and everywhere.

In 2008, the United States Holocaust Museum, the American Academy of Diplomacy and the U.S. Institute for Peace convened a task force, headed by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, to outline strategies to prevent genocide. Their report included many recommendations, one of which is that education can help protect individual rights and promote a culture of lawfulness that will prevent future genocides.

We encourage organizations in faith, civic, educational and human rights communities to raise awareness about genocide. Show a film, host a speaker, meet with some of Minnesota's thousands of genocide survivors, or discuss a book such as "A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide," by Samantha Power.

These steps will increase awareness, the first part of this important state resolution. The second part is genocide prevention. Most people feel that preventing genocide is far beyond anything they can do as ordinary individuals. Yet it is exactly ordinary individuals who have the power to prevent genocide.

Former President Bill Clinton was in office during the tragedy in Rwanda. He said, after the genocide, that he probably could have saved a few hundred thousand lives. Imagine being able to say that you could have saved a few hundred thousand lives, or a few thousand, or a few hundred, or even one. Clinton said he did nothing because he didn't hear from a single one of our 100 senators in Washington, or a single one of the 435 representatives, asking him to take a stand. He didn't hear from them for a very simple reason: They didn't hear from us.

Each of us can create the political will to prevent genocide. Each of us can make sure that our elected officials know we want innocent people to be protected, wherever they are. Each of us can speak up.

April is the cruelest month. We must ensure that the list of April's genocides grows no longer.

----

Ellen Kennedy is the executive director of World Without Genocide at William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul.
Minnesota Public Radio ©2011 All rights reserved

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

THERE IS NO JUSTICE FOR MY FAMILY

2011-04-23T16:44:00.002-07:00

I continue to remember and hold close to my heart the events of 17 April 1975. At that time I was about 11 years old. My father was a government official in the Department of Cadastre of the Khmer Republic. He was a supporter of Sihanouk because he wanted to drive out the U.S. imperialists who invaded the country. My mother was a gem trader and my older brother and sister were students.

On the morning of 17 April 1975, while I was sitting on the stairs in front of my house watching my father fix his car, I heard the sound of an explosion and I saw smoke fluttering into the sky. Soon after, three soldiers dressed in black walked to my house and screamed for us to open the door of our gate. They said that if anyone did not listen, they would be shot and killed. One of the soldiers asked my father, “Were you a Lon Nol soldier?” My father told them, “I was not a soldier. I worked in the Department of Cadastre.” But these people did not even understand what the Department of Cadastre was. My father told them he acted as a hidden force, donating food and medicine to the movement. The soldiers nevertheless told him to prepare his belongings and a lot of food, because everyone in the city of Phnom Penh must evacuate for three days or longer.

When the soldiers left my house, the youngest removed his gun into the air and screamed out to all the residents in the area to leave within the day. At that time my father’s face became dark and he did not utter a word. I felt like I had no weight because I witnessed tears on my parent’s faces staring at one another. My neighbors began to gradually leave their homes. Within four or five hours, the area around my house became silent and deserted. Once in a while I saw the soldiers dressed in black holding soda or liquor bottles. They drank and laughed, one hand grabbing a bottle of liquor and the other waving a gun shooting anything they pleased.

In the morning, my family left in one car. We traveled without any idea of where we were going. We just followed others. If people stopped to rest somewhere, we also stopped and rested with them. If soldiers dressed in black pointed guns at us and forced us to continue our journey, we would continue our journey. From the outskirts to the rural areas there were corpses along the road.

Because of the events that passed on 17 April 1975, my family and hundreds and thousands of other families were forced to separate from each other. Nearly 3 million people were killed without reason. Among those killed were my parents and my brother and sister. Hundreds and thousands of orphans were left without any understanding of why their parents were killed or why they cannot remember their parents’ faces. Among all these orphans, I am also one.

Sampeou

** After the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime on 7 January 1979, more than two hundred thousands of children were left orphaned.

-------------------------

Look at the Day the Khmer Rouge Took Power
Kong Sothanarith, VOA Khmer | Phnom Penh Tuesday, 19 April 2011

Photo: AP
A Khmer Rouge rebel frisks a civilian in downtown Phnom Penh hours after the rebel forces led by Pol Pot took control of the Cambodian capital April 17, 1975.

The Documentation Center of Cambodia is preparing a permanent exhibition of photographs marking the day the Khmer Rouge took over Phnom Penh and began their devastating four-year rule 36 years ago.

Chhang Youk, director of the center, said the exhibition, which opens next Monday, is to remind people of the beginning of the Khmer Rouge atrocities.

The exhibition showcases 17 rare photographs taken by American photographer Al Rockoff and French photographer Roland Neveu.

The center receives between 600 and 800 visitors each month, Chhang Youk said, and the exhibit is meant to be a discussion point that provides a look back at Phnom Penh.

In the exhibition, one can see victorious Khmer Rouge soldiers, Lon Nol troops protecting the evacuation of the US Embassy, Phnom Penh residents leaving the city, and a woman who weeps near her dead husband on the side of the road, among other images of the day.

April 17, 1975, is annually marked as the day the Khmer Rouge took over, instituting ultra-communist policies that lead to the deaths of up to 2.2 million people.

This year, a survivor of the Tuol Sleng prison commemorated the day with a ceremony there, while members of the opposition visited the mass graves of the Choeung Ek execution site outside the city.

“Any activity to remember this day is necessary,” said Dim Sovannarom, a spokesman for the UN-backed Khmer Rouge tribunal. “And that’s why the [tribunal] is operational under its mission here to bring those responsible to trial.”

-------------------------

Former Khmer Rouge Recalls Fall of Phnom Penh
Kong Sothanarith, VOA Khmer | Phnom Penh Tuesday, 19 April 2011

Photo: by Chun Sakada
Him Huy, 54, a former Khmer Rouge soldier.

On April 17, 1975, Him Huy, an 18-year-old soldier within the Khmer Rouge revolution, found himself on Road 24, passing Kandal province’s Sa’ang district as part of a concerted attack on the capital, Phnom Penh.

“That day, all units and divisions came from every side into Phnom Penh,” Him Huy told “Hello VOA” Monday, recalling the day 36 years later. “Heavy weapons and light weapons both were used by Khmer Rouge in the attack.”

By the end of the day, the city had fallen to the revolution, and Year Zero had begun. Him Huy, who led a group of 12 soldiers into the city for the attack, would find himself assigned to a former high school the Khmer Rouge turned into a prison, S-21, or Tuol Sleng.

More than 12,000 people were tortured there and sent for execution at the nearby killing field of Cheoung Ek. Last year the UN-backed Khmer Rouge tribunal sentenced Duch, Him Huy’s supervisor, to a commuted 19 years in prison for crimes committed at the prison.

Now 54, Him Huy said Monday he had been recruited as a young man the year before the capital fell. He had joined, he said, to overthrow the US-backed regime of Marshall Lon Nol and to put Norodom Sihanouk back on the throne.

“Back then, people loved the king,” he said.

He’d rejoiced at the fall of Phnom Penh, he said.

“We knew that there would be no more war, and that we would not be killed,” he said. “Unfortunately, we didn’t know it had turned into a communist regime.”

The Khmer Rouge emptied the city, frightening residents by saying the US bombers were coming. “This is all that I knew,” he said.

In 1976 Him Huy was instated at the head of security guards at S-21, he said. He led arrests of “enemies” of the regime, he said, but it was Duch, or Kaing Kek Iev, who ordered their torture.

By that measure, he said, Duch deserved imprisonment of up to 40 years, with no deduction.

END.
Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

'Cambodia's Curse,' by Joel Brinkley

2011-04-23T16:44:00.001-07:00

Sunday, April 17, 2011

Cambodia's Curse
The Modern History of a Troubled Land
By Joel Brinkley
(PublicAffairs; 386 pages; $27.99)

This year Arab leaders have been caught off balance by their citizens, who have shown unexpected courage and come out in force to demand democracy and an end to corruption and cruel inequities. Those protests are proof that the truism that Arabs needed "strongmen" to rule them was wrong. In just weeks, the nonviolent demonstrators overthrew the ruling tyrants in Tunisia and Egypt, inspiring other uprisings in Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria. Now, no matter how these revolts play out, Arabs have broken out of racial and cultural stereotypes that said they were unfit for democracy.

In his new book "Cambodia's Curse," the former New York Times journalist Joel Brinkley comes very close to offering a similar dead-end theory to explain why he thinks the people of Cambodia are "cursed" by history to live under abusive tyrants. In his telling, Cambodians are passive Buddhists who have accepted their stern overlords since the days of the Angkor Empire. "Far more than almost any other state, modern Cambodia is a product of customs and practices set in stone a millennium ago," he writes, blaming that history for the ability of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to squash meaningful dissent against his corrupt regime.

As a young reporter, Brinkley won a Pulitzer Prize in 1980 for his coverage of the Cambodian refugee crisis. Returning to the region 30 years later, Brinkley - now a professor of journalism at Stanford - chose his subject well. Hun Sen deserves a thorough examination. Along with his cronies, he has amassed extraordinary wealth selling off the country's assets to the highest bidder. Everything is up for grabs - land wrested from peasants to be sold to corporations and turned into plantations or tourist resorts, young girls and boys sold into prostitution, and dense forests cut down and the lumber sold abroad. Corruption is everywhere. Underpaid schoolteachers demand bribes from their students, judges issue rulings based on the amount of money paid on the side or the dictates of the government, businesses flourish by paying handsome bribes for licenses and to avoid unwelcome regulations.

Brinkley admirably highlights nearly all of these crimes and demonstrates that Hun Sen's administration has been a disaster for many Cambodians. His portrait of the businessman Mong Reththy is a gem, showing how businessmen enrich themselves through corrupt government concessions and then underwrite charities or schools in the areas impoverished by their corruption.

Yet there are only two types of Cambodians in these pages - either victims (passive, poverty-stricken Cambodians for whom Brinkley shows great sympathy) or villains (cruel, selfish politicians and businessmen). Missing are normal Cambodians who work day jobs and study at night to get ahead; Cambodians who return from abroad with dreams of a better life; Cambodians who promote human rights or flourish in the arts and sciences. The few people painted in full, heroic strokes are American diplomats who served as ambassadors to Cambodia. Brinkley focuses on them and the foreign community of aid groups and governments who spend billions of dollars to improve the lives of Cambodia's poor. He correctly asks whether much of that money has gone to waste or into bank accounts of corrupt officials, and chastises foreign governments for not demanding real reforms for the aid.

Undermining his reporting is his thesis that thousand-year-old traditions are to blame for this state of affairs rather than 21st century realities. Brinkley fails to track the extraordinary sums of foreign investment fueling official corruption. Crooked signing bonuses and commissions, money laundering, selling off government land to foreign investors, human trafficking - these modern plagues are hardly confined to Cambodia. International businesses are pouring billions into Cambodia. China and South Korea are at the top of that list, giving them an outsize influence in Cambodia, yet they barely appear in Brinkley's book.

To retain control over all that money, Hun Sen has amassed a monopoly on power through the army and police, buying off or killing off dissidents. His path to power has been anything but democratic: Trained as a young Khmer Rouge officer, Hun Sen defected and was installed as prime minister by the Vietnamese occupiers; later he bullied the United Nations into appointing him a co-prime minister even though he lost the country's first election, then rigged subsequent elections.

Brinkley makes the blanket claim that Cambodians accept this because they are a people who "could not, would not, stand up and advocate for themselves," forgetting Cambodia's history of revolts or movements against French colonial rule, King Sihanouk's autocracy, the corrupt Lon Nol regime, the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam's occupation and Hun Sen himself. In more recent times, Chea Vichea led a free-trade union movement and became a serious challenger to Hun Sen's power until he was gunned down by thugs. Brink- ley mentions Vichea's murder in a short paragraph without fully describing his impact or the courage and skill he showed organizing Cambodia's textile workers.

And countless Cambodians have fought back when soldiers and police have thrown them off their lands. Cambodian activists like Dr. Pung Chhiv Kek have been so successful defending against human rights abuses that the government issued a draft law in December to effectively put them under government control. Brinkley might have also given greater weight to Cambodia's short experience with fully free elections and the legacy of the Khmer Rouge revolution, which could put a damper on anyone's desire to revolt again.

Further clouding his book are frequent errors. He describes the United Nations' 1993 peacekeeping operation as an "occupation," and then compares it unfavorably to the Allied occupation of Germany. He claims it is "rare to see Cambodians laugh." He confuses the Hindu faith with the Hindi language. He has China invading Vietnam in 1989, rather than in 1979. And why does he make the exaggerated claim that Cambodians are "the most abused people in the world"?

By arguing that Cambodians are passive and that the "Buddhist notion of individual helplessness" is a central factor holding them down, he dismisses the possibility that Cambodians could reform their own country. Instead he concludes that the country's best hope is in the hands of foreigners. He challenges the foreign governments to withhold aid money until Hun Sen lives up to his promises to enact reforms and respect human rights. "Maybe, just maybe, after 1,000 years, Cambodia's rulers might finally be forced to give the people their due," he writes.

Or maybe Hun Sen doesn't need that money so desperately and those donor governments are not such disinterested parties.

Brinkley may blame the legacy of Angkor kings for Hun Sen's ability to keep down Cambodians. But the Cambodian leader's recent actions suggest otherwise. When Egypt's Hosni Mu- barak started tottering under the demands of protesters, Hun Sen shut down the opposition websites in Cambodia.

Elizabeth Becker, a former correspondent for the New York Times and Washington Post, is the author of "When the War Was Over" (1986), a history of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge. E-mail comments to books@sfchronicle.com.
------------

TIME
One Nation Under a Hex
By Douglas Gillison

See: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2062366,00.html

------------------

http://www.akp.gov.kh/?p=5064

John McAuliff’s Letter to Editor of Washington Post

Phnom Penh, April 19, 2011 AKP –

Mr. John McAuliff, Executive Director of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development, sent on Monday a letter to the Editor of the Washington Post.

The full letter reads as follows:

“Cambodia has been the target of US conservatives and allies of opposition leader Sam Rainsy for many years. When the Republicans controlled Congress, tight restrictions were placed on US government assistance.

Cambodia is troubled by corruption and by the gulf between rich and poor, as are most countries in the region. However, it is a very different and far more developed place than during the first fifteen years after the Khmer Rouge were forced from power, having destroyed all of its modern economy and killed most of its educated people.

It has transformed itself economically and socially with a free press, a robust public forum and contested elections. The dominance of Hun Sen and the Cambodian People’s Party reflects in part a far more serious approach to governance and grass roots organization than manifested by their at least as ethically challenged rivals.

Most countries, including the US, require international and domestic NGOs to register and to file annual reports. In Cambodia, for unique historical reasons of dependency, they have enjoyed unusual leeway.

Mr. Brinkley no doubt believes sincerely that he is speaking on behalf of an exploited and dis-empowered population. I believe his solution is naive and judgmental and will do nothing but harm its intended beneficiaries. It would not be welcomed by serious international NGOs and development agencies that I came to know during some 50 visits since 1981.” –AKP

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/aid-to-cambodia-rarely-reaches-the-people-its-meant-to-help/2011/04/15/AF2JN8vD_print.html

Aid to Cambodia rarely reaches the people it’s meant to help
By Joel Brinkley, Sunday, April 17, 7:45 PM

Representatives of more than 3,000 governments and donor organizations are meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on Wednesday. If past experience is indicative, they will pledge to provide hundreds of millions in aid.

Most of these donors should simply stay home.

Year after year, smiling Cambodian government leaders attend these pledge conferences, holding out their hands. But first they have to listen as ambassadors and aid officers stand at the podium, look them in the eye, and lambast them for corruption and jaw-dropping human rights abuses.

Each year Prime Minister Hun Sen promises to reform. The donors nod and make their pledges — $1.1 billion last year. Then everyone goes home and nothing changes. In the following months, officials dip into the foreign aid accounts and build themselves mansions the size of small hotels, while 40 percent of Cambodia’s children grow up stunted for lack of nutrition during infancy.

This year should be different. Over the past two decades, the Cambodian government has grown ever more repressive. Now it is actually planning to bite the hand that feeds it: The legislature is enacting a law that would require nongovernmental organizations to register with the government, giving venal bureaucrats the ability to shut them down unless they become toadies of the state.

Eight major international human rights organizations are calling on Cambodia to back down, saying the bill is “the most significant threat to the country’s civil society in many years.” Donors, they say, should hold back their pledges. But they say that every year, and each year the donors ignore them. Meanwhile, the status of the Cambodian people the aid is supposed to help improves little if at all. Nearly 80 percent of Cambodians live in the countryside with no electricity, clean water, toilets, telephone service or other evidence of the modern world.

All of this might surprise most Americans. It has been decades since many people here have given Cambodia even a thought. Forty years ago, Cambodia was on the front pages almost every day as the United States bombed and briefly invaded the state during the Vietnam War. Then came the genocidal Khmer Rouge era, when 2 million people died.

How many know what has happened there since? Last month, the Nexis news-research service carried 6,335 stories with Thailand in the headline. Vietnam had 5,196. For Cambodia, 578.

Most people don’t know that Cambodians are ruled by a government that sells off the nation’s rice harvest each year and pockets the money, leaving its people without enough to eat. That it evicts thousands of people from their homes, burns down the houses, then dumps the victims into empty fields and sells their property to developers.

That it amasses vast personal fortunes while the nation’s average annual per capita income stands at $650. Or that it allows school teachers to demand daily bribes from 6-year-olds and doctors to extort money from dirt-poor patients, letting them die if they do not pay.

This is a government that stands by and watches as 75 percent of its citizens contract dysentery each year, and 10,000 die — largely because only 16 percent of Cambodians have access to a toilet. As Beat Richner, who runs children’s hospitals there, puts it, “the passive genocide continues.”

You wouldn’t know any of that from the donors’ behavior. You see, for foreigners Phnom Penh is a relatively pleasant place to live. Rents are cheap and household help is even cheaper. Espresso bars and stylish restaurants dot the river front — primarily for diplomats and aid workers.

Donors have largely been able to pursue whatever project they wanted without interference. They knew that the government would steal some of their money. But so what?

“Some money goes this way or that way,” said In Samrithy, an officer with a donor umbrella group. “But it’s useful if some of it reaches the poor. Not all of it does but some does. That’s better than nothing.”

Even with that, many donors feel the way Teruo Jinnai does. He’s the longtime head of the UNESCO office in Phnom Penh. “Here I have found my own passion,” he told me. “Here, I can set my own target. So that gives you more power, more energy, more passion.”

Well, Mr. Jinnai, the noose is tightening. If, as expected, the NGO bill becomes law, government repression will reach out for you, too. Isn’t it time, then, for all those donors to make a statement? On Wednesday stand up and tell the government: I am withholding my aid.

Joel Brinkley, a professor of journalism at Stanford University, is the author of “Cambodia’s Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land.”

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

One Nation Under a Hex

2011-04-23T16:43:00.001-07:00

By Douglas Gillison

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2062366,00.html

------------------

http://www.akp.gov.kh/?p=5064

John McAuliff’s Letter to Editor of Washington Post

Phnom Penh, April 19, 2011 AKP –

Mr. John McAuliff, Executive Director of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development, sent on Monday a letter to the Editor of the Washington Post.

The full letter reads as follows:

“Cambodia has been the target of US conservatives and allies of opposition leader Sam Rainsy for many years. When the Republicans controlled Congress, tight restrictions were placed on US government assistance.

Cambodia is troubled by corruption and by the gulf between rich and poor, as are most countries in the region. However, it is a very different and far more developed place than during the first fifteen years after the Khmer Rouge were forced from power, having destroyed all of its modern economy and killed most of its educated people.

It has transformed itself economically and socially with a free press, a robust public forum and contested elections. The dominance of Hun Sen and the Cambodian People’s Party reflects in part a far more serious approach to governance and grass roots organization than manifested by their at least as ethically challenged rivals.

Most countries, including the US, require international and domestic NGOs to register and to file annual reports. In Cambodia, for unique historical reasons of dependency, they have enjoyed unusual leeway.

Mr. Brinkley no doubt believes sincerely that he is speaking on behalf of an exploited and dis-empowered population. I believe his solution is naive and judgmental and will do nothing but harm its intended beneficiaries. It would not be welcomed by serious international NGOs and development agencies that I came to know during some 50 visits since 1981.” –AKP

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/aid-to-cambodia-rarely-reaches-the-people-its-meant-to-help/2011/04/15/AF2JN8vD_print.html

Aid to Cambodia rarely reaches the people it’s meant to help
By Joel Brinkley, Sunday, April 17, 7:45 PM

Representatives of more than 3,000 governments and donor organizations are meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on Wednesday. If past experience is indicative, they will pledge to provide hundreds of millions in aid.

Most of these donors should simply stay home.

Year after year, smiling Cambodian government leaders attend these pledge conferences, holding out their hands. But first they have to listen as ambassadors and aid officers stand at the podium, look them in the eye, and lambast them for corruption and jaw-dropping human rights abuses.

Each year Prime Minister Hun Sen promises to reform. The donors nod and make their pledges — $1.1 billion last year. Then everyone goes home and nothing changes. In the following months, officials dip into the foreign aid accounts and build themselves mansions the size of small hotels, while 40 percent of Cambodia’s children grow up stunted for lack of nutrition during infancy.

This year should be different. Over the past two decades, the Cambodian government has grown ever more repressive. Now it is actually planning to bite the hand that feeds it: The legislature is enacting a law that would require nongovernmental organizations to register with the government, giving venal bureaucrats the ability to shut them down unless they become toadies of the state.

Eight major international human rights organizations are calling on Cambodia to back down, saying the bill is “the most significant threat to the country’s civil society in many years.” Donors, they say, should hold back their pledges. But they say that every year, and each year the donors ignore them. Meanwhile, the status of the Cambodian people the aid is supposed to help improves little if at all. Nearly 80 percent of Cambodians live in the countryside with no electricity, clean water, toilets, telephone service or other evidence of the modern world.

All of this might surprise most Americans. It has been decades since many people here have given Cambodia even a thought. Forty years ago, Cambodia was on the front pages almost every day as the United States bombed and briefly invaded the state during the Vietnam War. Then came the genocidal Khmer Rouge era, when 2 million people died.

How many know what has happened there since? Last month, the Nexis news-research service carried 6,335 stories with Thailand in the headline. Vietnam had 5,196. For Cambodia, 578.

Most people don’t know that Cambodians are ruled by a government that sells off the nation’s rice harvest each year and pockets the money, leaving its people without enough to eat. That it evicts thousands of people from their homes, burns down the houses, then dumps the victims into empty fields and sells their property to developers.

That it amasses vast personal fortunes while the nation’s average annual per capita income stands at $650. Or that it allows school teachers to demand daily bribes from 6-year-olds and doctors to extort money from dirt-poor patients, letting them die if they do not pay.

This is a government that stands by and watches as 75 percent of its citizens contract dysentery each year, and 10,000 die — largely because only 16 percent of Cambodians have access to a toilet. As Beat Richner, who runs children’s hospitals there, puts it, “the passive genocide continues.”

You wouldn’t know any of that from the donors’ behavior. You see, for foreigners Phnom Penh is a relatively pleasant place to live. Rents are cheap and household help is even cheaper. Espresso bars and stylish restaurants dot the river front — primarily for diplomats and aid workers.

Donors have largely been able to pursue whatever project they wanted without interference. They knew that the government would steal some of their money. But so what?

“Some money goes this way or that way,” said In Samrithy, an officer with a donor umbrella group. “But it’s useful if some of it reaches the poor. Not all of it does but some does. That’s better than nothing.”

Even with that, many donors feel the way Teruo Jinnai does. He’s the longtime head of the UNESCO office in Phnom Penh. “Here I have found my own passion,” he told me. “Here, I can set my own target. So that gives you more power, more energy, more passion.”

Well, Mr. Jinnai, the noose is tightening. If, as expected, the NGO bill becomes law, government repression will reach out for you, too. Isn’t it time, then, for all those donors to make a statement? On Wednesday stand up and tell the government: I am withholding my aid.

Joel Brinkley, a professor of journalism at Stanford University, is the author of “Cambodia’s Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land.”

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

John McAuliff’s Letter to Editor of Washington Post

2011-04-23T16:41:00.000-07:00

Phnom Penh, April 19, 2011 AKP –

Mr. John McAuliff, Executive Director of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development, sent on Monday a letter to the Editor of the Washington Post.

The full letter reads as follows:

“Cambodia has been the target of US conservatives and allies of opposition leader Sam Rainsy for many years. When the Republicans controlled Congress, tight restrictions were placed on US government assistance.

Cambodia is troubled by corruption and by the gulf between rich and poor, as are most countries in the region. However, it is a very different and far more developed place than during the first fifteen years after the Khmer Rouge were forced from power, having destroyed all of its modern economy and killed most of its educated people.

It has transformed itself economically and socially with a free press, a robust public forum and contested elections. The dominance of Hun Sen and the Cambodian People’s Party reflects in part a far more serious approach to governance and grass roots organization than manifested by their at least as ethically challenged rivals.

Most countries, including the US, require international and domestic NGOs to register and to file annual reports. In Cambodia, for unique historical reasons of dependency, they have enjoyed unusual leeway.

Mr. Brinkley no doubt believes sincerely that he is speaking on behalf of an exploited and dis-empowered population. I believe his solution is naive and judgmental and will do nothing but harm its intended beneficiaries. It would not be welcomed by serious international NGOs and development agencies that I came to know during some 50 visits since 1981.” –AKP

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/aid-to-cambodia-rarely-reaches-the-people-its-meant-to-help/2011/04/15/AF2JN8vD_print.html

Aid to Cambodia rarely reaches the people it’s meant to help
By Joel Brinkley, Sunday, April 17, 7:45 PM

Representatives of more than 3,000 governments and donor organizations are meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on Wednesday. If past experience is indicative, they will pledge to provide hundreds of millions in aid.

Most of these donors should simply stay home.

Year after year, smiling Cambodian government leaders attend these pledge conferences, holding out their hands. But first they have to listen as ambassadors and aid officers stand at the podium, look them in the eye, and lambast them for corruption and jaw-dropping human rights abuses.

Each year Prime Minister Hun Sen promises to reform. The donors nod and make their pledges — $1.1 billion last year. Then everyone goes home and nothing changes. In the following months, officials dip into the foreign aid accounts and build themselves mansions the size of small hotels, while 40 percent of Cambodia’s children grow up stunted for lack of nutrition during infancy.

This year should be different. Over the past two decades, the Cambodian government has grown ever more repressive. Now it is actually planning to bite the hand that feeds it: The legislature is enacting a law that would require nongovernmental organizations to register with the government, giving venal bureaucrats the ability to shut them down unless they become toadies of the state.

Eight major international human rights organizations are calling on Cambodia to back down, saying the bill is “the most significant threat to the country’s civil society in many years.” Donors, they say, should hold back their pledges. But they say that every year, and each year the donors ignore them. Meanwhile, the status of the Cambodian people the aid is supposed to help improves little if at all. Nearly 80 percent of Cambodians live in the countryside with no electricity, clean water, toilets, telephone service or other evidence of the modern world.

All of this might surprise most Americans. It has been decades since many people here have given Cambodia even a thought. Forty years ago, Cambodia was on the front pages almost every day as the United States bombed and briefly invaded the state during the Vietnam War. Then came the genocidal Khmer Rouge era, when 2 million people died.

How many know what has happened there since? Last month, the Nexis news-research service carried 6,335 stories with Thailand in the headline. Vietnam had 5,196. For Cambodia, 578.

Most people don’t know that Cambodians are ruled by a government that sells off the nation’s rice harvest each year and pockets the money, leaving its people without enough to eat. That it evicts thousands of people from their homes, burns down the houses, then dumps the victims into empty fields and sells their property to developers.

That it amasses vast personal fortunes while the nation’s average annual per capita income stands at $650. Or that it allows school teachers to demand daily bribes from 6-year-olds and doctors to extort money from dirt-poor patients, letting them die if they do not pay.

This is a government that stands by and watches as 75 percent of its citizens contract dysentery each year, and 10,000 die — largely because only 16 percent of Cambodians have access to a toilet. As Beat Richner, who runs children’s hospitals there, puts it, “the passive genocide continues.”

You wouldn’t know any of that from the donors’ behavior. You see, for foreigners Phnom Penh is a relatively pleasant place to live. Rents are cheap and household help is even cheaper. Espresso bars and stylish restaurants dot the river front — primarily for diplomats and aid workers.

Donors have largely been able to pursue whatever project they wanted without interference. They knew that the government would steal some of their money. But so what?

“Some money goes this way or that way,” said In Samrithy, an officer with a donor umbrella group. “But it’s useful if some of it reaches the poor. Not all of it does but some does. That’s better than nothing.”

Even with that, many donors feel the way Teruo Jinnai does. He’s the longtime head of the UNESCO office in Phnom Penh. “Here I have found my own passion,” he told me. “Here, I can set my own target. So that gives you more power, more energy, more passion.”

Well, Mr. Jinnai, the noose is tightening. If, as expected, the NGO bill becomes law, government repression will reach out for you, too. Isn’t it time, then, for all those donors to make a statement? On Wednesday stand up and tell the government: I am withholding my aid.

Joel Brinkley, a professor of journalism at Stanford University, is the author of “Cambodia’s Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land.”

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Aid to Cambodia rarely reaches the people it’s meant to help

2011-04-23T16:40:00.000-07:00

By Joel Brinkley, Sunday, April 17, 7:45 PM

Representatives of more than 3,000 governments and donor organizations are meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on Wednesday. If past experience is indicative, they will pledge to provide hundreds of millions in aid.

Most of these donors should simply stay home.

Year after year, smiling Cambodian government leaders attend these pledge conferences, holding out their hands. But first they have to listen as ambassadors and aid officers stand at the podium, look them in the eye, and lambast them for corruption and jaw-dropping human rights abuses.

Each year Prime Minister Hun Sen promises to reform. The donors nod and make their pledges — $1.1 billion last year. Then everyone goes home and nothing changes. In the following months, officials dip into the foreign aid accounts and build themselves mansions the size of small hotels, while 40 percent of Cambodia’s children grow up stunted for lack of nutrition during infancy.

This year should be different. Over the past two decades, the Cambodian government has grown ever more repressive. Now it is actually planning to bite the hand that feeds it: The legislature is enacting a law that would require nongovernmental organizations to register with the government, giving venal bureaucrats the ability to shut them down unless they become toadies of the state.

Eight major international human rights organizations are calling on Cambodia to back down, saying the bill is “the most significant threat to the country’s civil society in many years.” Donors, they say, should hold back their pledges. But they say that every year, and each year the donors ignore them. Meanwhile, the status of the Cambodian people the aid is supposed to help improves little if at all. Nearly 80 percent of Cambodians live in the countryside with no electricity, clean water, toilets, telephone service or other evidence of the modern world.

All of this might surprise most Americans. It has been decades since many people here have given Cambodia even a thought. Forty years ago, Cambodia was on the front pages almost every day as the United States bombed and briefly invaded the state during the Vietnam War. Then came the genocidal Khmer Rouge era, when 2 million people died.

How many know what has happened there since? Last month, the Nexis news-research service carried 6,335 stories with Thailand in the headline. Vietnam had 5,196. For Cambodia, 578.

Most people don’t know that Cambodians are ruled by a government that sells off the nation’s rice harvest each year and pockets the money, leaving its people without enough to eat. That it evicts thousands of people from their homes, burns down the houses, then dumps the victims into empty fields and sells their property to developers.

That it amasses vast personal fortunes while the nation’s average annual per capita income stands at $650. Or that it allows school teachers to demand daily bribes from 6-year-olds and doctors to extort money from dirt-poor patients, letting them die if they do not pay.

This is a government that stands by and watches as 75 percent of its citizens contract dysentery each year, and 10,000 die — largely because only 16 percent of Cambodians have access to a toilet. As Beat Richner, who runs children’s hospitals there, puts it, “the passive genocide continues.”

You wouldn’t know any of that from the donors’ behavior. You see, for foreigners Phnom Penh is a relatively pleasant place to live. Rents are cheap and household help is even cheaper. Espresso bars and stylish restaurants dot the river front — primarily for diplomats and aid workers.

Donors have largely been able to pursue whatever project they wanted without interference. They knew that the government would steal some of their money. But so what?

“Some money goes this way or that way,” said In Samrithy, an officer with a donor umbrella group. “But it’s useful if some of it reaches the poor. Not all of it does but some does. That’s better than nothing.”

Even with that, many donors feel the way Teruo Jinnai does. He’s the longtime head of the UNESCO office in Phnom Penh. “Here I have found my own passion,” he told me. “Here, I can set my own target. So that gives you more power, more energy, more passion.”

Well, Mr. Jinnai, the noose is tightening. If, as expected, the NGO bill becomes law, government repression will reach out for you, too. Isn’t it time, then, for all those donors to make a statement? On Wednesday stand up and tell the government: I am withholding my aid.

Joel Brinkley, a professor of journalism at Stanford University, is the author of “Cambodia’s Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land.”

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

DOCUMENTATION CENTER OF CAMBODIA PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (PA)

2011-04-23T16:37:00.000-07:00

Interview with Rochoem Tun, alias Phi Phuon and Chiem, male, 63 years old, Charay ethnic
Occupation during the Khmer Rouge: Former messenger of Ieng Sary, Nuoun Chea, and Pol Pot
Present occupation: Former Deputy Governor of Malai district (1997-2005)
Born in Kep village, Nhanh commune, Andaung Meas district, Ratanakiri district
Currently live in Daung village, Malai commune, Malai district, Banteay Meanchey province
December 19, 2010
Interviewer: Long Dany
Translated by Ten Soksreynith

Dany: What is your name, uncle?
Chiem: My name is Phi Phuon.
Dany: Why do most of the villagers call you Chiem?
Chiem: Because Angkar called me Chiem.
Dany: Is Phi Phuon your real name?
Chiem: No. My real name is Rochoem Tun.
Dany: What is your ethnicity?
Chiem: I’m from the Charay people.
Dany: How old are you now?
Chiem: I’m 63 years old.
Dany: Where do you live?
Chiem: I live in Daung village, Malai commune, Malai district, in Banteay Meanchey province.
Dany: What is your wife’s name?
Chiem: Her name is Sreng Bunly.
Dany: How old is she?
Chiem: She is 56 years old.
Dany: Is she also Charay?
Chiem: No, she is not. She lived in Kampong Cham.
Dany: Which district did she live?
Chiem: She lived in Choeung Prey district.
Dany: How many children do you have?
Chiem: I have four children.
Dany: How many daughters and sons do you have?
Chiem: I have two daughters and two sons.
Dany: Are they adults?
Chiem: They are all married. I now have eight grandchildren.
Dany: What is your job?
Chiem: I am a farmer.
Dany: Did you used to work for the provincial government?
Chiem: Yes, I used to be deputy provincial governor.
Dany: When did you become deputy provincial governor?
Chiem: I was the deputy provincial governor from 1997 until 2005. I held this position for two mandate periods.
Dany: Are you still working for the party?
Chiem: Yes, I am.
Dany: Are you working for the Cambodian People’s Party?
Chiem: Yes! I am a permanent member of the party.
Dany: What are your parents’ names?
Chiem: My father’s name is Patout Avik.
Dany: How old is he?
Chiem: He is 92 years old.
Dany: Where was he born?
Chiem: He was born in Che village, Nhanh commune, Andung Meas district.
Dany: Was that also your birth place?
Chiem: No. I was born in the same place as my mother: Keb village, Nhanh commune, Andung Meas district.
Dany: How many brothers and sisters do you have?
Chiem: There are five of us, two sisters and three brothers. But one of my younger sisters is dead. So there are only four of us remaining.
Dany: Are they in Ratanakiri or here?
Chiem: They are all in Ratanakiri. One of my sisters used to come and visit me. However, upon her return, she fell seriously ill and passed away.
Dany: Did you attend school?
Chiem: I never attended school.
Dany: When did you leave your family?
Chiem: I left my family in 1966.
Dany: Where did you go?
Chiem: I went into the forest.
Dany: Was Department 100 already established at that time?
Chiem: Yes, it was.
Dany: What happened then?
Chiem: It’s a long story. In 1966, I left the forest, and met H.E Ieng Sary in 1967. At that time, he was working for Department 102 and Pol Pot was working for Department 100.
Dany: Where were those departments?
Chiem: As far as I know, they were in Ba Keo district.
Dany: Who else did you meet?
Chiem: I first met Ieng Sary, and then Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Kuy Thuon.
Dany: How did you meet them?
Chiem: My brother-in-law was one of the resistants. His name is Lao, but he is already dead. He asked me to join the revolutionary movement.
Dany: How many people were there when you joined the revolution?
Chiem: There were only two people from my village, my sister and me. But my sister could no longer serve the revolution. Within two years, she quit because she was weak and ill. So she returned home eventually.
Dany: Is she your elder sister?
Chiem: No, she is my cousin.
Dany: What is her name?
Chiem: She is dead. Her name was Cham Biel. There were many people from different villages who joined the revolution. But there were only two from my province. After living in the forest for a period of time, we met Ieng Sary and Pol Pot. We implemented the growing rice movement in between 1968 and 1969.
Dany: Did you also work in the rice fields near Departments 102 and 100?
Chiem: No. We worked in Poun Le, Ba Kham commune, Ba Keo district.
Dany: Were there many people working in the rice fields?
Chiem: There were nineteen of us, but during harvest season, mobile work brigades and the villagers living nearby also worked in the rice fields with us.
Dany: How was the supply used? Was it for the staff in the Department?
Chiem: Yes! The supply was stored to feed people in the department and the army.
Dany: Did the army take form at that time?
Chiem: Yes! We were having moble work brigades and the army.
Day: Were there many people serving in the army?
Chiem: There were approximately three hundred men who came from the northeast zone.
Dany: Did Nai Saran aka Ya also serve in the army?
Chiem: Yes! At first he worked in Mudulkiri. Later on, whenever I met him, he was always with Pol Pot and Ieng Sary.
Dany: When did Ieng Sary and Pol Pot move there? Was it in 1966?
Chiem: I met them in 1967, but I don’t know where they were before that.
Dany: Did they also work in the rice fields?
Chiem: Yes. When the coup ďétat took place in 1970, Pol Pot returned from Peking by taking the road across Vietnam.
Dany: How about the King?
Chiem: He was still in Peking. In fact, Pol Pot went to Hanoi in order to go to Peking. He was still abroad hen the coup ďétat took place. In May 1970, while Pol Pot retuned to the country by the Dragon Tail route to Kampong Cham, Ieng Sary went to Hanoi to accompany King Sihanouk and establish the Nataional United Front of Kampuchea. I joined the trip from Dragon Tail to Kampong Cham with Pol Pot. We traveled on foot for seven months to reach Kampong Cham, starting from May unitl December.
Dany: How many people were there?
Chiem: There were about eighty people.
Dany: Was Pol Pot also there with you?
Chiem: Yes, Pol Pot and his family.
Dany: You meant his wife, Khueiv Bunnary?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: Were there many people from your ethnics?
Chiem: Yes! The large majority of us were from my ethnic group. There were only two Cambodians, Teav and Aul. They were intellectual cadres.
Dany: What was your position?
Chiem: I had no position. I just served in the defense unit.
Dany: Was it Pol Pot’s defense unit?
Chiem: Yes! The unit was in charge of opening the way, and I was responsible for parades. I solved problems when they occured. However, nothing happened along the way.
Dany: Did Pol Pot have other messengers?
Chiem: Yes, he had many messengers.
Dany: Did they also come from minority groups?
Chiem: Yes! Some died and some left him. In 1972, some of the messengers were assigned to fight in the battlefield, and died in Prey Kry, San Dek, and Tonle Sap (at the border line between Kampong Chhnang and Chhoeung Prey, Batheay and Kampong Cham). We traveled by boat from Prey Kry to Ta Ches during the deadly five-year fighting.
Dany: It took you five months [to reach Kampong Cham]?
Chiem: Actually, it took us seven months, from May to December.
Dany: It took you seven months to reach Prey Kry?
Chiem: No! We traveled this long way to reach our major base in Stueng Trang district, Kampong Cham province during the five-year fighting.
Dany: Oh! I also was born in Stueng Trang district, in Dei Dus, Prek Sangke!
Chiem: Really? I also traveled with Nuon Chea through Prey Sangke, Dei Dus to the east zone of region 203, Krauch Chhamar district during the five-year fighting.
Dany: Did he?
Chiem: Yes! We went to the east zone of region 203 to work with Soa Phoem.
Dany: Where was the department in Stueng Trang located?
Chiem: It was dispersed in several places the west and the east, along Chinith rever, nearby the waterfall, and so on.
Dany: Was it also once located in Bit Chhnout?
Chiem: Region 30, 17, 19, 24, 30, and 31 were in Bit Chhnou, but they were relocated to many other different places.
Dany: Why were the departments in the Ratanakiri region given the numbers 100 and 102?
Chiem: It was very common to use numbers for the names of the departments. The numbers were the secret codes of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. Simply put, if you hear Department 100, it is Pol Pot. If you hear Department 102, it is Ieng Sary.
Dany: It means you recognized them by their secret codes!
Chiem: Yes! For instance, if the letter was written “To Department 100 or 102,” we would know that it was sent to Pol Pot or Ieng Sary.
Dany: Did you used to be a messenger?
Chiem: Yes, I did.
Dany: Who did you work for?
Chiem: In 1970, I worked as a messenger for Pol Pot, leading him back and forth to battlefields and different regions.
Dany: Did you work as his messenger since then?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: Your job was to send letters?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: How did you send the letters?
Chiem: If the letter was directed to Sun Sen in the battle field, Kuy Thuon in region 304, Soa Phoem in region 203, Ta Mok in southwest zone, and Ta Nhoem in northwest zone, for instance, we just took the letter to the place it was addressed.
Dany: For example, it was very far to get to Stueng Trang in 1970. So how did you manage to send the letter?
Chiem: Between 1971 and 1972, I frequently got lost, particulary in Kampong Thmar, Y1, and the rubber plantations. The department of the army was yet established then. We followed Pol Pot to various districts, regions and zones when he provided military trainings and things like that.
Dany: As his personal messenger, were you supposed to personally hand the letters to the secretary officers of each zone?
Chiem: Yes! But there were also other messengers in each zone. So we simply dropped the letter at their offices. But if the letter said “Submit in Person,” we had to hand over the letter personally.
Dany: How did you deliver the letters?
Chiem: We walked to the place where the letter was sent. Because it took a great deal of time, until 1973 we traveled by motor.
Dany: Did you deliver the letter all alone or accompanied by other messengers?
Chiem: I usaully walked alone to deliver the letter.
Dany: You came from Ratanakiri. I wonder how you learned the geography of Kampong Cham province.
Chiem: I did not know the geography of Kampong Cham province well. The fact was that after leaving Ratanakiri, I walked with Pol Pot across the forest. We walked for seven months and finally reached Stueng Trang, where we established our base. Then, we traveled to different departments and communities with Pol Pot. So I knew only the places where Pol Pot paid visits to. Until 1973, we traveled by motor. We sometimes depended on the map for directions, and there were assigned routes for us to take. After the liberation in 1973, we traveled from Skun and Prek Kdam to Odung by motor. At that time, as we camped in Kampong Chhang, near Am Leang, we traveled on the national road. Soon after 1974 liberation, we used that road to cross the river.
Dany: You previously stated that there were Departments B20 and B19 and so on in 1970, 1971, and 1972. How were these departments named?
Chiem: They were simply called by the numbers. As seen, B17 was one department, and so were B19, B20, and so on and so forth. But those departments were relocated several times across the forest.
Dany: Were there many people serving in each B?
Chiem: Not many.
Dany: Does “B” mean “Department”?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: Did Pol Pot work in the department?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: How about Ieng Sary?
Chiem: Ieng Sary was on board from 1969 until Phnom Penh was liberated.
Dany: So there was only Pol Pot who was in charge of the department operation?
Chiem: It was Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Kheiu Samphan.
Dany: How about Sun Sen?
Chiem: Sun Sen was fighting in the battlefield. So he had rarely been to the department. He moved from place to place to command in the battlefields. For example, if there was fighting in Kampong Thom, Sun Sen would be there, just as in any other battles such as Kampong Cham and Phnom Penh.
Dany: What about Von Vet?
Chiem: Von Vet was on duty in special zone, while elder Mut, Se, Chung, and Sy were respectively in the southwest zone, Kampot, Koh Kong, Kampong Spue and Kampong Chhnang. They were revolutionaries.
Dany: Did Pol Pot move his department from Stueng Trang, Kampong Cham to Am Leang, Kampong Chhnang, and then to Kampong Spue in 1973?
Chiem: No! In 1973, Pol Pot commanded the fighting to capture Phnom Penh.
Dany: Where did he stay at that time?
Chiem: He stayed near Am Leang.
Dany: Did Kuy Thuon also stay in the same department as Pol Pot?
Chiem: No! Kuy Thuon worked in the department of military region.
Dany: Where was the department of military region located?
Chiem: It was located between thirteen and twenty-five kilometers [from Malai].
Dany: Was it in the rubber plantation compound?
Chiem: Yes! Everyone worked in their respective departments, except when they were called for an assembly.
Dany: Does it mean that when Pol Pot commanded the battlefield in Am Leang, all the departments in Stueng Trang had to move to Am Leang?
Chiem: No! There were those who were on duty in each department, so there was no need to move the department. I was brought to Samlot in 1972 by Nuon Chea. I usually travelled with him at that time.
Dany: Did you usually travel on foot?
Chiem: Yes! We walked.
Dany: How long did it take you to reach Samlot?
Chiem: It took us four months.
Dany: Did you carry out the activities of the regime movementhile travelling?
Chiem: Yes! We did some activities when we visited each base. At that time, we traveled from Kampong Thmar to Kampong Leng district, and then to Kampong Chhnang, Am Leang, and Pis Mountain. In 1973, Pol Pot commanded the army in the battlefields.
Dany: Did Pol Pot and Nuon Chea usually travel together? Did they travel to different places?
Chiem: They did not travel at the same time. When Pol Pot first set out on a trip, Nuon Chea would stay and oversee the department in Am Leang. He would call for discussion if there was an urgent and important issue.
Dany: Did you come to Samlot with Nuon Chea, only the two of you?
Chiem: Yes! I traveled with Nuon Chea alone in 1973.
Dany: So it means Pol Pot was in Stueng Trang in 1972, but he moved to Am Leang in 1973.
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: How long did Nuon Chea stay in Samlot?
Chiem: He was in Samlot for just one week.
Dany: Did he return to Am Leang after that?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: Why did he go to Samlot?
Dany: He went to meet the three elders, Ruos Nhoem, Keu, and Tul, in northwest zone.
Dany: So you worked as messengers for several senior leaders, including Pol Pot!
Chiem: Yes! I accompanied both Nuon Chea and Pol Pot.
Dany: Did they know you well?
Chiem: Very well! They were the ones who took me from Ratanakiri.
Dany: Did they allow you to study?
Chiem: Yes, I learned to read during my spare time.
Dany: Did they teach you, or you learn by yourself?
Chiem: No, they didn’t teach me. There were teachers to teach us. There were books and pens, for instance. I can read and write through documents. As far as I remembered, I read a document talking about civilian and militiaman fighting tactics.
Dany: As his personal assistant, did he give you any advice?
Chiem: He taught me how to do my work and build myself up. We learned to get rid of what was useless, and to improve ourselves in terms of the way we thought, and to live with good moral conduct. We would build up our ability and knowledge, and most importantly learn to get along well with our colleagues and leaders.
Dany: Did Ieng Sary bring you to work for Pol Pot and Nuon Chea?
Chiem: I first met only Ieng Sary. After working for Ieng Sary for a period of time, I met Pol Pot after his return from Peking. In May 1970, Pol Pot asked me to work for him, and Ieng Sary agreed. I had known Ieng Sary since he brought me with him in 1967.
Dany: How many people did Pol Pot ask to work for him? Were there any other people from ethnic groups?
Chiem: There were a few people who were Pol Pot’s personal guards. But they are all dead.
Dany: Who were they?
Chiem: They were Ken and Huon. They are dead.
Dany: Did they belong to ethnic groups?
Chiem: Er.. Phat, Pheat, Soem, Ky are also dead.
Dany: Were all of them Charay ethnics or other ethnic group?
Chiem: They were from different ethnic groups. Some were Charay, while some were Tomphuon, Kroeng, Kavet, Praov, and Kachak.
Dany: How many people did Pol Pot bring along with him?
Chiem: There were around eighty people from different ethnic groups.
Dany: Any Cambodians?
Chiem: Yes! His wife, Teav Aul, Yon, So Hong were all Cambodians, approximately ten people.
Dany: Was So Hong his newphew?
Chiem: Yes! I am not sure if he was Pol Pot’s nephew in blood. At that time, I did not know that. Only later did I learn about it.
Dany: Did you meet Nuon Chea when you arrived in Stueng Trang?
Chiem: Yes! We met not only Nuon Chea, but also Khieu Samphan, Ho Noem, and Ho Yun. It was a big gathering that all the representatives of each zone across the country, the northeast, southwest, northwest, west, and special zone, to name a few, attended.
Dany: They assembled in Stueng Trang?
Chiem: Yes! But they returned to their zones after the meeting was put into an end.
Dany: How did they travel the meeting, by foot, motor, or car?
Chiem: I had no idea because we arrived in and left the department at night.
Dany: You meant they arrived and left the department only at night?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: Was there anyone to guard the way for them?
Chiem: There were those who guarded and sent messenges.
Dany: So everyone worked during the day?
Chiem: Yes! We worked in the daytime.
Dany: Did you become a messenger both for Pol Pot and Nuon Chea in Stueng Trang?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: Did you find it okay?
Chiem: Of course! I usually traveled with both of them, particulary Pol Pot.
Dany: Did you return to Am Leang after going to Samlot with Nuon Chea to meet elder Nhoem, Kue, Tul?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: Where was the department based in Am Leam located?
Chiem: It was located in the foothills of Pis Mountain, in the west of Am Leang.
Dany: Was the central hospital where Doctor Chuon Choeun worked also located there?
Chiem: Yes, Dr. Chuon Choeun worked in Ra Smatch, next to Sduk Troal or Sduk Toal, Tuol Krasaong. At that time, it was commonly known as Kdak Ta Ngor.
Dany: Was it near your department?
Chiem: Yes, I think it may be located nearby my department.
Dany: Did all of senior leaders come to Am Leang?
Chiem: No! On one instance, upon the return of Nuon Chea, Pol Pot traveled to Am Leang.
Dany: Did you move from Stueng Trang to Am Leang?
Chiem: Yes, I travelled back and forth.
Dany: Did you always accompany those elders when they set out on a trip?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: Had you been to any military bases?
Chiem: No! We traveled to attend the closing session of the military training. After the training, we returned to Stueng Trang. We also provided military training at the base and regional levels.
Dany: Uncle! I have seen a photo of the king and the queen on a trip across Vietnam to Cambodia…
Chiem: It was in 1973 when I traveled to welcome the king and the queen in Siem Pang. We went through Stueng Treng to Stueng Sen, and continued to visit Kulen Mountain, Banteay Srei and Angkor Wat temple. I accompanied the king and the queen.
Dany: Was it in 1973?
Chiem: Yes, it was in 1973. Ieng Sary also accompanied the king…and in 1974 he escorted the Chinese journalists to Cambodia.
Dany: How did he get to meet the King?
Chiem: He traveled from Stueng Treng.
Dany: Do you mean he traveled from Vietnam and continued to Stueng Treng?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: How far did the Chinese journalists get into the country?
Chiem: They had been to Kep in 1974.
Dany: Oh, really?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Did they meet with Lon Nol soldiers during their journey?
Chiem: No. We traveled across only the liberated regions, so we faced no problem. The liberated region was large enough for us to set out our journey.
Dany: How long did the king and the queen visit the country?
Chiem: Their trip did not last long. They spent three nights in Siam Pang and another three nights in Anlong Kramuon.
Dany: Where is Anlong Kramuon?
Chiem: It’s near La Bavit. They also spent three nights in Stueng Sen and one night in O Kbal Chhlus, where they continued their trip to visit Kulen Mountain. They stayed at Kulen Mountain for three nights.
Dany: Where is O Kbal Chhlus?
Chiem: To get there, we took two different main roads to the north part of Kulen Mountain across the forest. During their trip, Kuy Thuon traveled by a car 404 because it could go through the forest, while the king traveled by the Chinese Jeep and a four-wheel-car. The Jeep could run only at night because the Americans bombared during the day time. It was really difficult!
Dany: So the king only traveled at the night time?
Chiem: Yes. We traveled only at night. One night, the car crushed into the trunk of a tree, causing the king and the queen to break their teeth and bleed from their tongues.
Dany: The car crushed into the trunk of the tree!
Chiem: Yes. That was because it was at night and the road was full of sand, and so on.
Dany: What did he say then?
Chiem: He said at least he could shed his blood in the battlefield.
Dany: Did they go to Siem Reap town after visiting Kulen Mountain?
Chiem: We could only enter the Angkor Thom temple because it was our liberated area. At that time, Lon Nol soldiers occupied Siem Reap town. Fortunately, there was no bombing on the day we went to visit Angkor Thom.
Dany: Which road was taken for their return?
Chiem: We took the same road.
Dany: In the same car?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Were there any Vietnamese or other nationals who accompanied the King during his trip back to the country?
Chiem: Yes, there were some Chineses and Vietnamese who accompanied the King. They were journalists.
Dany: Did the leaders of the two countries also accompany the King?
Chiem: No, I don’t think so because none of them was introduced, except the King. Ieng Sary accompanied the king and special activists in the movement.
Dany: Did Pol Pol also join the trip?
Chiem: Yes! All the [Khmer Rouge] leaders including Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ho Noem, Ho Yun travelled with the King.
Dany: What about Sun Sen?
Chiem: Yes, he accompanied the King, and so did elder Ya from the northeast zone.
Dany: Did they [all the KR leaders] stay in Am Leang until 1975?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: They stayed in Am Leang until Phnom Penh was liberated in 1975?
Chiem: Yes! From 1972, we camped in southwest zone located in the west of Am Leang and worked in Department B5 near Taing Poun, Ta Khmaov.
Dany: Where was Taing Poun?
Chiem: Taing Poun, Ta Khmaov was located in Kampong Tralach, Kampong Chhnang.
Dany: Was there a Department B5 [in Am Leang]?
Chiem: Yes, there was only one department.
Dany: Why was it named B5?
Chiem: I don’t know. I just called the way he did.
Dany: Who is “he”?
Chiem: Pol Pot!
Dany: What happened after the liberation in 1975?
Chiem: We entered Phnom Penh in 1975.
Dany: Did you go to Phnom Penh with Pol Pot?
Chiem: I stayed with Pol Pot in Phnom Penh for a period of time. However, when Ieng Sary left the city in order to build up the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I went with him.
Dany: Did Ieng Sary ask you to go with him or did you make a request yourself?
Chiem: No. We had no authority to make any requests. I was simply assigned by Pol Pot to go with Ieng Sary. My work was to provide hospitality to the guests and to look after the house [building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. Somehow, it was a hard work.
Dany: Where were most of the guests from?
Chiem: The first group were from China and other different countries. Within three years, there were a number of embassies that came into existence.
Dany: How many embassies were there?
Chiem: There were ten embassies from different countries permanently based in Cambodia. They were Vietnam, Lao, Yugoslavia, Romany, Albany, cuba, and the North Korea.
Dany: How about Timor?
Chiem: Yes, we also had Timorese embassy.
Dany: How about Thailand?
Chiem: We did not have a Thai embassy in the country yet.
Dany: Does that mean that after the liberation, you stayed with Pol Pot for a period of time?
Chiem: Yes, I stayed with him when I first came to Phnom Penh.
Dany: Where did you stay in Phnom Penh?
Chiem: We first stayed at the train station and then moved to the Finance and Economic Ministry. After that, we stayed in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which today is the Council of Ministers. During the first three years, the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an old house that was later destroyed. After that, it was re-built with the support of the Chinese government and the King, and eventually was inaugurated.
Dany: So you simply worked as a receptionist?
Chiem: No, I was just part of the staff who looked after the building, served the guests, and cleaned the kitchen and bathroom.
Dany: Where was Department 870? I used to hear this name, but I have no idea where it is.
Chiem: Department 870, also known as K3, was located in Tonle Basak near one of the embassies. I forget the name of this embassy! Tthe collective cooperative of the central committee was also there. However, K3 or Department 870 was displaced from time to time; for instance, it used to be near the Royal Palace, and Preah Kor and Preah Keo pagoda.
Dany: Is it now near Kuntha Bopha Hospital?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: So Department 870 was simply a mobile deparment.
Chiem: Yes, it was relocated over time. It used to be located near the hospital, Tonle Basak, Ta khmao, and Chram Cham Res.
Dany: Did the senior leaders work for this Department?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Besides Department 870 or K3, where else did Pol Pot work?
Chiem: In fact, Pol Pot worked in different places. Sometimes he worked in K3, sometimes in an office near the Royal Palace, sometimes near Tonle Basak, and sometimes he traveled to different zones.
Dany: How about Nuon Chea?
Chiem: Yes, he also worked in different places.
Dany: Khieu Samphan?
Chiem: Yes, him too.
Dnay: So it means you worked for the hospitality section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (today’s Council of Ministers)?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Did you stay in the Ministry permanently?
Chiem: Yes, I stayed in the Ministry, but the house was in the same block as the Ministry of Finance, near the Cambodian Development Company (CDC) near Wat Phnom. The house hosted for guests was located in Chamkarmon district.
Dany: What did you do everyday? Did you clean the house or cook for the guests?
Chiem: Yes, I prepared the rooms for the guests, making sure everything was ready.
Dany: Do you know where most of the Cambodian students from abroad stayed at that time?
Chiem: Most of them stayed in the house near Boeng Trabek. They had to travel to work for the ministry. Brothers Seng Hong and Hoa Nam Hong were also among those students. I have known him since then.
Dany: What was his job?
Chiem: At that time, he had just started working for the ministry, so he helped [brother] Keat Chhun with some works dealing with policy issues.
Dany: Did he also work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
Chiem: Yes. Oak Sokun, who came from France, also worked for the ministry. However, he is already dead. There is only Chuob Brasith, who is now living in France.
Dany: Were they just students [who were chosen to work for the party] or the revoluationary resistance group
Chiem: I noticed some of them worked with Ieng Sary since 1970, under the King’s rule. Of course, there were more of them volunteering [for the party].
Dany: Was Ieng Sary in charge of the whole operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Who was his subordinate?
Chiem: It was Brother So Hong.
Dany: How about Brother Vann Piny?
Chiem: I have no idea who Vann Piny was. What was his revolutionary name?
Dany: As far as I know, he was one of the subordinates. He was arrested later.
Chiem: Vann Piny? In the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uncle Ieng Sary was the one who oversaw the ministry. Brother So Hong was responsible for policy issues. Brother Toeb, Keat Chhun, Sokun, Chann Yorann, In Sopheap, Long Norin, Bun Heng, and Brother Tith Samnang also worked for the ministry.
Dany: What about Porng, the one who came along way from [Ratanakiri] with you? Where did he work?
Chiem: He worked as the president of Department 870.
Dany: How about Doeun?
Chiem: Touch Kham Doeun also worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Dany: I learned from the document that Touch Kham Doeun worked with Porng.
Chiem: In truth, Touch Kham Doeun was the younger brother of Touch Phoeun, the Minister of Transportation.
Dany: Were you the only member of an ethnic group who worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
Chiem: Camrade Tuon was also from an ethnic group. He now lives in Kanh Chabb.
Dany: Where is Kanh Chabb?
Chiem: It is in Pailin province.
Dany: Do you know the name of the district?
Chiem: No, I don’t.
Dany: What is Camrade Tuon’s name nowadays?
Chiem: His name is still Tou.
Dany: Did he also work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
Chiem: At that time, he worked as a technician for the North Korean and the Chinese embassies.
Dany: What is his wife’s name?
Chiem: Her name is Choeun.
Dany: Were you two the only members of ethnic groups who worked for the ministry?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: As a resistance member, did you find your job hard or challenging because you never used to experience this?
Chiem: I was taught and advised by the elders and some of the intellectuals, including Brother Long Norin. I learned a lot from him, and it took me a short while to be capable of doing those works.
Dany: You learned from the intellectuals!
Chiem: Yes. I was taught how to prepare the bedrooms, bathroom, and the office.
Dany: Did Long Norin also do the same work as you?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Besides Long Norin, who else did you work with?
Chiem: There were several other people, including Brother Suong Sy Koeun. I think you may know him. He is ill and now in Phnom Penh.
Dany: I used to visit his hometown in Prek Prasab. I met his newphrew two or three years ago. I asked him about Suong Sy Koeun, and he told me his uncle is also living in Malai, and teaching English to young children.
Chiem: Yes, that’s true. But his health is deteriorated.
Dany: Is he now in Phnom Penh?
Chiem: Yes, he has a newphew in Phnom Penh to look after him. Moving to Phnom Penh makes it easy for him to visit a doctor. No one stays in his house in Malai.
Dany: When did you get married?
Chiem: I got married in 1972.
Dany: Did you get married in Stueng Trang?
Chiem: Yes, I got married when I worked in Stueng Trang.
Dany: How old were you when you got married?
Chiem: I was 27 years old.
Dany: What did your wife do at that time?
Chiem: She was a female cadre, and worked for the department 304.
Dany: Did she work with Kuy Thuon?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: After your marriage, did she move to work with you?
Chiem: Before the marriage, she worked for Department 304, however, she moved to work for Department 870 after our marriage.
Dany: What was her job at Department 870?
Chiem: Her job was to cook for the senior leaders.
Dany: So that means she cooked for Pol Pot and Nuon Chea?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: How long did she work as a cook?
Chiem: She worked until 1978.
Dany: Did she also cook for them when they were in Phnom Penh?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: So it meant that they had meals together?
Chiem: Yes, they joined the same table for meals.
Dany: Did they also stay in the same house?
Chiem: They stayed in a flat, consisting of several rooms, so they each could have their own room.
Dany: Does that mean that they had meals together but stayed in individual rooms in the Department 870?
Chiem: Yes, there was a large cooperative, where all the leaders gathered for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Sometimes Ieng Sary, who worked in Department B1, also joined the table with all of us at the communal eating hall in the ministry.
Dany: Did you mean Department 870?
Chiem: No, I meant at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Dany: Did he also have meals with you?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: So you had meals in Department B1?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Did Ieng Sary eat with you everyday or just occasionally?
Chiem: Actually, he was the cooperative supervisor, but he also worked for the ministry, so he sometimes ate at the ministry.
Dany: How were the meals served? Three times a day?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: How was the food?
Chiem: They had some sorts of sour soup, fried vegetables, or fried fish, and so on.
Dany: How many recipes were served per day?
Chiem: There were no more than three recipes, including a soup with vegetables or meat.
Dany: Did they usually have porridge as their breakfast?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: What was served with porridge?
Chiem: They ate dry fish or salty egg or fish. We often cooked sugar fish or meats as breakfast.
Dany: Did they also have sweets or fruit sometimes?
Chiem: Yes, they did. There was a restaurant in Central Market where the ministries got food and fruit.
Dany: At the Central Market?
Chiem: It was called the Administrative Market, under the supervision of Ministry of Commence. During the first year, each of the ministries went there for food. However, during the second and third year, some of the ministries managed to find food on their own. Some went to search for fish in Chhnuk or Roang Pruol to make dry fish or fish paste, and some grew vegetables.
Dany: Was some of the food production for the ministries assigned to specific regions or zones?
Chiem: Of course, there was at least one region or zone assigned to produce food for each of the ministries. Each ministry also assigned some people to grow vegetables in Chram Chamres, for instance, in Prek Pnaov.
Dany: Did Pol Pot or Nuon Chea frequently travel to visit each base in the each region
Chiem: Yes, they did.
Dany: How often?
Chiem: Quite often.
Dany: How about Ieng Sary?
Chiem: Uncle Ieng Sary rarely traveled in the country, but he often went abroad. Sometimes, if free, he would accompany the foreign l delegates to visit the base in the region.
Dany: Did you always accompany him?
Chiem: Yes, sometimes.
Dany: Did you travel with him whenever he led the delegates?
Chiem: Yes. When I worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affiars, I always accompanied him.
Dany: Wherever he went, you were always with him?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Every zone he visited?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: When there was a trip, did he inform you beforehand?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Did he ever conduct a trip to meet the students who came from abroad?
Chiem: Yes. He went to meet students in Boeng Trabek.
Dany: What did he talk to the students?
Chiem: First, he gave the students a summary of current situation, both inside and outside the country. Second, he explained the goals of the revolution, that everyone had to build up themselves in accordance with the regime movement.
Dany: Were there many students?
Chiem: Yes, there were many students.
Dany: Where were they come from?
Chiem: They came from different countries, for instance, France.
Dany: Both male and female students?
Chiem: Yes, some were male and female, but the majority were from France.
Dany: Do you think he often went to see the students at Boeng Trabek?
Chiem: No, I don’t think so. The office [in Boeng Trabek] was only put under supervision of the Minstry of Foreign Affairs in late 1978.
Dany: Who was the supervisor of that office?
Chiem: It was under supervision of Department 870, and after that Ministry of Foreign Affairs took over it.
Dany: Have you known Hoa Nam Hong since the resistant period?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Was he one of the students staying at Boeng Trabek?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: What did he do?>>>
Chiem: He was the monitor of the intellectual groups. He was also one of the intellectual members, but he led other students. Brother Heng Aun was his assistant, while others, including Brother Chuob Prasith, Keat Chhun, Chann Yorann, and Brother Eth Sokun, were assigned to work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dany: Did you know that some of the cadres were arrested, including Porng?
Chiem: Yes, we learned about it only after they disappeared.
Dany: Do you know the reason why those people were arrested?
Chiem: No, I don’t know.
Dany: As one of the members of the resistant group, you may be aware that some of your members were disappeared and arrested, including Von Vet, Touch Kham Doeun, Touch Phoeun, Ya, and so on. Do you know why they were arrested?
Chiem: Speaking of the arrests, they were surprising to everyone. We noticed that many of the members had disappeared.
Dany: Did the senior leaders say anything about these matters, particularly regarding the reason for those arrests?
Chiem: I don’t know. They didn’t say anything about those arrests, but in the case of Kuy Thuon, I knew why he was arrested. News of his arrest was published in Revolutionary Flag magazine, explaining that he had confessed to committing a moral offense. I had no idea why others were arrested, except that they disappeared.
Dany: Were there many members who disappeared?
Chiem: There were many cadres who disappeared, at both the regional and zone levels, as well as the district level. They suddenly disappeared.
Dany: As I have learned from my interviews with most of the former cadres, chiefs of regions were swapped. For instance, Ta Mut, chief of the southwest region, was assigned to oversee the northwest region and Ta Nhoem, chief of the east region, was transferred to the north region, and so on. Do you know the reasons for these reassignments?
Chiem: Yes, I do. The assignment of new cadres to oversee the southwest region caused mass killings. Many of them were proud and rigid. Ta Mok is a bad person, I hate him. In 1979, there seemed to be a heated argument over the management in southwest region, where Ta Mok built up cruel cadres to commit execution.
Dany: Did Pol Pot and Nuon Chea talk anything about this problem?
Chiem: I didn’t notice that. I don’t think they said anything. Also, nothing was written in any documents. Simply, there was no mentioning of any killings. Our movement was called the National Democratic Revolution during the resistance period. However, after the liberation day on the 17th of April, 1975, it was called the Socialist Revolutionary Party, with the purpose of creating a communist state. It was the goal of the regime. It was true that during the national resistance, we fought against the American imperialists and their servants, while under the democratic resistance, we fought the feudalists, capitalists, and reactionists. The resistance was against the former regime, not any particular groups of people. However, it was implemented in an extreme manner that took many innocent lives. Everyone was petrified, including me! I might not be alive today if the Vietnamese troops had not overthrown the regime. Perhaps I might have been arrested.
Dany: Why did you feel that way?
Chiem: I have no reason in particular, but I certainly know that this would have happened to me.
Dany: You worked closely with Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Nuon Chea, so what were you afraid of?
Chiem: After they were appointed as leaders, I was not afraid of anything. Their movement was as strong as a broken dam! However, after the liberation, they fought each other for powers.
Dany: Which ones were hungry for power?
Chiem: All of them aggressively fought for power, especially Ta Mok. I learnt this personally! Why did I say Ta Mok was aggressive? It’s because he argued with others while they were having meals. He claimed that comrades Soa Phoem, Kuy Thuon and Khieu (Sun Sen) didn’t arrive in Phnom Penh before him. However, Pol Pot was the one who reached a compromised and suggested that everyone work together. He said that the success of Phnom Penh liberation was not achieved by any particular individual, but by the unity and solidarity of everyone. Yet Ta Mok was demanding for his own reputation!
Dany: You mean Ta Mok.
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Did they argue over this matter during their meeting?
Chiem: Yes, they did. He acted strangly compared to others. I am glad that he died. I hate him!
Dany: Do you really hate him?
Chiem: He is a pigheaded person!
Dany: Does it mean that whenever they held a meeting in Department 870, you saw and heard their discussion?
Chiem: Yes, because I also was there in the meeting. During the three year resistance I didn’t learn this, because I was not assigned to work for a military unit until 1979. Ta Mok attempted to beat me. I was not afraid of him. He cursed me and intended to shoot me. Because I controlled military forces both in the east zone and An Long Veng region, he dared not do so. He was a selfish person. He liked to look down on everyone, particulary those like us, members of ethnic groups. I hate him, and I am happy to see him dead. I am furious because Ta Mok was a tricky man. The situation might not have gotten as bad as it did. That was because of Ta Mok! As the proverb goes, “If one fish spoils, the other fish in the basket also spoil!” Ta Mok committed most of the dirty acts. For example, in 1978, there was a mass killing of 79 people in the region where he was in charge.
Dany: What was the real situation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when the Vietnames troops captured Phnom Penh in 1979? Did everyone decide to escape or retreat?
Dany: In December 1978, the first phase of invasion took place. The second phase occurred in the north of the country. Our forces could not stand against the attack, so we dicided to retreat from Phnom Penh. On the 7th of January, I was on duty to fight. Around 7 or 8 o’clock at night we retreated.
Dany: Did you serve as soldier on the 7th of January?
Chiem: Yes. At night on the 6th of January, I dropped the king at the airport to Peking. That night, we prepared to fight. My forces were trained in military tactics.
Dany: I would like to know another important story about the king. In his book, Nayann Chenda wrote that the King escaped to the northwest region. Is that true?
Chiem: Yes, it is. I was the one who helped him escape.
Dany: Could you please briefly tell me about his escape?
Chiem: At that time, Angkar said, the Vietnamese forces are now inside the country and the king shall be evacuated to Poi Pet.
Dany: When did that happen?
Chiem: It was before his return to Phnom Penh. It might have been on the 29th or 30th, between those dates.
Dany: In December 1978?
Chiem: Yes. We left Phnom Penh at 9 pm and arrived in Svay at 5:30am. Our forces gathered in Battambang province. The fact was that we usually stopped for a rest at our resting spot, for instance, in Kampong Chhnag, Pursat, Banttambang, and Sisophorn.
Dany: How many people were there in the car?
Chiem: There was the King [Shihanouk] and the queen, King Pen Nut and his queen along with two or three servants.
Dany: The king and the queen, along with King Pen Nut and… were in the car.
Chiem: The King and the queen traveled in black Mercedes, and King Pen Nut and his queen were in another black car. There were another two cars, one in the front and one behind. In total, there were four cars running to Poi Pet. The King said if the Vietnamese forces captured this region, just wait for orders from the Angkar. Whereever Angkar told us to go, we must follow the orders.
Dany: Were you his driver…?
Chiem: Yes, because I had traveled forth and back with the King since 1973 and safeguarded his journey from Kantuy Neak (Dragon’s Tail) to Siem Pang destrict. I had known him well ever since the three-year-resistance.
Dany: Did the King know you?
Chiem: Yes. During the three year resistance, whenever the King traveled to the province, I was usually assigned to drive for him. One time when I drove him to Svay, he said to me that if was something went wrong, just keep on heading to Thailand.
Dany: Did Ieng Sary assign you to take the King into exile?
Chiem: Yes! I waited for the order. On the fourth of December, I was called back to Phnom Penh.
Dany: Did Ieng Sary require you to return to Phnom Penh or you…?
Chiem: Yes, he did, but Angkar assigned him to ask me to return. We held a meeting in House Number 1, today’s Cambodian Development Committee near Wat Phnom, and held a party for the fact that the King went to Peking and the United Nations in order to attract attention to the Vietname invasion. The King was on board the plane on the sixth of January at around 8pm. After he had gone, I made a request for more weapons even though it was at night.
Dany: Does that mean that on the fourth of January you brought the King back to Phnom Penh?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Did you arrive in Phnom Penh on that day?
Chiem: No, on the fourth, we started our journey, and on the fifth we decided to slow down our journey. We finally arrived in Phnom Penh at around five o’clock. I dropped the King at his palace near the Independence Monument. It was a new palace.
Dany: Didn’t he stay in his previous palace?
Chiem: Yes. At that time, he decided to move to a new and small palace, which I was assigned to build.
Dany: Is it near the Prime Minister Hun Sen’s house today?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Is it the embassy of North Korea?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: When did the King move out from his palace?
Chiem: The new palace was halfway under construction, and was only completed in 1978. He said his palace would be for entertaining guests, and that he would prefer to stay in the house behind the palace.
Dany: Was there a meeting on the fifth?
Chiem: Yes, and after the meeting, we held a party.
Dany: Did the King also attend the party?
Chiem: Yes, Nuon Chea, Pol Pot, Sun Sen, and Ieng Sary also joined the meeting and party.
Dany: Was the party held nearby today’s Cambodian Development Committee?
Chiem: Yes, but it was called House Number 1.
Dany: Did you also join the party?
Chiem: No. I didn’t attend the party, but I guarded the building outside.
Dany: What happened on the sixth of January, after the party?
Chiem: On the fifth, we worked and enjoyed the party, but on the sixth we simply carried out our usual tasks. At night, we sent the King to the airport to travel to Peking.
Dany: When did the flight to Peking take off?
Chiem: It was around 8 o’clock.
Dany: Do you mean 8pm?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Who took the flight with the King?
Chiem: Only the King Pen Nut and a few servants accompanied the King.
Dany: Did Ieng Sary go with the King?
Chiem: No.
Dany: Did you know where the King was heading to?
Chiem: He said first he would head first to Peking, and then to the United Nations. However, he was furious and blamed us for the fact that the Vietnamese forces had invaded Cambodia’s territory.
Dany: Do you mean he blamed everyone after he had settled into Peiking?
Chiem: Yes, upon his arrival, he put blame on us. He was extremely furious at us. He would not go discuss the issue with the United Nations.
Dany: At that time, do you mean that everyone was equipped with weapons and tools to fight against the Vietnamese?
Chiem: Yes! That night, I was on alert from 11am until 12pm. There were ongoing explosions across Phnom Penh. We believed that the Vietnamese forces were traveling down Road Number 1. We frequently heard explosions. When the morning came, I was preparing the ammunition. I met Ta Mok at around 8am. He asked me to place our military forces in Nak Loeung, and said he would send 20 tanks afterwards. We were waiting for the order to attack. At that time, Brother Met was the Chief of General Staff in Nak Loeng, but he disappeared.
Dany: Who?
Chiem: Brother Met.
Dany: Oh, do you mean Sou Met?
Chiem: Yes. He was the chief general. He disappeared. When Phnom Penh was chaotic and full of gun shots, my forces and I left for the train station and we passed Cheng Heng’s house in The Kosamak Hospital and Stung Meanchey. At around twelve, the Vietnamese forces entered Phnom Penh and occupied the Central Market. I sent some of the forces to spy for more information, and found out that there were many Vietnamese soldiers.
Dany: Were the staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affair asked to serve as soldiers?
Chiem: Yes, They became soldiers, and most of them were male.
Dany: Did they mobilize as one unit?
Chiem: Yes, they became a force of a regiment.
Dany: What happened when the Vietnamese troops captured the capital? Did the KR forces decide to retreat?
Chiem: As we no longer could win the battle, we decided to retreat to Thmat Porng Mountain. We spent two and a half months assembling the forces, and finally in mid-March we moved to the northwest zone. We ceaselessly fought against the Vietnamese forces and as a result, many were killed, including Vietnamese soldiers, and many of weapons were also destroyed.
Dany: Were [the KR] forces equipped with adequate weapon?
Dany: We didn’t have adequate weapons, and worst of all the front-line forces were not placed along the border. Thus, when the Vietnamese forces attacked, the rear forces were not able to control the situation and eventually retreated.
Dany: Did the soldiers usually retreat during the attack?
Chiem: We retreated to Pailin, and it took us four months.
Dany: Did the senior leaders come with you?
Chiem: No. When the Vitenamese forces captured Phnom Penh, I didn’t stay with them. By that time, Ieng Sary had already moved out of Phnom Penh with his family. He stopped at the Chinese embassy, and left the embassy afterwards.
Dany: So the Chinese embassy hadn’t withdrawn from the country yet. Is that true?
Chiem: Actually, the Chinese embassy was near the place where the senior leaders stayed. In April, I eventually arrived in Pailin, and I met Ieng Sary. I also met Pol Pot in Samlot.
Dany: While in the battle, did you maintance the contact with the senior leaders?
Chiem: Yes, I did. We did have an radio transceiver to communicate. We reported everything to them, and followed their orders.
Dany: In April when you arrived Pailin, how was the forces mobilized?
Chiem: Some of the forces were from Trat and were evacuated by the Thai authorities to Lem. Some forces were escaping from the north part of Siem Reap province. Of course, there were hundreds of thousands of people. It was a terrible situation.
Dany: Who were they? Were they the Khmer Rough cadres, soldiers, or villagers?
Chiem: Everyone moved to Pailin. A large majority were the soldiers themselves, and their families, from every ministry. Also, the staff from each ministry were unified into the military forces, both male and female. Male soldiers were in front line, while women served in transportation units and the young and the old were assigned to fight behind the front line.
Dany: Was it your own initiative or orders from the leaders to reform the forces?
Chiem: The reformation of the forces was suggested by the senior leaders. We were allowed to take actions to solve our political, military, economics, and technical problems after the plan was set up by the leaders.
Dany: During the three year resistance, the senior leaders took vigorious actions to strengthen the forces. You stated that when you moved to Pailin, the transportation unit and the front line soldiers had already been established, so could you tell me how this new policy differed from the previous policy?
Dany: It differed slightly from the previous policy. As you noticed, the secret resistance was distinctive from year to year. For instance, the secret resistance during the five year war differed from the three year resistance and the 1979 period.
Dany: I see. What was the secret resistance, really?
Chiem: It means we secretely resisted the government. However, during the coup d’ẻtat on the 18th of March, 1970, we didn’t have many members. Only during the five year war did we gather adequate forces and creat a transportation unit, known as “Sneng” unit, based in the battlefield. During the revolution that led up to the founding of National Democratic Kampuchea, hundreds of villagers volunteered, and they all were committed to liberate the country. On one hand, this revolution was known as the revolution of National Democratic Kampuchea, which won a complete victory on the 17th of April, 1975. It was noticeable that there was no resistant movement to overthrow the KR regime, except in 1977.
Dany: Does that mean that there had always been a traitorious group aiming to overthrow the revolution?
Dany: Yes, of course. They wanted to overthrow the revolution, and thus they were seeking ways to cause trouble, particularly by throwing accusations against the southwest and east zones. In fact, it was overcrowded in the southwest zone, and everyone was dying for power. Another problem was that Ta Mok had been continually promoted in the central zone. Worst of all, the cadres overseeing the east zone were accused of being the enemy, thus provoking chaos, and as a result, the Vietnamese forces were able to encroach on Cambodia’s territory. If the Vietnamese troops had not captured some areas, our government would not have been overthrown. . Noticeably, the policy of dealing with political and governmental management had been reformed. The forces in southwest zone were scatterred across every region, causing internal turmoil. For instance, stealing a potato, breaking a spoon was considered as a crime. It seemed that everyone viewed everyone else as an enemy, unlike the five year resistance when the people were unified. At this time, everyone criticized everyone else and dared to kill for power.
Dany: Did you become aware of all these minor accusations of stealing a potato, breaking a spoon or ploughing before or after the three-year-resistance?
Chiem: I became aware of this issue before the three-year-resistance because I had been travelling to various regions.
Dany: Did the senior leaders also learn about this?
Chiem: They definitely knew this. They knew that the cooperatives were not as developed as they claimed, because most people had only gruel with some vegetables. I also witnessed the poor living condition of people in the northwest zone, in Pursat province.
Dany: Do you mean you saw that the cooperatives that were supposed to be well developed could barely offer gruel to the people?
Cheim: Yes.
Dany: How was the living condition of people at that time?
Chiem: I have the memory of seeing people building dams, canals, and so on. At that time, I teased the elderly Nhoem, saying that the fact that villagers had only gruel showed that the cadre overseeing those people was incapable.
Dany: Oh, did you talk to elderly Nhoem in person?
Chiem: Yes, I did. I was just teasing him, but he took it seriously. Based on the party policy, those cadres who could only provide gruel to their people were incapable and useless.
Dany: When did you witness the poor living condition of people?
Chiem: In 1978.
Dany: Was Nhoem still alive in 1978?
Chiem: Yes, he was still alive in early 1978.
Dany: Who did you go with when you happened to witness this incident?
Chiem: I went to [the northwest zone] with Pol Pot. Road Number 5 linking Siem Reap to Kampong Cham was inaccessible, so we travelled by boat back to Phnom Penh.
Dany: Did Nuon Chea also join this trip?
Chiem: No, only Pol Pot.
Dany: How about Ieng Sary?
Chiem: No, Ieng Sary worked at his office in the Ministry.
Dany: Did you always travel with the senior leaders, although you worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
Chiem: Yes, I travelled with them whenever I was called, and Ieng Sary usually assigned me to go with them.
Dany: By the way, back to what you said earlier, you mean that senior leaders as such Pol Pot and Nuon Chea were aware of poor living condition of people.
Chiem: Of course, they were aware of this, that’s why in early 1978 they sent a message calling upon the cadres to tolerate each other and avoid accusing each other of being the enemy.
Dany: Yes, I also learned about that letter from 1978, which requested that the cadres tolerate and forgive each other.
Chiem: Yes, we had to tolerate and learn to forgive others.
Dany: Did the upper cadres also know about this?
Chiem: Yes, they knew it. Now that the potential cadres became cadres of the central committee, everyone in each zone and district knew everyone else. Because we were in the central zone, we knew everything. As members of the central committee, we were respected by the other cadres. We firmly trusted one another.
Dany: Did you know Nhoem and dare to talk to him?
Chiem: Yes, I had small talks with other cadres in every region, including those in the central zone.
Dany: I read a telegram discussing the Cham people in the north and northwest zones. Were you aware of the fact that the Chams in Koh Phal, Kampong Cham rebelled against the cadres, and killed some of them? Also that there was an evacuation of the Cham people out of the region?
Chiem: I didn’t know about such incidents. However, I heard Pol Pot mention some rebellious movements against the revolution. All the cadres were called to show their stances in their regions. Therefore, we had to be cautious. During the first three years, the first accusations that people were C.I.A or K.G.B agents took place. Also, the Kok Minh Taing group secretly established its three tratorious lines in Cambodia, aiming to take control over Cambodia. These three tratorious lines were tightly unified. Thus, we had to be on an alert for the revolutionary enemy.
Dany: Really?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: How about the Vietnamese enemy?
Chiem: There was no mention of the Vietnamese enemy, but the Vietnamese were known for their desire to establish an Indochinese federation. After our victory on the 17th of April, the Vietnamese were dismayed. The Vietnamese government directly asked our government to discuss its Indochinese plan in 1973. But we denied their call.
Dany: What would the discussion have been about?
Chiem: The Vietnamese troops attacked in the south part of the country and denied the negotiations proposed by the Americans. Finally, the Vietnamese government convinced the Cambodian government to negotiate with the Americans in June and July of 1973. Because of the poor cooperation, we refused to be involved in the negotiation. Although we lacked of ammunition, we stood firm and attacked back. As one of our slogans said, “Take the artillery from the enemy to fight the enemy,” “Where there are people, there are troops,” “Where there are people, there is economic growth”and“Where there are people, and there is a request.”
Dany: What happened in 1979?
Chiem: In 1979, we needed to dissolve the Communist Party of Kampuchea and mobilize forces.
Dany: How the situation in 1979 differred from the three-year-resistance?
Chiem: During the five-year-fighting, we were independent, but it was difficult to win the war. Nonetheless, we had adequate supplies, including weapons, gunpowder, healthy food-beef, sugar, rice, monosodium glutamate, fish paste, bread, canned fish, oil, and so on. Moreover, the implementation of the militia war tactics was running smoothly. At that time, we were able to defend ourselves and struggle to maintain our power, but during the last few years, the situation was uncontrollable, for example, we did not participate in the Barey Agreement, and thus were unable to participate in election movement. What is more was that Ta Mok set first and second conditions that required us not to join the election campaign and to continue to attack the enemy. At that time, we held a meeting organized by Ta Mok nearby Chhatt [Umbrella] Mountain.
Dany: What did he suggest during the meeting in Chhatt Mountain?
Chiem: Ta Mok told Pol Pot that if Pol Pot decided to carry on the fighting, he would follow the decision. It seemed that Ta Mok was no longer independent. The situation during the national resistance differed from the three-year-resistance. When the Vietnamese forces attacked us, we were weak both spiritually and intellectually. Everything was under Ta Mok authority, and consequently caused internal instability. He attempted to arrest Ieng Sary. However, because Ieng Sary oversaw the armed forces in Pailin and Malai, he orded his forces to be on alert. Worst, Pol Pot was not able to resolve the dispute, allowing Ta Mok to try to seek a solution to the row, which simply made the situation worse, like trying to extinguish a fire with gasoline. Also, my forces did not want to be under the control of Son Sen. Son Sen planned to arrest many leaders, namely Sok Pheap and E Chhean. This caused controversy among the leaders. One day, it was broadcast on air that Ieng Sary, Sok Pheap, and E Chhean were traitors. After learning this, we, soldiers from the two units, rose up against the accusation. Now that we were accused of being enemies, we decided to defect to the Hun Sen government. We thought it was useless to struggle anymore! Our group was not big, but still we broke apart. So Unit 320, the Ta Bet unit, and Unit 705 defected to the government, while the central unit remained under Son Sen’s authority. Ta Mok ordered the central unit to attack my forces in Malai and Pailin. However, because we used to struggle together, we decided to negotiate. They asked why we defected to the government. We simply replied “despite the internal disagreement, there shall not be an accusation broadcasted on air. Now that we were considered as traitors, we had better defect to the government.”
Dany: Do you mean the [KR] cadres based in Pailin and Malai defected to the government?
Chiem: Yes. Without the forces in Pailin and Malai, we would not have been here today. It was not that easy to overthrow the regime if the internal unity did not break apart.
Dany: Why was Son Sen killed?
Chiem: It was the internal dispute among the senior leaders. Because Son Sen was not able to oversee the Malai and Pailin zone, he was accused of being incapable. Eventually, he was killed by Ta Mok. In fact, there was a row among the leaders, and as a result, Pol Pot was kept in one place and prohibited from being involved in any problems. Ta Mok agitated cadres from the upper and the lower ranks, and was able to arrest Pol Pot as hostage. The internal affair was really complicated. Finally, Ta Mok planned to kill Pol Pot, hoping that he would be promoted as a leader when Pol Pot was killed. Actually, Ta Mok was a pigheaded and useless person.
Dany: What happened to Ny Korn or Neay Korn?
Chiem: Ny Korn?
Dany: I refered to Ny Korn, who was under supervision of Son Sen.
Chiem: Ny Korn was an older brother of Son Sen.
Dany: Really?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Did he also work for the Minstry of Foreign Affairs?
Chiem: He worked as an organizer for the Ministry. In 1979, he camped in Mak Heurn, and oversaw both political and military forces. Brother Hong was in charge of opening the way from Koh Kong to the areas near Lao border. Therefore, Ieng Sary contacted him and mobilized his forces to resist the government along the border.
Dany: I would like to know how Malai was developed?
Chiem: Yes, go ahead!
Dany: Before the armed forces settled in Malai, what was it called?
Chiem: Malai was a settlement of Division 450. It was Division 450 which stood firm against the enemy, and indeed Malai was frequently attacked. However, we were strong enough to keep the clash under control. After that, UNTAC was able to internally work with us, and as consequence the situation was calmed.
Dany: I would like to know what the original name of Malai? Was it originally called Malai?
Chiem: During the three-year-resistance, I heard it was called Malai Mountain. It was a settlement of free Khmers. In 1975, they were those who surrendered, namely, Dieng, Diel, and In Taom, and they were also known as White Khmer. It was said so, as far as I have heard. These groups ran a tremendous movement against the Khmer Rouge. In 1979, when I moved here, it was a densely forested area, full of wild animals such as tigers, elephants, and so on. It was completely different from today.
Dany: Who took control the Malai region or Malai Mountain during the three-year-resistance?
Chiem: It was under supervision of the northwest region.
Dany: Name of the region?
Chiem: Malai was in Region 5.
Dany: What was its district?
Chiem: It was in fact called Serey Sophorn district.
Dany: Wasn’t it Ou Chruv district?
Chiem: No, Ou Chruv district was named after the regime collapsed. Under the regime, it was Serey Sophorn district.
Dany: Wasn’t it Region 3?
Chiem: No, it was Region 5.
Dany: Who controlled Region 5?
Dany: It was Chiel, a son of Nhoem. I knew most of them, including elderly Vanh, who was in charge of military units in the northeast zone, Samai, Sou, Kue, Tul, and many more.
Dany: Does it mean that Malai was in Serey Sophorn district during the three-year-resistance?
Chiem: Yes!
Dany: Who was the chief of Serey Sophorn district?
Chiem: I don’t know, but Hing and Chiel controlled Region 5.
Dany: Was Malai the settlement of free Khmer forces and bandits?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Did the bandits attack the Khmer Rouge?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Did they still remain in this area when you moved here?
Chiem: No, I didn’t see any of them here, and had no idea where they had gone. Perhaps they emigrated to Thailand. But we found a place called Sras of Free Khmer [Pond of Free Khmer], where those free Khmer were stationed. It was belonged to an unknown minister. This area was a market for selling wood to Thailand, and the minister earned pretty good money. That’s all I saw at that time.
Dany: Was Sras of Free Khmer or Sras of immigrants named by your forces after you moved here?
Chiem: It was named by the Khmer people. The area was called that Sra of Free Khmer because the emigrated Khmer dug the pond to extract water for daily use.
Dany: When did these people emigrate?
Chiem: Those who lost in the war in 1975 escaped into the forest. Later on, they emigrated to Thailand. Elderly In and Taom created a movement called Molynaka.
Dany: After 1979, your team set up a transportation unit and combat forces. I would like to know how the management policy for the military and the civilians were set up.
Chiem: As army soldiers, we created a structure with a team chief, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, and squad. The living conditions in the battlefield were like a military camp, in a collective way. Everyone was on alert, maintaining internal orders, known as the second regime. Political and military commanders were in charge of different duties. For instance, the military commander commanded the military forces in the battle, while the political chief was in charge of mobilizing and managing the political forces both in the front and rear lines. Soldiers were in the front line, while the villagers were in the rear lines.
Dany: Did Ieng Sary take control of Pailin and Malai regions?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Did Son Seng oversee Sampov Loun region?
Chiem: Yes, that’s true.
Dany: How about Ny Korn?
Chiem: Yes, Ny Korn was in the same region as Son Sen. At first, Son Sen controlled Regions 1001 and 1002.
Dany: Where were Regions 1001 and 1002?
Chiem: They were close to Preah Vihear province, along the Lao border with Cambodia. Son Sen moved from Regions 1001 and 1002 to Pailin province. However, he did not manage to take control of Pailin, so he decided to move to Sampov Loun region with his brother, Ny Korn. Once he managed to control military forces, he was assigned to the west zone. The west zone was along Road Number five, and was known as a battlefield base. Nuon Chea and Son Sen were in the west zone, while Ta Mok and Ke Pauk were in the north zone.
Dany: Where was the north zone located?
Chiem: It ran from Poi Pet to the northeast and bordered Preah Vihear, Rattanakiri, and Mondulkiri provinces. The south and the west zones were divided into two huge battlefields, one of which was in Anlong Veng.
Dany: Who took control of Anlong Veng region?
Chiem: Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan.
Dany: How about in this region?
Chiem: Ieng Sary took control of this region.
Dany: Which part of this region?
Chiem: He supervised Regiment 450 and another regiment in Pailin.
Dany: What was the name of the regiment in Pailin?
Chiem: It was Regiment 415, and it was overseen by E Chhean.
Dany: Did you earlier say that Son Sen moved from Regions 1001 and 1002 to stay with his brother, Ny Korn?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: In which particular areas did Ny Korn take control?
Chiem: His targets were Battambang and Tonle Sap.
Dany: Which areas were under your control?
Chiem: The area from Road Number 5 to the Battabang and Banteay Meanchey provinces was under our control.
Dany: Which part of Road Number 5?
Chiem: From Poi Pet to Svay Sisophorn.
Dany: Where was Ieng Sary’s house located?
Chiem: His house was nearby here, in Malai, but he also had another house in Pailin.
Dany: Does it mean that he stayed temporarily in Malai?
Chiem: Yes. He was responsible for transporting weapons, and some food and financial supplies to regions throughout the country.
Dany: Who else were in the leadership positions in Malai?
Chiem: Brother Sok Pheap was in charge of the military section and Brother So Hong was in charge of policy issues.
Dany: How about you?
Chiem: I worked in a regiment, in charge of transportation and weapons management.
Dany: Really?
Chiem: Yes, I also fought in the battlefield.
Dany: Really?
Chiem: Yes, we were unable to wage on war if we did not transport the weapons.
Dany: Were there many female cadres working in this unit?
Chiem: No. In this regiment, there was another team that maintained military forces both in the front and rear lines, while we were to be in charge of transportation. We were assigned to do certain activities such as hiding food and gunpowder supplies for soldiers in the forest. Without all these supplies, the soldiers were not able to fight.
Dany: As you was in charge of transporting the supplies, do you remember where these supplies were imported from?
Chiem: They were donated from China. These supplies included rice, salt, gunpowder, money, and food.
Dany: Were there any contributions from Angkar?
Chiem: No. But we also received some donations from some donors who provided some supplies to several camps, including a camp of elderly Nguk, E Dao camp, Sras Keo, and Kham camp.
Dany: Does that mean that China provided supplies to the soldiers in the battlefield?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: What tactics did the soldiers use to wage the war?
Chiem: First, we spied to keep track of the situation. With clear information on the situation, we would attack. Soldiers in the battlefields were quick to attack and then withdraw. Second, we used a tactic called militiaman attack, in which we first sent a few soldiers, followed by five more soldiers, and then ten soldiers. These soldiers were supposed to mine, explode bombs, and so on. Futhermore, these tactics were also being taught to the villagers. Setting nails along the roads was another militiaman tactic.
Dany: Did it also include making sticky spikes?
Chiem: Yes, we used all these strategies.
Dany: How were the sticky spikes made?
Chiem: They was made from bamboo stick with sticky gum. The sticky gum was mixed with snake venom or other kinds of venom, and boiled with plant roots. The sticky spikes looked similar to arrows. There were many kinds of spikes. We called this tactic, “people attack”, which meant that men, women, and the young and the old knew how to make it.
Dany: Do you mean that the villagers were taught to fight in this way?
Chiem: Yes. It was called “actual movement”. We implemented this type of training only when our ideology had been absorbed by most of the people in our controlled regions. It was absolutely effective when people were quick to learn and believe in our movement. However, speaking of espionage, it was a difficult task to plant mines, although it was deemed as the most effective defense measure.
Dany: As a group of soldiers living in such a densely forested area, how did you all manage to build houses?
Chiem: You know, we were not able to afford these kinds of houses! The houses were simply made of bamboo sticks with thatched-roofs made out of plants. We also used tents for shelters. For the villagers, they simply built a hut small enough for one bed as their shelters.
Dany: Where were their huts?
Chiem: They were scattered around the river and throughout the forest.
Dany: I see. How many soldiers were gathered in this area?
Chiem: There were around two to three hundred thousand soldiers.
Dany: That many!
Chiem: Yes, and if we also counted in the villagers, there were millions of people. The militiaman resistance was impossible to dissolve with this great number of forces.
Dany: Million of people?
Chiem: Yes. Mobilizing forces was possible everywhere.
Dany: As I was told by some villagers here, the Vietnamese and the government forces made an attack on this area.
Chiem: Yes, the attack forced our forces to retreat to Thai territory.
Dany: Why?
Chiem: Because the front forces were not able to control the situation, we had to retreat. It was our tactic to retreat, or else our forces would be completely destroyed. However, we used another tactic, known as team attack. In 1989, we liberated Malai Mountain by attacking twenty to thirty times a day along the main road, and each attack-starting with bombs-was implemented by only a few militiamen. Regarding the bombs, we set a procedure for the militiamen to follow. They were not allowed to fire their guns, but only explode the bombs as that caused more death and injuries, and most importantly produced less noise. Once the Vietnamese and the government forces ran out of supplies and lost contact, they escaped for their survival.
Dany: How did your forces manage to escape into Thai territory when the Vietnamese troops attacked?
Chiem: The senior leaders asked permission from Thai authorities.
Dany: Where were your forces allowed to settle down?
Chiem: Of course, the Thai authorities granted the permission. We needed to rent a plot of land if we chose to settle in their territory.
Dany: What was the areas called?
Chiem: They were Areas 85 and 86.
Dany: How many people settled there?
Chiem: Hundreds of thousands of people.
Dany: Did you continue to make ongoing attacks?
Chiem: Yes, we finally liberated Malai in 1990.
Dany: Did people return to Malai after the liberation in 1990?
Chiem: Yes, in 1990 women and children were asked to resettle in Malai. However, the soldiers kept on attacking the Vietnames and the government forces along the border, Angkor Borey, and Svay. Eventually, we made their forces retreat, and we were able to enlarge our occupied areas. We set up forces to line up in those areas and continued attacking, and successfully occupied Sisophorn and Angkor Borey.
Dany: After enlarging the occupied areas, did the forces return to Malai in 1990?
Chiem: On November 15, 1989, we were able to liberate the above mentioned areas, except the area along Road Number 5 from Poi Pet to Sisophon. Finally, we took control of the whole area in the forest.
Dany: That means on November 15, 1989 your forces finally occupied those areas.
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: What were the challenges the group faced after all the Vietnamese and the government forces retreated?
Chiem: The area, known as the K5 mobilization, located along the border was filled with mines and spikes.
Dany: How did you deal with this?
Chiem: We cleared all the mines and dug up the spikes. We sold those spikes to Thai authorities, and earned some profit.
Dany: It was risky, wasn’t it?
Chiem: Yes, it was very risky.
Dany: How many were killed because of the mines?
Chiem: Hundreds.
Dany: I see.
Chiem: Some died, some wounded and crippled.
Dany: So, since your forces took control of Malia, did the Vietnamese forces attack on the area again?
Chiem: Yes, they hadn’t. At the beginning of 1990 and on October 23, 1991, there was an agreement. We sent our armed forces into Phnom Penh, enough to attack Khieu Samphan’s forces.
Dany: Did your grouphave hidden forces in Phnom Penh?
Chiem: Yes
Dany: When was the organizational structure of villages, communes, and districts created, Uncle?
Chiem: In Malai, we broke away to form the National Union of Democratic Kampuchea movement on August 15, 1996. In late 1998 we moved to Anlong Veng. In 1997, the government sent me to Stueng Treng, Zone 1, Ratanakkiri, Mondulkiri, and Kratie to convince the authorities there to form a break-away movement. I moved to Malai after I had finished my mission.
Dany: Who was in charge of the supervision?
Chiem: It was under the supervion of Yor, the most senior Khmer Rouge commander of the northern Nama Region.
Dany: His name is Yorn?
Chiem: Yor! Now he is a deputy commander of Ratanakkiri Miliary Sub-cooperation Zone. He holds the post of Colonel. He is my relative. He and I were lobbied to break away by the movement.
Dany: Uncle, I have another question. Malai district is divided into Dong Village, Kandal Village and so on. How was it divided then?
Chiem: At the time, those areas were grouped or systematized as a battalion or a regiment. I mean the battalion or regiment was like a village. In my division, there were 100 body guards, and then I organized it into a village.
Dany: What was its name?
Chiem: Presently, we had such villages as Reaksmei Meanchey, Santepheap, Banteay 1, Toul Prong Ror, Kla Gnorb, Koh Snuol, O Sampor 1, O Sampor 2, and Banteay 2. These villages were then grouped into a commune.
Dany: How many villages were there in a commune?
Chiem: Sometimes a commune consisted of four villages, eight villages or five villages. In Malai, there were 6 communes: Boeng Beng, Malai, So Srohlaov, O Sampor, Tuol Pong Ror and Ta Kong.
Dany: But first of all, were villages created where solders were based?
Chiem: Yes! When we defected to the government, we ceded our forces into the framework of military armed forces and military police. Some were district governors, deputy district governors, and we had different offices. The administrative structure was organized in compliance with the structure from the top.
Dany: Did your former Khmer Rouge grouphave to do this job on our own or we had anyone to help?
Chiem: No, not at all! They just informed us they would come and discuss how many villages there were and how many villages or communes we wanted to create. Obviously, we were better aware of the region than they were. If our request to create a district was agreed by the ministry, then we just waited for a royal decree to be issued, as we had already have governors.
Dany: Did your groupappoint people or develop the organizational structures on our own?
Chiem: Yes. We developed the organizational structure and sent it to the ministry for approval. If it was approved, we would carry out our jobs according to the hierarchy.
Dany: What would you compare a village to?
Chiem: A villag was comparable to a battalion or a regiment.
Dany: Does a battalion mean a village?
Chiem: Yes. Also, a regiment can become a commune. In each regiment, we have a chief.
Dany: Before the integration with the government, were there any villages or commune names as such Malai commune, Daung or Kanal or Thmei villages?
Chiem: No, after defecting to the government, the former KR named these villages and communes according to their geographical areas. For instance, Porng Ro village was named because this village was full of Porng Ro [a kind of sour fruit], Koh Snuol village, full of Snuol [force-ripened] trees, Banteay I and Banteay II, Boeng Beng commune, Sangke village, Chambak and Lavea village.
Dany: Oh, I see.
Chiem: It was how they were named.
Dany: How were people recruited to serve in military offices, administrative offices, and provincial government and as police officials?
Chiem: If I was a chief of a regiment, I would be recruited as provincial governor or deputy governor.
Dany: A chief of regiment?
Chiem: Yes. For instance, the chief of a regiment in the battlefield will reorganize and rename its regiment. For example, Regiment 450 was renamed Regiment 21 or 51.
Dany: Who served in the civil sectors?
Chiem: The civilians.
Dany: You mean the governor and deputy governor?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Who was the provincial governor at that time?
Chiem: In 1997, it was Chhoem Mony. Now he is working for the office of provincial hall.
Dany: What did he do before that?
Chiem: He worked as politician.
Dany: How many deputy governors were there?
Chiem: There were three deputy governors, including Mun, Morn and me. The provincial governor was Chhoem Mony.
Dany: What was the structure of police officials?
Chiem: The chief of provincial police is known as the inspector, while the chief of communce police is known as the police official. In each commune, there are nine police officials.
Dany: Yes, I know that. But during the integration with the government, were there any police officials?
Chiem: No.
Dany: Who were qualified to be police officials?
Chiem: Most of people served in the battalion were qualified.
Dany: They were recruited to be inspectors!
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: How about the security officials?
Chiem: The security officials hold the same ranking to the provincial military commander. It is the policy of the government.
Dany: After the election, were there any changes in the structure of provincial governors?
Chiem: No. There was no election. They were just simply appointed, and after their retirement, a new recruitement would take place.
Dany: Does age matter?
Chiem: No. As seen there are four governors, namely, Yi, Sokha, Keo and Ra, who are the former members [of the KR], while other deputy governors are newly recruited.
Dany: Senior members?
Chiem: Yes, among all deputy governors, there are three former deputy governors, three general provincial governors, and two other deputy governors, one of who is female. Also, we just established councils of provincial committees.
Dany: How many members are there in a council of provincial committee?
Chiem: There are thirteen members, twelve of whom are from the Cambodian People’s Paty and one from Sam Rainsy.
Dany: Ware you one of the members?
Chiem: No, I was appointed, but I declined to because it is an tiring job.
Dany: Do you now just simply work in the office of Cambodia People’s Party?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: After the integration with the government, what have you noticed about the changes in Malai between 1979 and the integration period?
Chiem: It was good for us to defect to the government. Our ranking framework remains the same, thus, we are able to be independent. The Win Win policy of the prime minister is very effective, and the government is implementing its promise. We are able to be the owners of the land, houses, and our personal property after we integrated with the government. Most noticeably, each village and commune implements decentralized management, which makes it possible for each village to play an independent role. The structure is divided into independent villages-consisted of village chief, deputy chief with an assistant, The structure is the sameboth commune level and provincial level.
Dany: What did today’s provincial governor do when you were the deputy governor?
Chiem: Today’s provincial governor is Tep Khun Nal.
Dany: Yes.
Chiem: Tep Khun Nal was a personal secretary to Pol Pot.
Dany: Does he also live in Malai?
Chiem: No, he first settled in Anlong Veng. Only in 1999 did he move to Malai.
Dany: Did he?
Chiem: The senior officers asked him to defect to the government, but he refused.
Dany: Please clarify!
Chiem: He was asked to work for the new government as a member of the council of ministers.
Dany: Did he really refuse this request?
Chiem: He wrote a letter to the King, requesting to be on duty in the province. Finally, he was granted permission. He is a capable member.
Dany: Is he an educated person?
Chiem: Yes, he is.
Dany: I don’t know him. Do you know how old he is now?
Chiem: I think he is a few years younger than me.
Dany: What were the strengths and weaknesses of the integration with the government?
Chiem: Before the integration, we were fearful of war. However, we are now able to live with our families, farm, and strive to earn a better living. We feel safe when travelling. So long as we have enough money, we can go wherever we want.
Dany: Have you noticed any weaknesses so far?
Chiem: In Malai, we have poor infrastructure. Recently, the government set up a development plan to build a new road in this area, except the road to the ricefield. . Also, if the water system can be improved, then Malai will become a developed area because all the important reconstruction, such as school buildings and ministries, has already been established. Moreover, people widely understand the rule of law and human rights practices.
Dany: Did you make a visit to your home village during the three-year-resistance or after the government liberation?
Chiem: I didn’t visit my home village during the three-year-resistance.
Dany: When did you visit your home village?
Chiem: I flew from Phnom Penh to visit Ratanakiri in 1997.
Dany: Oh, did you fly there because you had an important task to do?
Chiem: Yes, and that made it possible for me to visit my home village.
Dany: How did you feel after having been away for many years?
Chiem: I saw there were almost two hundred thousand people living there. Before that, there were just thirty thousand people.
Dany: In Ratanakiri?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: Do you mean in your village?
Chiem: There were not as many people as that in my village. I could see everyone that owned a motorbike, unlike under the regime, when no one could afford a bicycle.
Dany: Did your brothers or sisters and your father still recognize you when they first saw you?
Chiem: Yes, they did. There was a news report, and they learned about me. So they traveled with the Red Cross team and visited me. I met my parents and everyone. After I completed my task, I returned back.
Dany: How did you feel when you first met them?
Chiem: I was completely thrilled and happy.
Dany: During the three-year-resistance, you held a considerably good position. Why didn’t you make a visit to your home village?
Chiem: I thought I would visit my family in 1979 after all I had been tied up with my daily work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the three-year-resistance, I traveled to China.
Dany: Really?
Chiem: Yes.
Dany: When did you go to China?
Chiem: It was in 1976.
Dany: Did you travel to China to visit or to study?
Chiem: I went to China along with Pol Pot, Von Vet, elder Doeun, five people in total.
Dany: How long did you stay in China?
Chiem: It was around one month.
Dany: Where did you visit?
Chiem: We visited several provinces including ……
Dany: Did you vist Peking?
Chiem: Yes, we visited Peking and also the Great Wall of China.
Dany: Did you take any photos?
Chiem: Yes. But I have none with me because such photos shall be stored with Angkar. We had no rights to personally keep them.
Dany: Did your relatives live and work in Phnom Penh or at a base?
Chiem: No. My younger brother was a doctor since the three-year-resistance, and he still holds this profession, while my eldest sister was a housewife.
Dany: Did she work at all during the three-year-resistance?
Chiem: No.
Dany: Did you bring your brothers or sisters to Phnom Penh?
Chiem: No.
Dany: Have your relatives visited you in Malai?
Chiem: None, except my younger sister who has died. However, my father has been here for four months, and returned back in 2006.
Dany: Did he spend four months here?
Chiem: Yes. This is a picture of my mother and father.
Dany: When did you mother pass away?
Chiem: In 1978.
Dany: Your father is now 92 years old! He is very old! When visiting your home village, how do your relatives, friends, or villagers react?
Chiem: We are happy to see each other, but many of them are dead.
Dany: Have you ever thought of returning to your home village?
Chiem: I think we cannot afford that. We have already settled down here. But if we have enough money, we will see if we can return to our home village.
Dany: Why do you wish to live in your home village?
Chiem: Because I am here alone, while many of my relatives, and espically my three siblings are living there.
Dany: You have been living quite a long period of time. So do you think you will find it difficult to speak your native language if you return to live there?
Chiem: It’s difficult at first; however, after one week, I manage to adapt well.
Dany: Do people in your family speak Khmer or your native language?
Chiem: We speak Khmer.
Dany: I see. I would like to thank you so much for your time.
Chiem: Yes.

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

IF SAMUEL BECKETT MET POL POT

2011-04-04T11:30:00.000-07:00

TIK PANHAO - In some of Cambodia’s thousands of killing fields, the bones of the dead can sometimes be seen, rising to the surface after storms or rain, like grisly emblems of an unburied past. Perhaps 16,000 died at the s-21 Detention Camp in Phnom Penh, or at Choeung Ek outside the city. All told, an estimated 2 million people died during Pol Pot’s terror.

Breaking the silence onstage (Photo: Simon Roughneen)

On Wednesday evening, Tik Panhao was the scene of a searing, stark drama in the dimly-lit marketplace in front of the village pagoda, a bumpy hour’s motorcycle ride outside Phnom Penh. Tears run down Nhem Roeun’s face as she watched and listened to the performers on a makeshift stage.

“Where was my father? Where did you kill him?”, a woman asks. The Khmer Rouge cadre she accuses deny any foul play, or knowing where the missing man is. Later, as the drama moves through its seven mini-plays, all played by the same group of actors and actresses, the impact of ‘Breaking the Silence’ becomes apparent.

Encouraged beforehand to speak about their experiences after seeing the play, the older audience members nod in recognition of the themes, actions, dynamics and events recounted throughout, in a sparse, almost Beckettian style, which seems to fit well with the tranquil open-air setting.

Crowd watches near the pagoda as the silence is broken (Photo: Simon Roughneen)

Sayana Ser works for the Documentation Centre of Cambodia, whose vast repository of real-life accounts of the Khmer Rouge era were reproduced, often verbatim, in ‘Breaking the Silence’. “The people identify with what they see. We have staged the play twenty times now, and often there is an emotional reaction”, she says.

Watching the enactment of a scene in which a daughter steals rice from her family amid looming starvation, older men and women turn to each other, “it’s true” is whispered around the two hundred or so people sitting in the night-time warm, fanned by an unseasonal yet welcome cooling breeze.

Now 58 and born in Svay Rieng, Nhem Roeun was in her twenties when the Khmer Rouge killed her father and brother in Battambang. “It is good that children see this”, she said, wiping her cheek, “but I am not happy that Duch is appealing”.

Kaing Guak Eav, better known as Comrade Duch, was the head of S-21, a detention and torture camp in the heart of the nearby capital. Perhaps 16000 people died there or at Choeung Ek outside Phnom Penh, one of thousands of ‘Killing Fields’ established across Cambodia during the 1975-79 Khmer Rouge regime.

So far Duch is the only person convicted of crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge, even though a quarter of the country’s population died. He is appealing his 35 year sentence, which was handed down in July 2010 by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), to give the Khmer Rouge tribunal its full title. He says that he committed his crimes under duress from the senior Khmer Rouge leaders, 4 of whom are scheduled to go on trial later in 2011. The prosecution is saying that Duch should face a longer jail term, given that he could conceivably emerge a free man after spending 18-19 years in jail, with the sentence effectively commuted due to time already served in detention.

From behind the wire in S-21 (Photo: Simon Roughneen)

Lawyer and writer Theary Seng’s parents were murdered by the Khmer Rouge, and she says that a reduced sentence for Duch would be an injustice. However, looking ahead to the trial of the main surviving Khmer Rouge leaders, she thinks that the inconsistencies shown by Duch during his trial and appeal could jeopardise the bigger Case Number 2.

Khmer Rouge brutality in dramatis minimalist (Photo: Simon Roughneen)

“Duch will be the star witness when Nuon Chea and the others face the court”, she said, asking “what better way to discredit the witness by having him flip-flop before the court already?” She believes that Duch came under pressure to amend his remorseful stance, adding to long-standing allegations of political interference with the court.

Duch himself claims to be a scapegoat, the only one selected from hundreds if not thousands of other Khmer Rouge of similar profile or standing to face trial. “S-21 was not unique. It was like all the other security centers where torture was employed”, he said on Wednesday at the closing of his appeal hearing.

According to the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, “allegations of political interference have also caused uncertainty over the likelihood of further indictments beyond Case 002, complicating the development of a completion strategy for the tribunal.”

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, himself a former Khmer Rouge member, has made public his reluctance to have senior colleagues testify in Case 002, and previously, the Pre-trial Chamber’s international judges claimed “reason to believe that one or more members of the RGC (Royal Cambodian Government) may have knowingly and wilfully interfered with witnesses”. Sadly, with growing doubts over the trial of the mainly octogenerian Khmer Rouge leaders, Cambodia’s tragic and traumatic drama may not be over yet.

Echoes from the Killing Fields - The Irrawaddy
Cambodia's Teflon Tribunal - ISN
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Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Dispute Over Sentence of Khmer Rouge Prison Chief

2011-04-04T11:28:00.000-07:00

By SETH MYDANS
Published: March 30, 2011

BANGKOK — Prosecutors and defense attorneys both asked for drastic changes this week in the sentence given to the former commandant of the Khmer Rouge’s main prison and torture center.

In a three-day appeal hearing outside Phnom Penh prosecutors asked for a maximum sentence of life in prison. The defense asked for an acquittal that could allow the immediate release of the defendant, Kaing Guek Eav, better known as Duch.

He is the first Khmer Rouge official to stand trial for atrocities committed when the radical Communist regime held power in Cambodia, causing the deaths of an estimated 1.7 million people from 1975 to 1979. Four senior Khmer Rouge leaders are in custody in what is known as Case Two, which court officers say is expected to start this summer.

Last July Duch was sentenced to 35 years in prison for war crimes and crimes against humanity after an emotional and sometimes lurid trial describing the torture and killing of inmates at the Tuol Sleng prison.

The sentence was reduced to 19 years for time served and because of technicalities, arousing an outcry from survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime. It meant that Duch, now 68, could possibly walk free one day, particularly if the sentence is reduced for good behavior.

More than 14,000 prisoners were held and interrogated at Tuol Sleng; only a handful survived to see the Khmer Rouge driven from power by a Vietnamese invasion. The trial included vivid testimony, mostly from Duch, about prisoners’ torture and execution.

During the trial Duch acknowledged and apologized for his crimes in what many analysts saw as a tactic to obtain a lighter sentence, though some observers also saw genuine remorse. Then, on the final day of the trial, he fired the French lawyer who had constructed this defense. His Cambodian co-counsel said Duch was not guilty and demanded his immediate release.

During the appeal hearings this week his lawyers repeated that demand using a familiar defense — that Duch had obeyed his superiors for fear of execution. They called the tribunal, which is supported by the United Nations, “nothing but a venue for vengeance.”

“He had no other choice than to implement the orders, otherwise he would have been killed,” said one of his lawyers, Kang Ritheary, addressing the judges. “If you were in his shoes in 1979, what would you have done?”

Prosecutors, meanwhile, had their own criticisms of the court’s sentence last year. They said too much weight had been given to mitigating factors like Duch’s cooperation and his qualified expressions of remorse.

“We call for the imposition of a life term, reduced to 45 years,” said a prosecutor, Andrew Cayley. That figure takes into account 11 years Duch spent in illegal detention in a military jail. “For the purposes of history, a life term must be imposed,” Mr. Cayley said.

Duch’s unexpected declaration of innocence at the end of the trial undercut his claim of remorse, Mr. Cayley said.

A ruling is expected this summer.

Also this summer the second trial is due to begin, focusing on the four surviving senior members of the Khmer Rouge, all in their 70s and 80s and in poor health. The top Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, died in 1998. The defendants in Case Two are Nuon Chea, known as the movement’s chief ideologist; Khieu Samphan, the former head of state; Ieng Sary, who was foreign minister; and his wife, Ieng Thirith, who was minister for social affairs.

Although much of the world’s attention has moved far away from the decades-old crimes of the Khmer Rouge, the atrocities still arouse intense feelings in this traumatized country.

Norng Chan Phal, who was rescued as a child from Tuol Sleng when it fell to the Vietnamese in 1979, burst into tears on the first day of testimony Monday when he heard defense lawyers arguing for acquittal, according to Reach Sambath, chief spokesman for the tribunal.

“This is crazy,” he shouted, flinging a plastic bottle of water to the ground.

“He lost control,” Mr. Sambath said. “He said: ‘There is no justice! This is not justice for my father and mother who died in Tuol Sleng.’ ”

Mr. Sambath said he had comforted him saying that he, too, had lost his parents and that it was time to move forward and to let the law take its course.

© 2011 The New York Times

http://www.sundaytimes.lk/index.php/world-news/6002--victims-of-krouge-torture-prison-seek-justice-in-appeal
Victims of KRouge torture prison seek justice in appeal
Mohideen Mifthah

PHNOM PENH, March 30, 2011 (AFP) - Survivors and relatives of some of the 15,000 people who died in a Khmer Rouge prison run by torture chief Duch made a final call for more reparations as his appeal case drew to a close Wednesday.

Cambodia's UN-backed court sentenced Duch, 68, in July to 30 years in jail for war crimes and crimes against humanity for overseeing mass murder at the notorious prison Tuol Sleng -- or S-21 -- in the late 1970s.

The only reparations the court awarded the victims, known as the civil parties, was to include their names in the judgment and agree to publish Duch's apologies.

Financial compensation for victims is not an option but their lawyers on Wednesday called for other forms of collective and moral redress, such as memorials or free psychological support.

Their appeal followed those of the defence and the prosecution earlier this week and marked “the last moment for civil parties to get justice”, Brice Poirier from Avocats Sans Frontieres, which represents some of the victims, told AFP.

Lawyers are also asking for more civil parties to be admitted after the lower court rejected 24 of the 90 applicants, saying they had failed to prove their harm was closely linked to Duch's actions.

This had caused “distress” to individuals already “traumatised once by the actions of the accused”, lawyer Karim Khan told the Supreme Court Chamber.

In their appeal on Monday, Duch's lawyers called for his acquittal and release, saying the court had no right to try him because he was “just a minor secretary” following orders.

The prosecution argued on Tuesday that Duch had failed to show “real, sincere remorse” and demanded life imprisonment, to be reduced to 45 years for time spent in unlawful detention before the tribunal was established.

A ruling on the appeals is expected in late June.

Anne Heindel, a legal advisor to the Documentation Centre of Cambodia, which collects evidence of Khmer Rouge atrocities, said the civil party appeal reminds the court that the proceedings are not just about legal arguments but about “the lives of flesh and blood victims”.

A bespectacled Duch could be seen scribbling notes throughout the hearing.

Duch was originally given a 35-year jail sentence but this was reduced for the period of illegal detention.

Given time already served, he could walk free in less than 19 years, to the dismay of many victims of the brutal 1975-1979 regime.

Led by “Brother Number One” Pol Pot, who died in 1998, the Khmer Rouge wiped out up to two million people through starvation, overwork and execution.
S-21, in Phnom Penh, was at the centre of the regime's security apparatus.

Duch has been detained since 1999, when he was found working as a Christian aid worker in the jungle. He was formally arrested by the tribunal in July 2007.

Copyright © 2011 Times Online.

http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/2011032948222/The-Post.blogs/Duch-Supreme-Court-hearings-open.html
Duch appears at the Khmer Rouge tribunal on Monday (ECCC).
By James O'Toole and Cheang Sokha

Appeals in the case of former S-21 prison chief Kaing Guek Eav began at the Khmer Rouge tribunal yesterday with a contentious debate on the court’s jurisdiction and its right to try the accused, better known as Duch.

Prosecutors, the defence and civil party lawyers have all appealed the original judgment handed down last July, in which Duch was found guilty of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and sentenced to 30 years prison. Yesterday’s proceedings focused on the defence appeal, with lawyers Kar Savuth and Kang Ritheary charging that Duch falls outside the court’s mandate to prosecute “senior leaders” and those “most responsible” for crimes committed under Democratic Kampuchea.

In a rambling and often incoherent address at the outset of the hearing, Kar Savuth accused the tribunal of violating Cambodian law in its decision to try Duch, referencing documents including the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements and the 1994 Law to Outlaw the Democratic Kampuchea Group that he said restrict prosecutions of Khmer Rouge cadres.

“When there was a dispute between Thailand and Cambodia at the border, there was an appeal to the international community to really force Thailand to respect the law,” Kar Savuth said, drawing chuckles from the gallery. “When Thailand does not really respect these regulations, we say that Thailand is behaving unlawfully, and we believe that this tribunal would not really follow the footsteps of Thailand.”

Kar Savuth later added that because the Khmer Rouge were “lawless”, “whatever any individual did was not against the law”. He also questioned why former KR standing committee members So Phim and Ta Mok had not been identified as suspects by the court.

Ta Mok was arrested in 1999 before dying in custody in 2006. So Phim committed suicide in 1978.

Both Kar Savuth and Kang Ritheary also questioned why Duch could be considered one of those “most responsible” when the dozens of other prison chiefs of the DK era had not been arrested as well.

“Duch [was] merely the chief of a prison, similar to the 195 chiefs of prisons throughout Cambodia,” Kar Savuth said, adding that many former KR officials had been peacefully reintegrated into the government without facing charges.

“Even now at the Ministry of Defence, there are former Khmer Rouge cadres who have rank and status,” he said.

Terith Chy, head of the Victim Participation Project at the Documentation Centre of Cambodia, said the defence arguments were “probably more for the crowd than for the judges”.

“That’s our worry.... [that] people might buy what Kar Savuth has said, because he’s such a character, but we feel that these are not the legal arguments that [a] judge is looking for,” Terith Chy said.

“It’s obvious it’s unfair, why just one prison chief is prosecuted and why not others, but looking from the available evidence at the court, looking at the gravity of what happened in Tuol Sleng, looking at the responsibility of Duch ... he’s the type of person to be prosecuted.”

Co-prosecutor Chea Leang said the jurisdictional challenge was illegitimate since it had not been raised during the initial hearing as required by court rules. That aside, she said Duch was clearly one of those “most responsible” for Khmer Rouge crimes.

“The policy of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was implemented by the security centres, and the security apparatus was the heart of the policy of the CPK in smashing enemies,” she said. “S-21 was the most important office in this apparatus.”

Civil party lawyer Martine Jacquin added that Duch had “full control over the actions of his subordinates and over everything that happened at S-21”, a facility in which nearly all of the perhaps 14,000 people who entered were eventually killed.

The accused himself spoke only briefly at the beginning of the hearing, telling the court that he authorised his lawyers to act on his behalf. Wearing a white jacket over a button-down shirt, he appeared frail and at times did not seem to be paying attention to the proceedings.

Eng Try, 56, of Kampong Cham province, said outside the court that he had lost his parents and six siblings to the Khmer Rouge and strongly opposed the defence team’s bid for acquittal.

“My suffering from the Khmer Rouge regime is tremendous. He should serve life imprisonment,” Eng Try said.

Prosecutors requested in their appeal that Duch receive a 45-year jail term, commuted from life in prison because of his excessive pre-trial detention. This issue will be discussed when the tribunal reconvenes today.

Copyright © 2011 The Phnom Penh Post. All Rights Reserved..

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

CAMBODIA TRIBUNAL MONITOR: FINAL WORDS

2011-04-04T11:27:00.002-07:00

March 30, 2011
Final Words
By Charles Jackson, Candidate for Juris Doctorate, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois

Visitors gather to witness the final day of the Duch appeal
Charles Jackson

Today marked the end of the Kaing Guek Eav (alias “Duch”) appeals before the Supreme Court Chamber. A gallery full of Cambodian visitors provided a fitting background to the day’s topic of civil party appeals, which centered around complaints that the Trial Chamber failed in its duty to provide an adequate forum for reparations to victims of the Khmer Rouge. However, what most will remember from today was Duch’s final statement, an oddly formulated and self-indulgent request for release that brought a close to Case 1 hearings.

Civil Party Appeals

Each of the civil parties had an opportunity to address the court today and present their appeals related to victim participation and reparations. The three main contentions of the civil parties were that the Trial Chamber 1) misinterpreted the Internal Rules by creating a two-tier review of civil party admissibility, 2) erred by applying an excessively high standard of admissibility for civil party applications, and 3) failed to provide adequate reparations to the victims.

Karim Khan, co-counsel for Civil Party Group 1, began oral arguments with an emphatic request to the Chamber to recognize the traumatic effect that the Trial Chamber’s decision to reject certain civil party applications at the judgment phase had on those victims. “After enduring months of trial, after doing everything that was asked of them…on the day of the judgment for the very first time they were told that the civil party status that had been granted to them had been revoked.” He contended that nothing in the Internal Rules could justify the Trial Chamber’s decision to impose a two-tiered review of civil party status. The standard was “conjured up.”

The other civil parties echoed this argument and submitted that the Trial Chamber’s decision amounted to a deprivation of their client’s rights. These clients relied on the initial approval of their civil party status during the entire trial. Judge Klonowiecka-Milart expressed sympathy for the civil parties who had been rejected, but questioned whose responsibility it was to manage their expectations. She also pointed out that the Cambodian Code of Civil Procedure does include a two-tiered review of applications, possibly indicating some support for the Trial Chamber’s ruling.

Related to this alleged error of law, civil parties contended that the Trial Chamber also applied an unnecessarily high burden of proof when deciding that some civil party applicants had failed to show sufficient evidence that they were related to individuals killed at S-21.

Civil Party Group 2 and 3 also took issue with the reparations awarded by the Trial Chamber, which were limited to an inclusion of the civil parties’ names within the judgment and on the court’s website. The civil parties made numerous suggestions for more appropriate “moral and collective” reparations, such as the construction of memorials, the publication and dissemination of Duch’s statements of remorse, and the provision of medical care for those victims still suffering physical or mental harm.

Frustrated with the lack of resources provided by the court, Silke Studzinsky, co-counsel for Civil Party Group 2, expressed dissatisfaction with the Trial Chamber’s decision not to impose the costs of reparations on Duch directly. She questioned why the ECCC assumed that Duch was indigent, pointing out that he had profited from selling the rights to his autobiography and from participating in the production of the film “The Last Executioner.”

Studzinsky also lamented that this hearing was the last time civil party co-counsel would act in an autonomous capacity in court. Newly added Internal Rule 12ter creates two civil party co-lawyers and directs them to “coordinate civil party representation at trial” and grants them “ultimate responsibility to the court for the overall advocacy, strategy and in-court presentation of the consolidated group of civil parties during the trial stage and beyond.”

Duch’s Closing Statement

All hearings for Case 1 ended today with a closing statement from Duch in which he tried to walk an impossible line between showing remorse for his crimes and asking for a full acquittal. He began by reiterating his main point that the ECCC lacks personal jurisdiction to try him because he was not a senior leader or among those most responsible for crimes of the Khmer Rouge. He opposed the prosecution’s characterization of S-21 as a key organ of the Standing Committee. Duch equated himself to mid-level cadre and said, “S-21 was not unique. It was like all the other security centers where torture was employed.” He then transitioned into a duress argument, saying that he only survived the Khmer Rouge regime because he “respectfully and strictly followed orders.” Duch also argued that he had acted as a cooperative and remorseful witness, a noticeably odd claim given that it was sandwiched between denials of guilt and requests for release. “I maintain remorse for the victims and ask for forgiveness…Finally, I return to my principle. I do not fit within the personal jurisdiction of the court.”

Posted by CambodiaTribunalMonitor at Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Northwestern University School of Law Center for International Human Rights and Documentation Center of Cambodia

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

CAMBODIA TRIBUNAL MONITOR International or Domestic Court?

2011-04-04T11:27:00.001-07:00

March 29, 2011
International or Domestic Court?
By Charles Jackson, Candidate for Juris Doctorate, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois

International Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley takes questions from the judges
after requesting a life sentence for Duch
Courtesy ECCC

Day two of the Kaing Guek Eav (alias “Duch”) appeals before the Supreme Court Chamber centered around the prosecution’s appeal of the Trial Chamber’s judgment on grounds that the Trial Chamber incorrectly interpreted crimes against humanity and issued a manifestly insufficient sentence. Along with the change in topic from yesterday’s hearing came a noticeable shift in tone as co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley’s calm and methodical approach created a stark contrast with co-defense counsel Kar Savuth’s vocal and animated representation the day before.

Judge Agnieszka Klonowiecka-Milart began the proceedings by reading through the prosecution’s and defense’s appeals of the judgment. The prosecution was requesting a re-characterization of Duch’s conviction accompanied by a higher sentence. The defense was asking for a reduction.

Framing the specific legal arguments were differing thematic approaches taken by the prosecution and defense. On the one hand, Cayley began his oral arguments with a plea to the Supreme Court Chamber to recognize its position as an internationalized court, distinct from the domestic Cambodian judiciary. He asked the court to seize this important opportunity to foster the growth of a consistent body of international jurisprudence by looking to precedent from other tribunals. This foundation proved essential as each argument he made was supported with international case law. The defense, on the other hand, was quick to remind the Chamber throughout the day that the ECCC exists within the Cambodian judiciary and, as such, should be bound by domestic law.

Cumulative Convictions for Crimes Against Humanity

The first ground for appeal by the co-prosecutor related to the Trial Chamber’s decision to encompass all of the convictions for crimes against humanity, including murder, torture, rape, and forced labor, within the single crime of persecution. Expressing concern for national reconciliation and the historical record created by the ECCC, Cayley urged the Supreme Court Chamber to separate each offense into a distinct crime. Not doing so, he contended, would undermine the gravity of Duch’s actions and send the wrong message to future generations about what Duch did to his own people.

Cayley bolstered his policy argument with citations to case law from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). He argued that international jurisprudence provides for multiple criminal convictions for the same act so long as each offense has a material element that requires proof of a fact not required by the other offense(s). He explained how this was the case with Duch’s crimes, using a comparison of persecution and murder as an example. Murder requires proof that the accused caused the death of another person, while persecution does not. Persecution, on the other hand, requires a showing of discriminatory intent, while murder does not.

The defense declined to respond.

Rape as a Crime Against Humanity

Next, the co-prosecutor set forth his argument as to why the Trial Chamber incorrectly characterized rape as a form of torture instead of recognizing it as a separate crime against humanity. Cayley gave a lengthy history of rape as an offense recognized by civilized nations, beginning with the Lieber Code of 1863 from the American Civil War and including citations to the Hague Convention, the Geneva Conventions and the Control Council Law No. 10 of 1945. He contended that by 1945 rape had crystallized as a crime under customary international law and, therefore, it would not offend principles of legality to convict Duch for rape as an offense distinct from torture. He bolstered his argument with more references to the ICTY, ICTR, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which all have recognized rape as a crime against humanity.

The principle of legality, Cayley explained, does not require an offense to be domestically codified prior to the commission of the crime. Instead, legality is met so long as it was reasonably foreseeable to a perpetrator that his actions were criminal. Cayley then argued that the evidence and historical record clearly indicate Duch was aware that rape at S-21 was criminal.

Co-defense counsel Kang Ritheary led the defense’s response by reminding the court that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Duch. He then argued that Duch should not be found criminally liable for the act of rape that occurred at S-21 because he punished the actual perpetrator and took subsequent actions to prevent future acts of rape. Co-defense counsel Kar Savuth then made a brief statement. Lacking any legal basis, he asserted that rape at S-21 could not be charged as a crime against humanity because it only happened once and, therefore, could not be seen as widespread or systematic.

Enslavement and Forced Labor

Last, the co-prosecutor argued that the Trial Chamber erred by including forced labor within the definition of enslavement. Cayley argued that this error led the Trial Chamber not to convict Duch for numerous acts of enslavement at S-21. In its judgment of Case 1, the Trial Chamber convicted Duch of enslavement in relation to all of the detainees at S-24 (a labor site associated with S-21) and those detainees at S-21 who also were forced to work. Cayley urged the Supreme Court Chamber to re-characterize the Trial Chamber’s definition and convict Duch of enslavement of all S-21 detainees.

Co-defense counsel Ritheary gave a brief response in which he rejected the claim that enslavement and forced labor occurred. He said that detainees could “roam freely” and were treated equal to the Khmer Rouge cadres. “Even though [S-21 and S-24 victims] were detained they could go to work. Even cadres were under some restrictions.”

Sentencing Requests

The co-prosecutor argued that the Trial Chamber’s errors resulted in a sentence that was “manifestly insufficient” and requested the Supreme Court Chamber to increase it from 35 years to life imprisonment. However, the prosecution also recognized that due process violations for Duch’s time in illegal military detention justified a reduction of up to 5 years. Therefore, the OCP’s final recommendation was for Duch to serve 45 years with no possibility of parole.

The defense took a different view, urging the Supreme Court Chamber to find that the Trial Chamber gave insufficient weight to mitigating factors, including Duch’s cooperation and remorse. Co-defense counsel Ritheary also gave an impassioned description of Duch as a man who did everything he could to limit the harm of the actions he was forced to do under the threat of death. Ritheary challenged the judges to consider what they would have done had their lives been threatened by the Khmer Rouge and answered his own question by telling them, “You would be sitting where Duch is today.”

The defense requested that if the Supreme Court Chamber did not fully acquit Duch for lack of personal jurisdiction they should at least reduce his sentence to 15 years. Considering a sentence reduction for due process violations and time served, this would amount to his immediate release.

International or Domestic Court?

The prosecution’s heavy reliance on international law and defense counsel’s position that the ECCC is a domestic court culminated in a surprising and upsetting afternoon when both sides argued over whether or not the Cambodian Penal Code of 2009 (“2009 Penal Code”) should be considered by the Supreme Court Chamber when deciding an appropriate sentence for Duch. Article 95 of the 2009 Penal Code provides that if a life sentence is reduced for mitigating circumstances, the judge “may pronounce the penalty of imprisonment of between 15 and 30 years.” However, Article 668 of the 2009 Penal Code states that the code is not binding where it conflicts with other “special criminal legislation.”

The defense contended that the ECCC, as a domestic court, is bound to apply Article 95 and that it should be interpreted as providing a 30-year ceiling on the potential sentence that could be imposed due to the mitigating circumstances in Duch’s case. Although drafted after the formation of the ECCC, defense argued that proper statutory construction requires that an accused person receive the benefits of criminal legislation enacted subsequent to the commission of their crimes.

The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that the ECCC Law constitutes ‘special criminal legislation’ and, therefore, the ECCC is not bound by the 2009 Penal Code. Instead, the ECCC is bound by Article 39 of the ECCC Law, which grants the judges broad discretion to impose a sentence of five years to life imprisonment.

Judge Klonowiecka-Milart made the audience noticeably uneasy when she flatly rejected the prosecution’s characterization of the ECCC as sui generis and unbound by substantive domestic law. She also expressed doubt that there was any conflict between Article 95 of the 2009 Penal Code and Article 39 of the ECCC Law, indicating a belief that Article 668 of the 2009 Penal Code may be inapplicable. She then asked the prosecution how the court, as a domestic institution, would fail to serve the interests of the Cambodian people by taking into account the 2009 Penal Code, which is a Cambodian law. The proseution reiterated their belief that the court was sui generis and, even if it was seen as a domestic court, fell under the Article 668 exemption. Judge Klonowiecka-Milart seemed unconvinced. One audience member, keenly aware of the impact this could have on Duch’s sentence, left the visitor’s gallery in tears.

Posted by CambodiaTribunalMonitor at Tuesday, March 29, 2011
Northwestern University School of Law Center for International Human Rights and Documentation Center of Cambodia

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

BREAKING THE SILENCE RETURN 30 March 2011

2011-04-04T11:23:00.002-07:00

On 26 July 2010, the Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) delivered the judgment in its first case, sentencing Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, the chairman of the Khmer Rouge's S-21 prison, to 35 years in prison. With deductions for his cooperation with the Court, earlier illegal detention and time served, Duch currently has less than 18 years left to serve in prison. Of 90 victims participating as civil parties in the proceedings, 24 were not accorded that status in the judgment. All parties to the case have appealed. From March 28-31, the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber is hearing appeals against the Trial Chamber judgment. The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) has prepared a number of activities to facilitate the participation of civil parties and survivors.

On the evening of 30 March 2011 at 7 .pm., all civil parties and community representatives will have an opportunity to see a theater performance entitled "Breaking the Silence," produced by Amrita Performing Arts and directed by Annemarie Prins. The performance will be staged in Wat Tikha Panhao in Tikha Panhao village, Samraong Kraom commune, Khan Dangkao, Phnom Penh (see map below). “Breaking the Silence” encourages survivors to share their experiences from the Khmer Rouge regime with their family members and fellow survivors. The performance will be open to the public, free of charge.

You can contact DC-Cam for more information about performance times and locations. It is not too far away from the ECCC compound.

Savina Sirik Sayana Ser Terith Chy

012688046 092763272 012795353

“Breaking the Silence” Confronts Cambodia’s Past Artistically

Dacil Q. Keo

Art can be a powerful tool to help victims to cope with seemingly irreconcilable pain and trauma, especially when other means are unavailable. In Cambodia where millions experienced four years of brutality and subhuman conditions under the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975-1979, there are less than 30 psychiatrists in the country. Victims have lived knowing, in some cases nearby, their perpetrators for over two decades. Legal justice, with all its necessary and unnecessary complications, finally emerged in the form of the Khmer Rouge tribunal only recently. Its mission is to prosecute less than ten senior leaders, but what mechanisms will address the thousands of perpetrators who actually committed the atrocities and the victims who know their faces? Play director Annemarie Prins believes that art may be part of the answer. She hopes that her play, “Breaking the Silence,” will help foster an “open dialogue as part of the process of reconciliation” in Cambodia.

Prins’ entry into such plays began four years ago at the Royal University of Fine Arts where she lectured at a workshop. She exposed and intrigued the participants there to western contemporary theatre. During the course of the two week workshop, several participants opened up to Prins about what they had suffered during the genocide. These stories became the basis for Prins’ first play called, “3 Years, 8 Months, and 20 Days,” a title referring to the exact number of days in which the Khmer Rouge regime was in power. Her second play, produced by Amrita Performing Arts, expands upon the themes and issues addressed in the first, incorporating its survival stories with the added complexities of present-day coping measures.

“Breaking the Silence” is a play of seven stories of troubled relationships between survivors- both victims and perpetrators, of the Khmer Rouge regime. It is a humble yet compelling endeavor created to break the silence surrounding Cambodia’s traumatic past, hence the play’s name. The stories are acted by four female teachers from the Royal University of Fine Arts who will play both male and female roles. With teachers performing, Prins believes, the opportunity for Cambodian drama students to learn is even greater because the teachers will be able to incorporate their performance experiences into their instruction.

The issues addressed in the play are raw and sincere, supported with heartbreaking song, poetry, and dance. In one story, a former Khmer Rouge cadre grapples with guilt and seeks forgiveness from his mother, whom he meets on Saturdays at the market but does not talk to. When they finally exchange words, the mother responds, “It will never be the same, it will never be the same, my son.” Another story involves two former child soldiers who cope differently with their past. One is full of remorse and travels to a prison site where killing and torture took place, to ask for forgiveness. The other, still defending his actions during the day, succumbs to nightmares when he sleeps. A third story centers around a man who came close to avenging the death of his father and at present is caught between Buddhist teachings of karma and personal anguish. The other four stories illustrate similar conflicting emotions between survivors and within survivors; individual coping measures vary among the individuals. All stories share the theme of silence, in the form of denial, empty communication, or the inability to speak. This theme of silence is ubiquitous and loud, and certain to reflect the sentiments and thoughts of the audience.

Prins’ “Breaking the Silence” hopes to reach a wider audience than her first play and there are plans for a nationwide tour. With support from the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands and several organizations, including the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) which provided research and will bring the production to various provinces as part of its outreach activities, this play has the potential make a significant contribution to Cambodia’s healing process. When silence dominates survivors and the legal system is unreliable, plays such as Prins’ may hold one of the keys to unlocking Cambodia’s traumatized national psyche and in the process, gradually heal it. Localized mechanisms of dealing with trauma must resonate with the locals and in that regard plays may become an instrumental tool in Cambodia. DC-Cam Director Youk Chhang believes that Prins’ play will “communicate well with the hearts of the villagers” and that such plays are necessary because they help us “to recognize the beauty in the darkness and treasure it.” While some might not agree that there is always beauty in darkness, all can agree that darkness is a part of many of our lives and that beauty can exist in the ways in which honest reflections of darkness are artistically expressed. As the country struggles to overcome its darkness, plays such as Prins’ offers renewed hope in the resilience and strength of Cambodians.

A Dissertation on Breaking the Silence: Collective Memory

http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Radio/pdf/Collective_Memory_in_Cambodia.pdf

Scripts:

http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Radio/pdf/DCCAM_BREAKING_THE_SILENCE_%20FINAL.pdf

Some photos:

http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Radio/Drama_Images/index.htm

Breaking the Silence on Voice of America

http://www.voanews.com/khmer-english/news/special-reports/entertainment/Breaking-the-Silence--A-New-Cambodian-Play-91838704.html

* Please follow the map below to get to Wat Tikha Panhao:

“...a society cannot know itself if it does not have an accurate memory of its own history.”

CAMBODIA TRIBUNAL MONITOR: DUCH WAS JUST TOOL

2011-04-04T11:23:00.001-07:00

March 28, 2011
"Duch Was Just a Tool"
By Charles Jackson, Candidate for Juris Doctorate, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois

Duch stares intently as Supreme Court Chamber considers his request for acquittal
Courtesy ECCC

There was an almost nervous energy in the audience today as the visitor’s gallery at the ECCC filled with Cambodian onlookers for the first day of the Kaing Guek Eav (alias “Duch”) appeals before the Supreme Court Chamber.

Proceedings began with a summary reading of the Trial Chamber’s judgment by President of the Supreme Court Chamber, Kong Srim, including the crimes Duch was convicted of, the 35-year sentence issued, and the due process violation that reduced it by five years. He then summarized the procedural setting for the hearing and passed the floor over to defense to put their case forward as to why the Trial Chamber judgment should be invalidated and Duch released.

Duch spoke first, but only to state his belief that the Trial Chamber erred in finding personal jurisdiction over him and that his lawyers have authority to represent him before the Supreme Court Chamber.

Duch’s Appeal

Kar Savuth, the Cambodian co-defense counsel for Duch, led the defense team’s oral argument. For about an hour and fifteen minutes Savuth seemed to take a buckshot approach, jumping from one argument to the next in hopes that something would stick. There was also a strong focus on rhetoric as Savuth analogized the ECCC to Thai border incursions and Duch to pilots dropping bombs on Cambodia at the order of former U.S. President Richard Nixon. The former was used to highlight his point that the court had illegally extended its jurisdictional mandate beyond senior leaders and those most responsible for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime. The latter was used to illustrate his assertion that Duch was only following superior orders and, therefore, should not be held criminally responsible.

Stringing together the various points, the defense counsel’s key arguments were that 1) the Trial Chamber erred in its interpretation of Article 2 of the ECCC Law and Article 2 of the UN/Cambodia Agreement, which grants the court jurisdiction over “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes” of that regime, and 2) the Trial Chamber erroneously ignored Internal Rule 87 when determining that the defense’s jurisdictional challenge was inadmissible under Internal Rule 89.

Personal Jurisdiction

Savuth spent the majority of his time hammering the point that Duch was not a senior leader of Democratic Kampuchea and, therefore, was not one of the individuals most responsible for the crimes of that regime. He began by reminding the court that the purpose of the ECCC according to the UN/Cambodia Agreement is to bring peace and reconciliation to the people of Cambodia while respecting the sovereignty of the Royal Government of Cambodia. To do this, he argued, the court must respect the RGC’s intent to allow only the prosecution of the senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge and that senior leaders were only those few individuals who had the power to render orders and give commands on behalf of the Khmer Rouge regime. “Duch was head of a prison” he said, “so how could he be most responsible or a senior leader?” Duch was just a “puppet.”

Savuth argued that, because Duch was not a member of the Standing Committee, he could not be seen as a senior leader most responsible for crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction. His argument implied a conjunctive reading of Article 2 of the Law and Article 2 of the UN/Cambodia Agreement whereby, according to him, only senior leaders could be characterized as those most responsible. However, it wasn’t until Judge Chandra Nihal Jayasinghe asked whether this was the defense counsel’s argument that the other co-defense counsel for Duch, Kang Ritheary, confirmed it to be defense’s argument.

Once having established his assertion that only senior leaders could be prosecuted before the ECCC, Savuth questioned how Duch could be characterized as such. He quoted Judge Cartwright as having said that the Communist Party of Kampuchea made all the decisions related to who was to be detained in security centers and who was to be ‘smashed’. He also pointed to documents that showed Duch was not a member of the Standing Committee. He reasserted numerous times that Duch was a low-level secretary with no real authority; that the real blame lie with Pol Pot, Son Sen and Nuon Chea. “Duch was just a tool.”

Finally, Savuth spent time pointing out that there were 195 security centers under the DK regime, each with its own leader, yet Duch was the only one being tried. Possibly hinting at selective prosecution, he asked, “Was killing at other prisons not willful? Were detainees detained legally? Was there not torture? Were people kept in a hotel or something?”

After offering an apology to the victims and informing the audience that he, too, had lost family members to the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, Ritheary followed up Savuth’s jurisdictional argument with many of the same points. He asserted that the Trial Chamber’s finding that Duch fell within its personal jurisdiction amounted to an expansion of its legislative mandate in violation of civil law theory. “Perpetrators don’t fall within the court’s jurisdiction. Only instigators,” he said.

Internal Rule 89 - Preliminary Objections

The second argument of Duch’s defense counsel centered around the question of whether jurisdictional arguments must be made as preliminary objections in order to be preserved for appeal under Internal Rule 89 or whether they could be made anytime during trial if new evidence was admitted under Internal Rule 87. However, the oral arguments failed to clearly illuminate their point and, instead, the defense counsel spent their time levying accusations that the Co-Investigating Judges, the Co-Prosecutors, and the Trial Chamber failed to consider exculpatory evidence that showed Duch was not a senior leader or among those most responsible for crimes of the DK regime.

Defense counsel also briefly argued that Duch’s detention should be viewed as “witness protection” because the detention was illegal and because Duch had offered substantial cooperation to the court, giving evidence about the Standing Committee’s structure and the role of S-21 within Democratic Kampuchea. The point of this argument was noticeably unclear and led to follow-up questions from the judges that received equally vague answers.

The Prosecution’s Response

Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang presented the prosecution’s response to Duch’s appeal and focused mainly on the impact Duch had on Khmer Rouge decision-making and the unique role of S-21. She pointed to evidence that Duch reported directly to the Standing Committee and that his annotations on detainee statements clearly showed his power to decide which prisoners would be ‘smashed.’ She also pointed out that Duch, unlike other security center leaders, had the power to arrest, detain and kill high-ranking Khmer Rouge cadre throughout Cambodia. In this way she argued S-21 was a key organ of the Khmer Rouge regime and that Duch, as its head, was fairly characterized as among those “most responsible.” Therefore, she asserted the Trial Chamber correctly held it had jurisdiction to prosecute Duch.

When asked by the judges whether “most responsible” and “senior leaders” should be read conjunctively, as defense asserted, Co-Prosecutor Andew Cayley rose momentarily and directed the court to evidence that the UN Committee of Experts and the Cambodian National Assembly, when considering the ECCC’s jurisdictional mandate prior to the court’s creation, both intended the statement to be read disjunctively.

Prosecutorial Discretion

Although listed on the court’s schedule as the key issue for today’s hearing, the question of whether Article 2 of the Law and Article 2 of the UN/Cambodia Agreement were subject to judicial review received little attention. After both the defense and the prosecution had made their arguments, Judge Motoo Noguchi put the question to the prosecution, asking them whether the phrase ‘senior leaders and those most responsible’ was intended as a guide to be used by the Co-Prosecutors when exercising prosecutorial discretion and, as such, not subject to review or whether it was a jurisdictional requirement that was subject to judicial review. The prosecution responded that it was the former, but failed to give a legal basis for their opinion. The defense counsel did not directly address the issue, although their jurisdictional argument and request for acquittal implied a belief that it was subject to review.

Civil Party Statement

The day finished with a 30-minute statement by Martine Jacquin, co-counsel for Civil Party Group 3. Although well organized and eloquent, the statement did little more than summarize Duch’s argument and reemphasize points made by the prosecution. Defense counsel had a brief final word and said that civil parties should only address the harm committed to victims and the appropriate reparations that the court should grant them.
Posted by CambodiaTribunalMonitor at Monday, March 28, 2011

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

AT THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL TODAY

2011-04-04T11:21:00.002-07:00

PHOTOS: http://dccam.org/Projects/Living_Doc/Photos/2011/Duch_Appeal_at_the_ECCC_March_28_2011/index.html
----------

NEWS:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12877629

British Broadcasting CorporationHome
28 March 2011 Last updated at 08:03 GMT
Khmer Rouge jailer Duch appeals against convictionBy
Guy De Launey
BBC News, Phnom Penh

A UN-backed tribunal in Cambodia is hearing the appeal of a former Khmer Rouge member who was convicted of crimes against humanity.

Kaing Guek Eav was in charge of a detention centre in the late 1970s and oversaw the deaths of around 15,000 people.

But now the man best known as Comrade Duch is arguing he should not have been tried at all.

The Khmer Rouge tribunal has a strictly defined role.

That is to bring to justice the surviving senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge and the people most responsible for the worst crimes committed during the four years Pol Pot's government controlled Cambodia.

Comrade Duch claims he falls into neither category.

Baffling

He has admitted that he ran the notorious S-21 detention centre in Phnom Penh.

During the public phase of his trial he even apologised to relatives of the people who died there.

But he insisted that he was only following orders and that he and his family might have been killed if he had not done as he was told.

The trial chamber rejected his arguments and passed a sentence of 35 years for crimes against humanity, torture and pre-meditated murder.

Youk Chhang is the director of the Documentation Centre which investigated the events at S-21.

He says Cambodians would be baffled by Duch's appeal.

"It's difficult for the public in general to understand the court procedure - they're not lawyers," he said.

"And it's because Duch himself has said all these things during the hearing already: 'Well, I admit it; now I don't'. And then people find that crazy."

The appeal hearing should be followed within months by the long-awaited second trial at the tribunal.

Four senior surviving Khmer Rouge leaders are facing charges of genocide for creating the policies which led to the deaths of around 2m people.

BBC © MMXI The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites.

------------

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/world/7493935.html
Ex-Khmer Rouge prison chief appeals sentence
By MIKE ECKEL Associated Press © 2011 The Associated Press
March 27, 2011, 11:42PM

Mark Peters AP
In this photo released by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, Kaing Guek Eav, also known as Duch, center, who ran the notorious
Toul Sleng, a top secret detention center for the worst "enemies" of the
state, looks on during his appealing at the U.N.-backed war crimes tribunal
in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Monday, March 28, 2011. The man who admitted
overseeing the killing of 16,000 people as the Khmer Rouge's chief prison
warden returns to the courtroom to appeal his 19-year prison sentence on
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. (AP Photo/ Mark Peters,
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia)

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — The man who admitted to overseeing the torture and
killing of 16,000 people as the Khmer Rouge's chief prison warden returned
to the courtroom Monday in Cambodia to appeal his 19-year prison sentence
for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Kaing Guek Eav — also known as Duch — is the only person so far to be tried
by a special U.N.-backed tribunal set up to investigate and prosecute
officials from the brutal ultra-Marxist regime whose four-year rule in the
1970s led to the deaths of an estimated 1.7 million people.

The 68-year-old Duch was sentenced last July to 35 years in prison for war
crimes and crimes against humanity, but the sentenced was commuted to 19
years due to time already served and other technicalities.

Defense lawyers have argued that Duch was wrongfully convicted because the
tribunal — known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia —
was supposed to try only senior Khmer Rouge leaders. They argue that Duch
was not a top leader and was merely following orders.

Duch briefly told the court Monday that his case hinged on "personal
jurisdiction" — that is, whether the court had authority to prosecute him.
He then sat impassively as his lawyer spoke.

"Duch was the chairman of a prison guard, of a security center. How could he
be considered to be one of those most responsible for the crimes?" defense
lawyer Kar Savuth said. "He was of course a perpetrator, but he received
orders from his superiors like at other prisons."

Kar argued that Duch was a victim of selective prosecution, since the court
has not sought to indict chiefs of the Khmer Rouge's other 195 prisons,
where he said far more people died than under Duch.

"Duch was just a minor secretary who had no real authority to make any real
decisions or do anything contradictory to the orders of the upper echelon,"
Kar Savuth said.

Prosecutors and others have widely criticized the sentence as too lenient.
Prosecutors have filed a separate appeal and were scheduled to present their
arguments after the defense, with the proceedings scheduled to end by
midweek. A ruling was expected "in the next few months," said tribunal
spokesman Reach Sambath.

Victims and relatives of the Khmer Rouge have expressed outrage by the
sentence, which could allow Duch to one day walk free.

During his 77-day trial, Duch admitted to overseeing the deaths of up to
16,000 people who passed through the gates of the notorious Toul Sleng
prison — also known as S-21 — in Phnom Penh. Prisoners were accused of being
enemies of the regime, and many were tortured into making false confessions.
Torture methods included pulling out prisoners' toenails, administering
electric shocks and waterboarding — a form of simulated drowning.

The hearings will once again focus attention on the U.N. court as it gears
up for another trial later this year of four senior Khmer Rouge leaders:
Nuon Chea, the Khmer Rouge's chief ideologist; Khieu Samphan, its former
head of state; Ieng Sary, its foreign minister; and his wife Ieng Thirith,
who was minister for social affairs.

Critics say the tribunal — 10 years and $100 million in the making — has
been too slow to investigate potential suspects and bring them to trial. The
four leaders scheduled to stand trial in June are all in their 70s and 80s
and in poor health.

The court has also faced allegations of corruption and has been stonewalled
by the current Cambodian government headed by Prime Minister Hun Sen,
himself a former Khmer Rouge military commander. Hun Sen has vehemently
fought the tribunal's efforts to bring more Khmer Rouge officials to
justice, arguing that such moves could destabilize the poor country.

The Khmer Rouge's top leader, Pol Pot, died in 1998.

Copyright © 2011 The Houston Chronicle

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Cambodia Tribunal Monitor

2011-04-04T11:21:00.001-07:00

Report from Royal University of Agriculture

By: Sok-Kheang Ly,

March 24, 2011

A workshop on the Cambodian Tribunal Monitor (CTM) website was held at Royal University of Agriculture (RUA) on March 23rd, 2011. Located in an 18-hectare compound covered by numerous species of tree and beds of vegetable garden, and dotted with old and separate buildings, RUA hosted hundreds of students who study at nine faculties. The majority of them are from various provinces across Cambodia, while only a small percentage are from Phnom Penh. With prior information about the workshop, approximately 600 students came and gathered together at a huge and nice conference building of the university.

The workshop started with DC-Cam Deputy Director Vanthan Peou Dara expressing his thanks to RUA for its cooperation with DC-Cam's CTM project. This project is designed to guide the students on how to use the important tools to log in, read and retrieve information about the Khmer Rouge trials. Mr. Vanthan quickly showed them different parts of the website, including the blog, news, multimedia, ECCC & NGO report, trial proceedings, history, tribunal background, and commentary pages. These sections contain significant information that captured students' attention.

In interviews with several students, they said that the CTM website is beneficial for them. Mr. Din Samrith, foundation year student, said that the website will equip him with the knowledge necessary to engage in debates about the tribunal and also the KR history. In addition, Ms. Sa Pisey and Ms. Bun Chanthou, both foundation year students, said that they will do more research about, and follow the process of, the Khmer Rouge tribunal. Meanwhile, Mr. Khoem Chamrong, also a foundation year student, said the website is a source that makes it possible for him to do more research and to understand the policy of the KR leaders through the ongoing judicial process. Most students have shown their keen interest in the presentation about the CTM website, and expressed a desire to use it as a source of research.

In addition to learning about the website, several students debated with Mr. Vanthan about a number of topics, while some voiced their views on the Khmer Rouge. One student began by wondering why the KR regime ruled the country and made all Cambodians betray their consciences. Mr. Phim Meng Hak, a foundation year student, wanted an explanation as to why the KR needed to preserve a large collection of documents left behind at S-21. Interestingly, Mr. Heng Seng Pheang, also a foundation year student, expresses his curiosity about whether Case 003 will be brought to trial or not. In response, some students managed to express their views in regard to the abovementioned topic and Mr. Vanthan helped clarify those points.

After hearing this discussion, Ms. Khoeun Srei Pol, a second year student, tried to convince some of the younger generation who tend not to believe in the KR atrocities of the reality of the KR history. Some of the students even laughed at the gestures of the Khmer Rouge survivors depicted in the DC-Cam-produced film titled: "Behind the Walls of S-21: Oral Histories from Tuol Sleng Prison" (please visit the link: http://www.dccam.org/Archives/Films/Films.htm). Mr. Yorn Chandara, a foundation year student, thought that it was a mistake for the students to do so, saying that their lack of understanding was because they have never experienced such tremendous suffering. Mr. Vanthan then took that opportunity to compromise the differences by resonating the word of DC-Cam's Director Youk Chhang that: "as victims, they have cried for more than 30 years. They should stop crying now."

The workshop ended at 4:30 p.m with the distribution of 80 copies of "Searching for the Truth" magazine, 500 Booklets on Case 002, and 500 hand-outs that help guide students to use the CTM website.

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Duch: Teacher who became feared Khmer Rouge jailer

2011-04-04T11:20:00.000-07:00

AFP
Sat, Mar 26, 2011

PHNOM PENH - Khmer Rouge torture chief Duch once taught maths to schoolchildren, but put his cold, calculating mind to far more devastating use as head of a jail from which few inmates ever came out alive.

The 68-year-old - whose real name is Kaing Guek Eav - oversaw the extermination of around 15,000 men, women and children at the Tuol Sleng prison in Cambodia's capital during the communist regime's brutal 1975-1979 rule.

Those who worked under him at the detention centre testified that Duch was universally feared. Most of the staff were uneducated teenage boys and Duch said they could be easily indoctrinated because they were "like a blank piece of paper".

Duch begged for forgiveness at Cambodia's UN-backed war crimes court for crimes committed under his command at the jail, where prisoners were tortured into denouncing themselves and others as foreign spies.

But victims questioned whether his remorse was genuine after he asked to be acquitted in his closing remarks.

He was sentenced to 30 years in prison last July for war crimes and crimes against humanity but could walk free in less than 19 years.

Duch's lawyers will appeal against the verdict next week, arguing their client should be released because he falls outside the court's jurisdiction, while the prosecution is seeking a longer jail term.

Anne Heindel, a legal advisor to the Documentation Centre of Cambodia, which collects evidence of Khmer Rouge atrocities, said Duch did not accept full responsibility for his crimes.

"He believes he was a cog in the communist party wheel, that because he was not fully autonomous in his decision-making, his guilt is lessened," she said.

Born in 1942 in central Cambodia, Duch is remembered as a sincere teacher devoted to helping the poor before he became a Khmer Rouge cadre in 1970.

"I joined the revolution in order to transform society, to oppose the government, to oppose torture," Duch said during his trial.

"I sacrificed everything for the revolution, sincerely and absolutely."

Inside the rebel-controlled zones, he chose Duch as his revolutionary name because it was used by a model student in a schoolbook from his youth.

He oversaw a series of jungle prisons before being made head of Tuol Sleng after the regime seized Phnom Penh in 1975.

What began as only a few dozen prisoners turned into a daily torrent of condemned coming through Tuol Sleng, or S-21, as the regime purged itself of its "enemies".

Ever meticulous, Duch built up a huge archive of photos, confessions and other documents with which prosecutors traced the final horrible months of thousands of inmates' lives.

Following the Khmer Rouge's fall from power, he maintained posts within the communist movement as it battled Vietnam-backed troops.

He reportedly worked for Radio China in the 1980s and later taught in at least one refugee camp. After his wife was murdered in 1995, Duch turned to Christianity.

He was arrested after Irish photojournalist Nic Dunlop uncovered him working for a Christian aid agency in western Cambodia under a false name.

Before that, many had long assumed he was dead following his disappearance after Vietnamese troops ousted the Khmer Rouge in 1979.

"I told Nic Dunlop, 'Christ brought you to meet me'," Duch told his trial.

"I said, 'Before I used to serve human beings, but now I serve God'."

Copyright © 2011. Singapore Press Holdings Ltd . Co. Regn. No. 198402868E. All rights reserved.

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Heartache of Khmer Rouge forced marriage victims

2011-04-04T11:19:00.000-07:00

AFP/DC-Cam/File – This photo, received from the Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam), shows Cambodian men and women …
by Michelle Fitzpatrick – 32 mins ago

PHNOM PENH (AFP) – When the Khmer Rouge ordered Phalla to marry a man she had never met in 1976, the young woman knew she had to obey if she wanted to survive Cambodia's infamous "Killing Fields" era.

Having already angered the superiors in her labour camp by refusing to wed her cousin, she was warned that such defiance would not be tolerated twice.

"I was told I was to marry another man and if I still refused, I would be re-educated," she said, a term she knew meant certain death.

"Then I agreed because I was very afraid," Phalla, 54, told AFP, not wanting to use her real name. Experts say the Khmer Rouge forced tens of thousands of men and women to wed, often in mass ceremonies, as part of leader Pol Pot's plan to boost the population.

Authorities wanted to control every aspect of an individual's life and sought to destroy family bonds, claiming the state was all the family a person needed.

The hardline communist regime strove to create an agrarian utopia but was ultimately responsible for the deaths of up two million people from overwork, starvation and execution between 1975 and 1979. Four of the movement's most senior surviving leaders -- "Brother Number Two" Nuon Chea, former head of state Khieu Samphan, ex-foreign minister Ieng Sary and ex-social affairs minister Ieng Thirith -- are set to face a UN-backed court for atrocity crimes in the middle of this year.

With forced marriage included as a crime against humanity in the indictments, the trial will provide the first forum for these husbands and wives to seek justice.

More than 600 forced marriage victims have been included as civil parties in the upcoming case, international civil party co-lawyer Silke Studzinsky told AFP, and many are hoping to give testimony. According to the indictments, the unions "were part of the attack against the civilian population, in particular the imposition of sexual relations aimed at enforced procreation".

In stark contrast to a traditional Cambodian wedding, Pol Pot's mass ceremonies were sombre affairs without any sense of celebration and usually without any family members present, witnesses say. "The organisation called out one male name and one female name," Phalla recalled. "They asked us to make a commitment to stay together forever. That was the first time I met my husband."

Many couples say there was pressure to consummate the marriage on the wedding night. A wooden dwelling on stilts provided a semblance of privacy for the reluctant couples, but they were hardly alone.

"Soldiers stood underneath our building, listening to hear whether we were getting along or having disputes," said Phalla.

"But we just lay there, like brother and sister." The next day they were sent back to their own bases and saw each other "only very rarely" at pre-arranged times. It is not known how many unions led to pregnancies or how many couples split up after the regime was ousted from power in 1979. "After the Khmer Rouge, many people tried to get back to their families and their homes, so it was easy to separate," said Studzinsky. "But others stayed together, often because they had children as a result of the forced marriage."

Phalla remained married. "Under the Pol Pot regime, my husband listened to me. He respected my rights, did not abuse me or rape me," she said. "In the end, I fell in love with him."

Still Phalla insists a crime was committed. "We had no opportunity to choose our own spouse. I want justice for that situation," she said. Unlike forced marriages in Rwanda, Sierra Leone or Uganda -- where husbands were often the perpetrators -- Cambodian men were themselves victims, according to Natalae Anderson, a researcher at Rutgers University in New Jersey.

"Forced marriage in the Cambodian context is unique when compared to incidences of forced marriage in other countries," she wrote last year in a paper for the Documentation Centre of Cambodia, which collects evidence of Khmer Rouge atrocities. Observers have warned the case will be lengthy and complex, with all four defendants denying the charges.

It follows the landmark conviction last July of Khmer Rouge prison chief Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, who was sentenced to 30 years in jail for overseeing the deaths of some 15,000 people. Both Duch and the prosecution have contested the verdict. Their appeals will be heard next week.

There will be no individual reparations for the forced marriage victims and the tribunal has instead invited suggestions for alternative forms of "collective and moral" redress. Education programmes and remembrance days are among the ideas mooted.

Sin Ban is stepping forward as a civil party "because our rights were abused".

Now a 57-year-old farmer, he said the officials in his commune ordered him to marry a woman who had difficulty walking just weeks before Vietnamese forces liberated the country. His eyes downcast, he admits that he considered leaving her when freedom beckoned.

"But then I thought about how she had lost her parents and that she was disabled. I felt pity for her so I tried to take care of her," said the father-of-six, who has stuck by his wife to this day.

Copyright © 2011 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved.

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

THE PREAH VIHEAR TIMES

2011-02-28T18:56:00.001-08:00

A Newspaper of the Documentation Center of Cambodia
(coming up...)

(PDF) HM King Sisowat's Letter of 5 November 1906 (attached), several months before the France-Siam 1907 Treaty was signed, regarding the provinces of Soren (Surin), Kuckkan (Sisaket), Sangkae (Sangka), Nokoreach sema, Chantaburi, Paknam etc. The King demanded that they be returned to Cambodia. [Bora Touch]

(Courtesy: International Court to Justice, 1962a, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear. Pleadings, oral arguments, documents. The Hague)

Unoficial translation

Letter from the King of Cambodia, H.M. Sisowath,
to the French Colonial Governor in Cambodia
(5 November 1906)

Kingdom of Cambodia
No. 205

Office of the King
H.M. Preah Bat Samdech Preah SISOWATH Cham-Chakrapong Hakrireach Barminthor Phuvanay Kraykeofa Soulalay Preah Chao Krong Kampuchea Thippadey, King of Cambodia
To the Governor of the French Republic in Cambodia,
Phnom Penh

Mr. Governor,

At a time when France, our benefactor, is busy with the delimitation of the border of Cambodia with the former Cambodian provinces abducted by Siam, I believe that it is my duty to send you the following observations and reservations, and I am also asking you to please let these be known, at an opportune time, to the delimitation Commission which will start its works and submit them to the Government of the (French) Republic. My delegates within this Commission are also in charge of supporting the same demands in front of the Commission.

1- In reality and incontestably, the cession to Siam by France of the former Khmer provinces which have just been re-attached to Cambodia – such as Stung Treng, Tonle Ropov, M'lou Prey, Krat and Koh Kong – cannot provide legitimate satisfaction to Cambodians given the circumstances in which the Siamese occupied these territories by force and by hypocrisy during the time when Cambodia was at the mercy of Annam (Vietnam) and Siam. By returning back these provinces (to Cambodia), the Siamese are only divesting what they took and detained against all rights of the people [of Cambodia], and that they do not want to keep them much longer because the lack of importance of these districts cannot compensate their costs of their exploitation, administration and maintenance.

2- We insist on the former natural limits of the Khmer Kingdom which, prior to the Siamese invasion, included on Siam's side the provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap, Stung Treng, Tonle Ropov, M'lou Prey, Kuckhan [currently known as Sisaket], Prey Sar, Soren [Surin], Sankeac [Sangka], Neang Rong, Nokoreach Seima (Korat), beyond the Phnom Dangrek Mountain, Koh Kong, Krat and Chantabor (Chantaboun [Chantaburi]) touching upon Bacnam and the Kingdom of Champassac (Passac).

All these provinces are still populated by Cambodians and they preserve their absolute Khmer patriotism.

3- The richest provinces of Cambodia are precisely Battambang and Siem Reap; in the latter province, (temple) ruins of our Kingdom old powerful capital still subsist, they are shining proof of the magnificence of our ancestors. These two provinces, just like the others, were never given to Siam by any of my predecessors, and our claims in view of their return back to Cambodia have never ceased and will never cease as long as we do not receive satisfaction in this regard. Our past numerous claims are testimonials to this effect.

Independently to all historical justifications which confirm our rights on these two provinces, the 15 July 1867 Treaty concluded between France and Siam mentioned that the December 1863 Treaty, allegedly concluded between the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Siam, was annulled and that Siam renounces forever all vassalage from the part of Cambodia. Therefore, this clause completely disengaged Siam from the Khmer Kingdom, which, by this treaty, should recover all her territorial integrity, and if the then-French diplomats – through Article 4 of this same 15 July 1867 treaty – consented, without consulting the Cambodian Government or the Cochinchina Governor, that the provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap remained with Siam, they were absolutely being cheated by the Siamese in their persuasion of the existence of an alleged treaty unknown to the Cambodians, and within Siam's rights and value of these territories. I am adding, that to my knowledge, this alleged treaty concluded on December 1863 between Cambodia and Siam never regularly existed and that it is only fair to provide us with satisfaction. In fact, in spite of our profound and sincere gratitude towards the protectorate Government, we cannot prevent ourselves from wondering whether such diplomatic action to get rid of our assets, behind our back and without our consent, could last.

In all cases and irrespective of the results of the works [accomplished] by the current Commission, and the ulterior diplomatic actions regarding our borders with Siam, not including the cession by Cambodia of her valuable provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap – along with all its dependences –, we are asking to reserve forever, for us and all our successors, the right to prevail our demands until full justice and satisfaction are given to us.

These are, Mr. Governor, the observations and the reservations that I make it as my duty to send to you, while assuring you that they perfectly represent the unanimous feelings of my Government and those of my people. Beyond our strong attachment to these provinces – the irregular detention of which is a real heartache for all the Cambodian people – you are aware of all the difficulties resulting from this detention that our neighbors are continuously creating through the encroachments of our territory, the robberies, the plundering actions and the daily crimes committed in our country by perpetrators who can easily find refuge on their side where they remained unpunished. These acts are actually taking place as they have been proven by the reports from your [French provincial] Governors and our provincial Governors. I believe that this situation which is absolutely prejudicial to all public security principle will become worst as long as the provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap, the most contiguous ones to Cambodia, are not returned to us.

Please accept, Mr. Governor, the assurance of my highest regards.

Done in our Royal Palace in Phnom Penh on Monday, the 4th day of the waning moon of the 2nd month of the Cholasakrach 1268, of the year of the Momi (Horse) Atthasak, the third of the reign, i.e. the 5th of November 1906 of the Christian calendar.

(Signed): Sisowath
Copy: The Cabinet Chief
(Signed) Unreadable

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

The view from Cambodia [PREAH VIHEAR TEMPLE]

2011-02-28T18:54:00.000-08:00

By Michael Hayes

When I was publisher and editor-in-chief of the Phnom Penh Post I was sued once by then-Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, accused of spreading disinformation and trying to create political instability. Over the years, several Cambodian government officials even accused me and my newspaper of attempting to “destroy the nation”.
At the very least I’ve never been called a spin doctor for the Cambodian government. But on the issue of the current border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand surrounding Wat Preah Vihear I’m as angry as all Cambodians are at what we perceive as a Thai-initiated conflict of grossly unjust proportions.
We are not alone. Since this issue flared up two years ago, I have not met one Asian or Western diplomat, one foreign aid worker or one expatriate businessman in Phnom Penh who disagrees. Even a few Thai friends have sheepishly expressed support for the Cambodian side on this spat.
The nagging question that perplexes us all is why Thailand is trying to export its domestic political problems and dump them on poor Cambodia ? The sentiment here is that if the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts want to fight it out, do so somewhere in Thailand , but don’t use Cambodia as a scapegoat.
The view from Cambodia is simple: the issue of sovereignty over the temple was decided back in 1962 when the case was submitted to the International Court of Justice in The Hague .
If Thailand didn’t want to abide by the court’s ruling then why did it agree to submit the case in the first place? And why are they groaning now and firing artillery shells at the temple almost 50 years later?
Moreover, when Thailand says: Well, we controlled the temple in the 1800s and before, the Khmers have a simpler reply: Yeah, but WE BUILT IT! We started construction in the early 9th century, modified and improved it for 250 years and then continued to pray there and celebrate our Gods for another three centuries until you guys stole it after you sacked and looted our capital at Angkor Wat three times between 1352 and 1431. Thank you very much. End of story.
Cambodia has no interest whatsoever in another protracted violent conflict with anybody. The Kingdom is still trying to recover from 30 years of civil war, Pol Pot madness and the ensuing guerilla conflict in the 80’s and 90’s that in total cost the lives of over 2.5 million Cambodians and left the country in ruins. Every dollar spent on the military conflict there is a dollar lost for building desperately needed roads, schools and hospitals.
The Thai accusation that Cambodia has had some secret plot to steal Thai land along the border is also seen as ludicrous.
Everybody knows that since 1970 Cambodia has been too consumed with domestic strife to take even one meter of land from any of its neighbors. In fact, foreign aid officials who worked on the Thai border in the 80s will readily admit that border creep worked in reverse. It was Thai farmers living in peace—and I’m not accusing the Thai government of some orchestrated campaign here—who took the opportunity to plant a few extra hectares in disputed border areas while internally Cambodia was in complete disarray.
If there is one thing that is clear, it is that the entire border needs to be systematically surveyed and demarcated, step by step, once and for all.
As for the disputed 4.5 square kms just north of temple, why not consider this: Turn the area into the Cambodian-Thai International Friendship Park and set it up as a jointly managed enterprise by both countries’ Ministries of Tourism. Invite in hawkers, entrepreneurs, whatever from both sides of the border to set up businesses to cater to the millions of tourists who will want to visit the site in the coming decades and beyond. Tax revenues could be shared by both nations equally. Everybody wins.
It could also be a model for other border disputes around the globe.
If the Thais want a protracted, bloody fight on their hands over the temple, they’ve got one. In the 20 years I’ve been in Cambodia the Preah Vihear issue is without question the only one I’ve seen that has united the entire nation. Cambodian TV stations have been running fundraisers off and on with donations large and small pouring in from all quarters for two years. Even the normally truculent Sam Rainsy Party and others in the opposition are fully on board.
It’s clear from a visit to the temple last week that the Cambodian military has dug in for the long haul. New heavy tanks, armored personnel carriers and ammunition “donated by friendly countries” are evident all over the base of the escarpment. Battle-scarred veterans, no doubt from all of Cambodia’s four previously warring factions and including ex-Khmer Rouge who controlled the temple from 1975 to 1998, are now all operating under one flag. And yes, of course there are Cambodian soldiers with weapons bunkered around the temple. If they weren’t there the Thai military could literally walk in and take control of it in five minutes. What government in Phnom Penh could allow that?
If this dispute goes real hot, relations between Cambodia and Thailand will be ruined for years, hundreds on both sides will die needlessly and the economic costs to the two countries will be astronomical.
Cooler heads need to prevail but rest assured the Cambodians will never, no matter what the price, give up control of Wat Preah Vihear.
Why should they? It’s theirs.

Michael Hayes co-founded the Phnom Penh Post in 1992 and was Publisher & Editor-in-Chief from 1992 to 2008.

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Ascertaining the Truth through a Partial Procedure: The Limited Obligations of the Co-Investigating Judges to Search for and Seek Exculpatory Evidence

2011-02-13T19:17:00.000-08:00

Gina Cortese
Santa Clara University School of Law 2011
DC-Cam Summer Associate 2010

Background

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’s (ECCC) Internal Rules provide the Co-Investigating Judges with a duty to carry out their investigation impartially and to seek out any inculpatory and exculpatory evidence that may be conducive to ascertaining the truth. However, the duty of the Co-Investigating Judges to respond to the parties, in particular defense requests for investigation, and to what extent they must disclose potentially chargeable modes of liability, their investigation strategy, and their general line of inquiry is unclear.

1. Co-Investigating Judges Duty to Seek the Truth

Pursuant to the ECCC’s Internal Rules, the Co-Prosecutors conduct preliminary investigations to determine if evidence indicates that crimes within the jurisdiction of the ECCC were committed and to identify suspects and potential witnesses. The initial work of the Co-Prosecutors sets the parameters for the investigation. The Co-Prosecutors must provide an Introductory Submission to the Co-Investigating Judges, who may then take any investigative action conducive to ascertaining the truth. This power of the Co-Investigating Judges is consistent with Article 127 of the Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure.

The central purpose of any civil law investigation is to ascertain the truth. Scholar Gregory Gordory explains, “This objective, where the main procedural rule is the search for truth, differs from the common law system, where “the truth” is viewed as the natural and logical result of a pre-determined process.”[1] At the ECCC, as in domestic civil systems, the law gives all necessary power to the investigating judges in order to guarantee freedom of action and enable them to perform their work. This gives the Co-Investigating Judges broad discretion when deciding how to gather inculpatory and exculpatory evidence in ascertaining the truth. It also is why, according to the Co-Investigating Judges, neither the systems put in place for the functioning of the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, nor the internal discussions within the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, are part of the case file or subject to disclosure to the parties. The rights of the parties to have access to the “results” of the investigations means access to the product of investigations, such as documents and records in the case file, and not information about the procedure followed by investigating authorities in analyzing the evidence that they have collected.

The ECCC Internal Rules limit the discretion of the Co-Investigating Judges by requiring that in all cases they conduct their investigation impartially, whether the evidence is inculpatory or exculpatory. However, it is difficult to assess whether this occurs in practice when a presumption of impartiality, derived from the Co-Investigating Judges’ oath of office, attaches to the judges. This places a high burden on an applicant to displace that presumption, and as scholar David Ormerod pointed out,[2] leaves little protection for the accused against deliberate or negligent failures to perform the investigative task fairly and effectively.[3]

These procedural issues need to be analyzed in the overall context in which they arise—a hybrid court trying senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge for crimes against humanity, genocide and violations of the Geneva Conventions. The presumption of innocence tends to change when suspects are accused of mass atrocities. It is indisputable that the acts occurred, and it is nearly impossible to deny the involvement of these specific persons. Ormerod, describing more generally the adversarial criminal justice system, pointed out that under such circumstances, the principal trial objective tends to be a focused inquiry into a single closed question: is the accused guilty of the offence charged? This results in a trial process that is “specific rather than sensitive—akin to the treatment of an ailment that has already been diagnosed where the instance is on resolving the problem, not investigating what the problem is.”

The power of the Co-Investigating Judges to take any action conducive to ascertaining the truth, and to refuse requests based on broad legal principals, raises the issue of whether they have a broad, unchecked discretion, limiting the rights of the parties to play a significant role in their own case, or whether the parties have a right to efficient recourse in the ECCC Internal Rules or international precedent and customary law.

2. Co-Investigating Judges Duty to Respond to Investigative Requests

Several challenges have been raised during the pre-trial investigation phases of Cases 001 and 002 as to whether fundamental principles regarding the rights of the accused are being protected. Specifically, the defense teams have raised concerns about the obligation of the Co-Investigating Judges to search the shared materials drive for exculpatory evidence; about the Co-Investigating Judges refusal to conduct witness interviews; and about the Co-Investigating Judges ability to request, seek and review exculpatory evidence.

The shared materials drive, or SMD, is a database accessible to all parties and the court through the ECCC search portal, containing documents and videos which have not yet been analyzed and put in the case file but are asserted to be potentially relevant to the case. Documents on the SMD comprise, among other items, records, interviews, newspaper clippings, and evidence of the structure and organization of the Democratic Kampuchea era. Defense teams have argued that the Co-Investigating Judges have a duty to investigate the SMD for potential exculpatory evidence. However, the Co-Investigating Judges have refused to review the materials on the SMD for this purpose. The Pre-Trial Chamber has upheld the Co-Investigating Judges decisions on this topic.

The defense teams have also expressed their concerns that their clients’ right to a fair trial has been impaired by the Co-Investigating Judges refusal to conduct witness interviews on behalf of the defense. The Co-Lawyers for Nuon Chea have requested interviews to be conducted and placed on the case file, but the Co-Investigating Judges have repeatedly denied such requests on the basis that similar or sufficient evidence already exists in the case file. This could potentially limit the right of the accused to have exculpatory evidence available, and ultimately their right to a fair trial.

The defense teams also have argued that their access to witness evidence and exculpatory evidence generally is limited due to a lack of clear investigatory standards and tests, as well as discrepancies in the Internal Rules as to whose burden it is to seek, review and include exculpatory evidence in the case file. Although the parties have a right to request investigative actions, the right offers little assistance when the Co-Investigating Judges have such broad latitude in refusing to comply.

a. Investigative Requests Defined

i. Types of Requests
The Rules do not clearly define what constitutes an investigative action. Nor do the Rules define the appropriate scope of an investigative request.

ii. Specificity of Request

Requests by the parties for the Co-Investigating Judges to make orders or undertake investigative action must meet a certain degree of specificity to ensure that the Investigating Judges understand the nature of the request. However, the Internal Rules do not provide a required degree of specificity, leaving it unclear whether the Co-Investigating Judges abuse their discretion to dismiss requests as unreasoned or unspecific, or whether the parties act irresponsibly in submitting requests, thereby impairing judicial economy.

Both the Co-Investigating Judges and the Pre-Trial Chamber have held that requests for investigative action must make out a prima facie basis as to why the Co-Investigating Judges should undertake the action. Several of the defense teams, including those for Ieng Thirith, Ieng Sary, and Nuon Chea, have contested the prima facie basis requirement, specifically as applied to requests to the Co-Investigating Judges to place additional files from the shared materials drive (SMD) in the Case File. The Pre-Trial Chamber stated that in the absence of any specific indication that any document on the SMD may be of exculpatory nature, the obligation to investigate exculpatory evidence does not, in itself, oblige the Co-Investigating Judges to review all materials contained in the SMD.

Thus, the Internal Rules do not stipulate an objective standard for the Co-Investigating Judges to follow in rejecting or accepting a request for investigative action, instead leaving it the discretion of the Co-Investigating Judges on a request-by-request basis.

3. Reasoned Opinion

The ECCC Internal Rules provide the Co-Investigating Judges with the discretion to reject requests generally for lack of specificity, yet maintain that it is the Co-Investigating Judges’ duty to provide reasons when granting or rejecting requests for investigative action.

Unfortunately, the Co-Investigating Judges have often failed to provide reasons, or have vaguely stated their rationale in dismissing requests, or have dismissed requests stating that the requests themselves were not sufficiently reasoned. This has, at times, made it impossible for the parties to determine the Investigating Judges’ actual basis for acceptance or rejection of their requests. Furthermore, when the Co-Investigating Judges reject requests, with the only reason being lack of specificity, the lawyers are not given enough information to be able to amend their request satisfactorily to have the investigative action performed.

Ultimately, the Co-Investigating Judges failure to provide coherent reasons for their decisions undermines the ability of the Pre-Trial Chamber to render decisions on appeal. In addition to requiring that the Co-Investigating Judges provide reasons, the Internal Rules stipulate that all decisions of the Pre-Trial Chambers shall be reasoned.

Although the ECCC Internal Rules may require that the Co-Investigating Judges provide reasons, the usefulness of this requirement is lost when it is supplanted by the Co-Investigative Judges right to deny requests on the vague reason that the requests are unspecific. In turn, the lawyers and the Pre-Trial Chambers are left unclear on how to make their requests more specific, making it harder for them to perform their own duties.

a. Standard of Review of Investigative Requests

i. Exculpatory Evidence Defined
A significant issue with regard to the balancing of rights is whether the duty of the Co-Investigating Judges to seek exculpatory evidence is limited to evidence that is determined to be exculpatory in nature, or whether it also extends to potentially exculpatory evidence. Exculpatory evidence is defined as evidence tending to establish a criminal defendant’s innocence.[4]

ii. Standard of Inclusion

Although the Internal Rules require that the Co-Investigating Judges provide factual reasons when ruling on requests for investigative action, the legal test for accepting or rejecting a request is unclear. The standard by which the Co-Investigating Judges must evaluate requests for investigative action turns on whether fulfilling such a request is conducive to ascertaining the truth. However, the Co-Investigating Judges appear to have used several different tests as their basis for evaluating whether certain requests are conducive to ascertaining the truth.[5] This has raised concern as to whether the investigation is a focused inquiry, or whether it is being directed by a partial and subjective discretion of the Co-Investigating Judges.

Absent a standard of investigative review in the ECCC Internal Rules, the Investigating Judges may act on an ad hoc basis without considering constraints on their power. For instance, the Co-Investigating Judges may have exceeded their power to reject requests when they determined that any investigative action that could have the effect of delaying the proceedings may be dismissed.

Despite the Co-Investigating Judges’ assessment that the right to an unduly delayed trial may be a reason for the preclusion of additional evidence, Article 14 of the ICCPR does not provide a hierarchy of the rights of the accused.[6] In fact, the right to be tried without undue delay is a minimum guaranteed right, part of the collective right of the accused to a fair trial. Thus, if any hierarchy were to be implied, the right to trial without undue delay would have to be weighed against whether protecting that right would contribute to or impair the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. The rights of the accused should not be divided to cut against one another. Nor may the right to a speedy trial be used as an excuse for the Co-Investigating Judges to avoid a comprehensive investigation into exculpatory evidence—the right belongs to the accused and to the accused alone to ensure his right to a fair trial.[7]

At most, the Co-Investigating Judges and Pre-Trial Chambers have put forth two requirements that must be met in order for the Co-Investigating Judges to agree to a request. The request must relate to a probative fact under investigation and the request must not be for something that would be unduly repetitive given the materials already in existence on the case file.

Unfortunately, neither standard is clear in practice when the Co-Investigating Judges do not explain their methodology in applying these standards. The defense teams need to understand what the Judges will consider “probative” and what exactly is included in the case file in order to be able to make efficient requests for investigative action.

4. Burden

a. Standard to be Applied

The responsibility of the Investigating Judges to collect and review evidence has been a particular issue for the defense lawyers, and one which they have contested before the Co-Investigating Judges and Pre-Trial Chambers. Structurally, the civil law system places the Prosecution and Co-Investigating Judges in a leading position to collect and review evidence and set the parameters of the case. This potentially narrows the line of inquiry and places the defense in a more passive position as compared with its adversarial and highly active role in the common law system. The defense teams alleged that the Investigating Judges have indeed focused only on proving the guilt of the accused, thereby impairing the right of the accused to the inclusion of exculpatory evidence in the case file.

International precedent, such as that from the ICC and ICTY, suggests that the defense should not bear the burden of searching for exculpatory evidence—that instead the Judges or Co-Prosecutors should bear the burden as both, due to the structure of the Court, have a more active role in the collection of evidence. The Co-Prosecutors thus should initially bear a strict burden of searching for and presenting evidence as part of the preliminary process of gathering materials to make out the case for the Investigative Judges. In overseeing an impartial investigation, the Co-Investigating Judges should ensure that the defense has the means to gather exculpatory evidence—whether this is through the Judges directly providing the means or through enforcing the Co-Prosecutors’ duty to do so.

5. Timing for Consideration

a. Internal Rules

The ECCC’s Internal Rules stipulate that if the Co-Investigating Judges do not agree with an investigative request, they shall issue a rejection order as soon as possible, and in any event, before the end of the judicial investigation. The lack of a specific timeframe in which the Investigating Judges must respond to investigative requests raises several concerns for the parties. If the Co-Investigating Judges choose to wait until the close of the investigation to reject a request, not only do the parties lose the motion, but also their right to effectively appeal the decision.

There appears to be agreement among international courts and tribunals that the prosecution is obligated to disclose the existence of exculpatory evidence to the defense. Implementing similar procedural rules for investigative judges regarding the disclosure of exculpatory evidence might better ensure a defense’s right to access, and receipt of, pertinent evidence to its case. Furthermore, the ECCC could benefit from mirroring procedural rules in place at other international courts and tribunals, such as Rule 84 of the ICC permitting the Trial Chamber to make any necessary orders for disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed.[8] The ECCC may use such a rule to outline the timing and duties of the Co-Investigative Judges to disclose relevant evidence in place in other international courts and tribunals. The ECCC may operate more efficiently if such a rule corresponded with specific, articulated duties as to who must ensure the disclosure and within what time frame, rather than leaving it to the parties to make redundant requests for the disclosure of evidence and later appeal when requests are denied. Procedural rules providing for a more active role on the part of the Co-Investigative Judges would also facilitate the introduction of evidence at trial—helping to ensure that evidence is disclosed sooner, guaranteeing a more efficient trial.[9] This would potentially improve judicial economy in that the judges and prosecutors would be required to disclose and search for evidence in the preliminary aspects of the investigation, as opposed to minimal or nonexistent disclosure which may increase delays due to appeals.

a. Constructive Dismissal
The Pre-Trial Chamber at the ECCC has upheld the parties’ right to seek recourse through constructive dismissal. The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the failure of the Co-Investigating Judges to rule on a request as soon as possible, in the circumstances where a delay in making a decision deprives the Charged Person of the possibility of obtaining the benefit he seeks, amounts to a constructive refusal of the application which can be appealed under Internal Rule 74.
That being said, the Pre-Trial Chamber has made it clear that it would be improper to use the notion of constructive refusal to found a right of appeal where no substantive right exists. The Pre-Trial Chamber has stated its view that requests to put documents on the case file, such as requests to translate a document, qualify as requests for the Co-Investigating Judges to make an order, not a request for investigative action. The Pre-Trial Chamber noted that this difference is important, because only requests for investigative action contribute to ascertaining the truth. Under Internal Rule 74(3)(b) the right of the accused to appeal is limited to decisions on requests for investigation action, not requests to make such orders. This limits what the accused may appeal and what may be considered a constructive dismissal, in that the request must be appealable under Internal Rules 55(10) and 74(3)(b)—making it necessary that the request was for investigative action, and not merely for the Investigating Judges to act. In this way, the rights of the accused to recourse against the Co-Investigating Judges’ decisions are severely limited depending on how the request is categorized by the Judges and the Chambers.

Conclusion
The most pertinent lacunae in the ECCC Internal Rules with regard to exculpatory evidence are rules surrounding the scope of exculpatory evidence that should be included in the case file, and whether it is the Co-Investigating Judges or the defense teams’ burden to seek, investigate, and review exculpatory evidence. It is arguable that a necessary and natural component of the investigation in a civil legal system is for the Judges to be left with broad discretion in undertaking investigation and responding to requests. However, it is equally tenable that a lack of clear and finely drafted procedural rules results in a significant deficiency in judicial oversight. Judicial discretion when used improperly through ill-intentions or incompetence, jeopardizes the credibility of trial proceedings as a whole. The fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber has corrected the Co-Investigating Judges on the standard by which to respond to requests for investigative requests suggests that the lack of procedural guidelines as to the obligations of the Co-Investigating Judges has left too much discretion to Judges’ in their investigative process to ensure fairness. Although the Pre-Trial Chamber provides some oversight, it is questionable whether the rights of the defense are any better served when the Pre-Trial Chamber sends requests back to the Co-Investigating Judges on remand. Without a procedural mechanism or the threat of sanctions ensuring that the Co-Investigating Judges review the request on remand in a timely manner with the correct standard, the only purpose the Pre-Trial Chamber’s review serves is to further delay the Court proceedings.

Implementing procedural concepts from the civil law system into the ECCC Internal Rules has been a challenge given the unique circumstances of the Court. The Court’s cases involve national and international law, foreign lawyers with backgrounds in varying legal systems, a range of legal experience and competence, mixed national and international lawyer and judicial teams, and inflammatory charges stemming from a brutal history. Applying vague civil system procedure rules without considering how they fit into the context of the ECCC ignores the complexity of the Court and the challenges it inherently faces as a new court that won’t be around long enough to perfect its process through practice.

Furthermore, if Cambodia is able to justly try the senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge for international crimes, such success may be the most important component to the country’s reconciliation process and future. Alternatively, an impartial and unjust trial would not only leave questions as to the usefulness of the trials, but it could reaffirm international doubts of Cambodia’s competence, potentially leaving Cambodia in the same position as it was before the establishment of the ECCC.

Full report, please click: http://www.dccam.org/Abouts/Intern/Gina_Cortese_Memo--Investigative_Requests.pdf

[1] Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and Limitations, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 45 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 635, at 643 (2006-2007).
[2] David Ormerod, Improving the Disclosure Regime, 7 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 102-129 (2003).
[3] Id. at 104
[4] Black’s Law Dictionary, “Evidence, Exculpatory Evidence,” 8th Edition (2004).
[5] E.g., The Co-Investigating Judges have at times referred to a sufficiency standard, a relevancy standard, and a prima facie basis standard.
[6] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14.
[7] Joint Defence Appeal from the OCIJ Order on the Request for Investigative Action to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in the SMD of 19 June 2009, Paragraph 33, July 24, 2009.
[8] International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 84, “In order to enable the parties to prepare for trial and to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings, the Trial Chamber shall, in accordance with article 64, paragraphs 3 (c) and 6 (d), and article 67, paragraph (2), and subject to article 68, paragraph 5, make any necessary orders for the disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed and for the production of additional evidence. To avoid delay and to ensure that the trial commences on the set date, any such orders shall include strict time limits which shall be kept under review by the Trial Chamber.”
[9] International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 81(5), “Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor which is withheld under article 68, paragraph 5, such material and information may not be subsequently introduced into evidence during the confirmation hearing or the trial without adequate prior disclosure to the accused.”

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

A graduate student helps train Cambodian teachers on how to teach the genocide

2011-02-13T19:16:00.002-08:00

By Justin Hubbard
Friday, February 11, 2011

Durham, NC -- At a recent teacher workshop in Cambodia, Nguol Sophal
submitted her essay "The Human Heart," unveiling painful memories of an
entire family, including all her children, lost under the Khmer Rouge
regime. Her story of a Khmer Rouge cadre who helped her recover from a
deathly illness led her to proclaim the perpetrators were not all monsters,
but "humans with human hearts."

For Sarah Jones Dickens, a Duke doctoral student in the department of art,
art history and visual studies historical narratives such as these are the
foundation of her work with the Cambodian Genocide Education Project (CGEP).

Dickens works with the Cambodian Ministry of Education and Documentary
Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) to implement genocide education into all
Cambodian high schools and universities. She trains history teachers so
they can teach genocide education in their schools.

Dickens received a Fulbright scholarship in 2007 for her work on visual art
and trauma in Cambodia. Since then, she has continued work with DC-Cam and
has made three trips back to Cambodia during winter and summer breaks.

Dickens, who is now in Durham, hopes to connect with Duke alumni, returned
Peace Corps volunteers and other students at the upcoming Duke in Depth
weekend, Feb. 24-26. She says she looks forward to learning from their
firsthand experiences working on similar issues in the world.

"I think the panels specifically on the roles of art, education women and
religion dovetail with my work in Cambodia," Dickens said.

CGEP aspires to promote national reconciliation and individual healing by
implementing genocide education in all Cambodian high schools and
universities by 2013.

"This is the first time Cambodia has implemented this history since the
genocide occurred and teachers are teaching younger generations, who often
minimize the stories of their parents," Dickens said.

Between 1975-79, an estimated 1.7 million Cambodians were killed under the
Khmer Rouge regime. The trauma was such that afterwards the society
experienced what has been termed "a wave of amnesia."

"You need that history in instances of mass trauma. If not, when you say
there is no history, no identity, then you have a past that is completely
vague. How can you heal or how can you rebuild your identity?" Dickens
said.

At the Cambodian workshop this past December, DC-Cam director Youk Chhang,
unveiled his "Land and Reconciliation-Building a Peaceful Society through
Education" model. The model contains more Cambodian-specific notions for
national reconciliation and healing and emphasizes a ground up approach
through education and teachers.

Teachers are respected throughout Cambodian society regardless of religious
or ethnic differences and are the primary actors in gathering historical
narratives.

"They have proven to be highly effective and efficient in collecting these
stories. At the training we asked all the teachers to collect two stories
from their villages so they can write the people's history to then be
disseminated across the country in monograph forms, " Dickens said.

Another important component of CGEP is government support. In addition to
its efforts with the international community to conduct the Cambodia
genocide tribunals, the Cambodian government has also set aside land for
DC-Cam's Sleuk Rith Institute, a permanent center that will function as a
museum, research institute and a university for master degree programs in
human rights and law.

© 2010 Office of News & Communications

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Sondhi urges Thai military to seize Angkor Wat in exchange for Preah Vihear

2011-02-13T19:16:00.001-08:00

Wed, 09/02/2011 - 11:34 | by prachatai

Yellow-shirt leader Sondhi Limthongkul has urged the Thai military to seize Cambodian territory, including Angkor Wat, to barter for Preah Vihear Temple.

On 7 Feb, Sondhi spoke to supporters of the People's Alliance for Democracy gathering at Makkhawan Bridge next to Government House.

He said that in a war campaign, Thailand, if it had a strong premier, would have tried to take a military advantage before conducting any negotiations, but even this was beyond Abhisit Vejjajiva's wit.

The PAD has predicted in advance that there will be a prolonged war with the potential to escalate further, because Hun Sen has assigned his 33-year-old son to take command of the conflict, he said.

Abhisit has always said that he insists that the watershed demarcates the border between Thailand and Cambodia, but has allowed Cambodia to refer to the 1:200,000 map. He is a weak prime minister. Otherwise, he would have ordered the Thai armed forces to push back Cambodian soldiers from Thai territory, and tried to take advantage by letting the Air Force show its power, before starting any negotiations, he said.

The Thai armed forces should move forward to seize Battambang, Siem Riap, Angkor Wat and Koh Kong. And then, in negotiations which would be arbitrated by China and ASEAN, Thailand would barter them for Preah Vihear and force Cambodia to adopt the watershed for border demarcation instead of the 1:200,000 map, according to Sondhi.

He said that a diplomatic approach should not be used in a military campaign. Thailand must take the most advantageous position before any negotiation, and it is not making war with China or Vietnam, but with Cambodia which has no warships. Thailand must wield its greater military power when it has to.

'[To] whoever says that we're mad for war, none of us sitting here want our children to [go to war and] die, but to die for a great cause, to protect the land, is worth it. We have 300,000 soldiers who are better equipped than Cambodian soldiers, but we lack the guts, because the senior military figures serve evil politicians. Today, [Defence Minister] Gen Pravit Wongsuwan is not a soldier, but a politician who says anything for political gain.'

Thai soldiers have been killed today because Thai generals are not decisive because it conflicts with their own interests, such as exporting petrol to Cambodia or selling goods along the border. The Thai military must hold on to the nation and the throne, not Gen Pravit, because nothing is more important than the nation, the King and the Queen, he said.

Today's Phnom Penh Post (10 February 2011, p.2) carries a sub-header 'Cambodia, Thailand at 'war': PM'
Darryl Collins
PO Box 93223
Siemreap-Angkor 17000
Kingdom of Cambodia

Nationalism Behind Thai-Cambodian Rift: Experts

2011-02-13T19:09:00.000-08:00

February 08, 2011

Nationalist fervor and political grandstanding are stoking a deadly border
dispute between Thailand and Cambodia but both sides will be keen to avoid
major hostilities, experts say.

Although the exact trigger for a series of armed clashes in recent days is
unclear, tensions have grown since seven Thais -- including one lawmaker --
were arrested by Cambodia in December near the frontier for illegal entry.

Two of them were sentenced to lengthy jail terms for spying, outraging
nationalist Thais, who have held protests in Bangkok calling on their Prime
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to resign.

Observers say the recent cross-border fighting, focused on the area
surrounding an ancient Khmer temple, is being used in both countries to stir
patriotic sentiment with elections on the horizon.

Yet while Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen has unleashed a torrent of fiery
rhetoric, accusing Thailand of being an invading aggressor and calling for
UN intervention, for Abhisit the standoff is seen as another unwanted
headache.

"Hun Sen is deliberately playing this to vitalise nationalist sentiment and
reinvigorate support for himself," said Professor William Case, director of
the Southeast Asia Research Centre at the City University of Hong Kong.

Hun Sen is "something of a tough guy ... but I don't think it will be
allowed to get totally out of hand," he said.

"On the Thai side this is a confrontation that the leadership would very
much like to avoid. The nationalism on the Thai side is not so much coming
from the government but from the masses, to which it has to respond."

"Yellow Shirt" Thai nationalists turned out in their thousands over the
weekend demanding Abhisit's resignation over the issue.

The royalist protest movement is strongly critical of Cambodia over issues
such as the border row and Phnom Penh's appointment of Thailand's fugitive
ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra as an economics adviser in 2009.

Seven people, including at least two civilians, have been killed since the
fighting broke out on Friday around the 11th-century Preah Vihear temple,
with both sides accusing each other of firing the first shots.

Ties between the neighbors have been strained since the temple was granted
UN World Heritage status in July 2008.

The World Court ruled in 1962 that Preah Vihear itself belonged to Cambodia
but both countries claim ownership of a 4.6-square-kilometre
(1.8-square-mile) surrounding area.

"Nationalistic fervor is fuelling both sides of the conflict," said
Professor David Chandler, a Cambodia expert at Australia's Monash
University.

"Kicking Cambodia around has been a Thai hobby since the 14th century;
Cambodia biting back dates from the colonial era and of course from the
World Court 1962 decision."

Michael Montesano of the Institute of Southeast Asia Studies in Singapore
said the border issue "certainly plays well" in Cambodia.

"Cambodian efforts to protect their rights along the border and stand up to
a stronger Thailand have political benefits for Hun Sen," he said.

The 59-year-old strongman -- who has ruled since 1985, vowing to remain in
power until he is 90 -- is looking ahead to a general election in 2013.

In contrast in Thailand the government and military would prefer to avoid a
confrontation, while nationalist activists "are determined to keep tensions
with Cambodia on the boil," Montesano said.

The "Yellow Shirts" were once allies of the establishment-backed Abhisit,
but relations have soured and the group's political party is eyeing
elections expected some time this year.

"With elections in Thailand approaching, the country's civil society
nationalists will play the Cambodia card to build up support for their
parties," said Paul Chambers, a Thai expert at Germany's Heidelberg
University.

"Preah Vihear has fallen victim to ultra-nationalism on both sides of the
Thai-Cambodian border."

Despite the tough talk and casualties on both sides, observers believe the
risk of a full-blown conflict remains slim.

"It will be a matter of bilateral negotiations with the possibility of
further skirmishes," said Professor Mark Turner at the University of
Canberra in Australia. "It's difficult to envisage any widening of the armed
conflict."

Agence France-Presse

------------------

http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54299
Tuesday, February 08, 2011 03:41 GMT

Khmer Rouge Leaders Seek Release Before Trial
By Irwin Loy

PHNOM PENH, Jan 31, 2011 (IPS) - Standing in an air-conditioned courtroom on
the outskirts of the Cambodian capital, an aging former Khmer Rouge figure
accused of genocide offered few words as he asked for his release.

"I only have one suggestion," said Khieu Samphan, "Please abide by the law."

More than three years after their arrests, three former Khmer Rouge leaders
accused of crimes against humanity and genocide asked a United Nations-
backed war crimes tribunal Monday to release them ahead of their pending
trials.

Lawyers for Khieu Samphan, the regime's head of state; Nuon Chea, its chief
ideologue; and Ieng Thirith, a former cabinet minister, are arguing they
should be released after having been kept in pre-trial detention since their
arrests in 2007. A fourth co-defendant, former foreign affairs minister Ieng
Sary, did not appear in court.

Observers say releasing the accused could ignite public outrage in this
Southeast Asian country. The Khmer Rouge movement was responsible for the
deaths of an estimated 1.7 million people. But, more than 30 years after the
regime was toppled, senior leaders have yet to stand trial.

Lawyers for the accused argued Monday that the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), as the hybrid tribunal is officially called, is
bound by its rules to release them in advance of their trials. The court
officially indicted the four accused last September. Lawyers claim that any
detention exceeding the four months that have since passed is illegal.

Court officials have not specified a date for the trials, but have indicated
they are expected to take place this year. Sa Sovan, a lawyer acting for
Khieu Samphan, noted the court has extended his client's detention period
numerous times since his 2007 arrest.

"There are no grounds to continue his detention any longer," he said.

Son Arun, a lawyer for Nuon Chea, said his client has no intention of
fleeing the country if released. On the contrary, he argued, he is eager to
testify and explain his side of the story.

"Nuon Chea has indicated again and again that he wishes to participate and
cooperate with the court," Arun said. "He would like to live with his family
and he does not intend to run away."

Court prosecutors, however, argued against releasing the accused, suggesting
they had many reasons to flee, and that authorities may not be able to
guarantee their safety outside the confines of the court complex.

"The passage of time has not diminished the impact of these crimes,"
co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley said. "If anything, it has increased the impact
of these crimes. There are many members of the Khmer population who are
suffering from psychiatric disorders as a result of their experiences during
this appalling time."

The four co-defendants are accused of being part of a leadership group that
oversaw egregious crimes committed more than three decades ago. Today, they
are aging and frail. The youngest, Ieng Thirith, turns 79 this year. She
quietly left the courtroom early on in proceedings Monday. Nuon Chea, 84,
sought medical attention after complaining of dizziness.

"She can barely walk," lawyer Phat Pouv Seang said of Ieng Thirith, "let
alone cause any disturbance to the public order."

In January, co-defendant Ieng Sary asked the court to permit half-day
sessions when the trial gets underway, citing his "age and ill health".

Court observer Panhavuth Long, a programme officer with the Open Society
Justice Initiative, said he believed the accused are acting within their
rights by asking to be released. Seeing the aged defendants Monday should
come as a reminder that the tribunal must not lose momentum in pursuing
prosecution.

"The testimony of the accused can shed light on the history," he said. "It
may enable us to understand more about the regime and also to understand the
personalities of the accused."

And for many victims of the regime, it is the testimony of the four accused,
as much as any verdict, that will determine what value the tribunal holds.

"We really want the trial to be up and running very soon. If they die, they
bring with them the truth," he said.

If the court were to release the accused before the trial, it would come as
a shock to a Cambodian public eager for justice, said another observer.

"If they are released, it would be a stunning moment for the whole nation,"
said Youk Chhang, director of the Documentation Centre of Cambodia.

But he said many people here have already come to their own conclusions.

"Each of the survivors has their own judgement, no matter what the court has
to say about it," Youk said. "The truth about [the defendants] is the crimes
they have committed against the people of Cambodia. This kind of truth will
never set them free."

The court is expected to rule on the co-defendants' release bids within 30
days.

The case represents the second trial as part of the court's mandate. Last
July, Kaing Guek Eav, better known as Duch, was sentenced to 35 years in
prison for his role as head of the notorious S-21 detention centre, though
the sentence was reduced by 16 years because of time already served and
illegal detention.

(END)

Copyright © 2011 IPS-Inter Press Service. All rights reserved.

-------------------

http://www.journallive.co.uk/culture-newcastle/arts-news/2011/01/29/musicians-and-poets-join-together-for-untold-stories-61634-28074825/

Musicians and poets join together for Untold Stories
by David Whetstone, The Journal
Jan 29 2011

HOLOCAUST survivors will be joined in Newcastle tomorrow by musicians and
poets in Untold Stories, a moving event in the same week as Holocaust
Memorial Day.

One speaker at the event at The Journal Tyne Theatre will be Youk Chhang who
survived the "killing fields" of Cambodia when 1.7 million people died at
the hands of the Khmer Rouge.

Youk Chhang was 14 when the Khmer Rouge began their four-year reign of
terror in 1975 and was put to work in the paddy fields where people died
every day.

Food and death, he has recalled, became his twin obsessions.

He now runs the Documentation Centre of Cambodia which has built up an
extensive archive of documents, photos and films relating to the Khmer Rouge
rule.

In the spirit of reconciliation, he has concluded that he could easily have
been sucked into the Khmer Rouge killing machine as others of his age were.

Also due to speak tomorrow is Eva Clarke whose mother, Anka, spent the nine
months of her pregnancy in Auschwitz concentration camp and gave birth after
being transferred to another camp, Mauthausen, on a coal truck.

Eva was born on April 29, 1945, three days before the Americans liberated
the camp and days after her father, a German-Jewish architect, was shot. He
hadn't even known Anka was pregnant. Eva's mother survived the war.

Also due to speak are Manchester-based Jewish refugee Peter Kurer, whose
family were saved from the Nazis by British Quakers, and Prof Roberta Greene
of the University of Texas, who has worked with Holocaust survivors.

Violinist Bradley Creswick, singer Katie Doherty and the Hotspur Children's
Choir will perform at the event tomorrow and there will be readings from The
Galloping Stone, an anthology of poems by Gillian Allnut and clients, staff
and volunteers from the Medical Foundation for the Care of the Victims of
Torture.

Holocaust Memorial Day coincides with the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau
concentration camp on January 27, 1945, and commemorates all victims of
genocide.

Untold Stories, which takes place at 3pm, is free but you must register via
www.hmd.org.uk/events

Copyright and Trade Mark Notice © 2011 owned by or licensed to ncjMedia
Limited.

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Many Genocides To Be Commemorated On Holocaust Memorial Day

2011-02-13T19:08:00.001-08:00

By Trevor Grundy
Religion News Service

CANTERBURY, England (RNS/ENInews) After the Nazi slaughter of 6 million Jews
during World War II, the world cried out "never again." But one of Britain's
best-known young rabbis, Jonathan Romain, said the phrase has proved
tragically wrong.

"Genocide has happened again and again and again," he told ENInews ahead of
Thursday's (Jan. 27) Holocaust Memorial Day observances 66 years after the
liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp in Poland.

"We only have to think about Biafra, Bosnia, Darfur and there are other
examples," said Romain, a leading spokesman for Reform Judaism in the United
Kingdom. "The list is deeply depressing and screams out that Holocaust
Memorial Day is needed as much now as ever before."

Survivors and mourners have been asked by the Holocaust Memorial Trust in
London to remember victims of other mass killings -- the Democratic Republic
of Congo, where 5.4 million people have been killed since 1998; Cambodia,
where an estimated 1.7 million were murdered by the Khmer Rouge between 1975
and 1979; the Bosnian war in the 1990s that claimed at least 98,000 lives;
Burundi, with 50,000 deaths in 1993 and Rwanda, which saw 800,000 deaths in
1994 due to tribal conflict.

Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams emphasized this year's theme of
"lost stories."

"If the stories are not told over and again, we lose the memory of those who
suffered and we risk losing something that protects our humanity ... I
commend for our remembrance the untold stories of Jewish people living in
Britain during the medieval era, those of the Holocaust and the stories from
the genocidal tragedies of many other contexts in our deeply damaged world
today," he said in a statement.

Copyright © 2011 TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc.

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Mot Ream: A Khmer Rouge Central Artiste

2011-02-13T19:07:00.000-08:00

Photo in A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) Book
By Som Bunthorn

One evening, Mot Ream saw her photo in a book entitled A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), which will be taught in high schools and universities. When first seeing the photo, Ream was not sure it was her because it was in black and white, and she took it in 1973, 38 years ago, at Banteay Srei temple. However, because she also saw her friends—Yav, a Pianist from Eastern Zone, and Comrade Rem, a female artist from Kratie province—in the same row as her, she was sure it was really her. Ream was surprised to see her photo because she has never imagined that she could survive the war during 1980s and also a serious illness she contracted while staying on Thai border.

Mot Ream was born in Prek Angkor Thmei village, Chikreng sub-district, Chikreng district, Siem Reap province. Ream has 10 siblings and her parents were farmers. When Ream reached the age of 10, her aunt, Voeun, a Region 35 deputy of an Artistic Unit, brought her to Sva Laut Artistic Office located in Pongro village, Pongro sub-district, Chikreng district without telling her mother. There, Ream noticed numerous Khmer Rouge soldiers based around the office where she was working.

Ream learned artistry—singing, dancing and music—with about 100 boys and girls. Ream preferred dancing because she did not have talent in singing. Uncle Munh, chief of the Artistic Unit, arranged for boys and girls to live separately. In his spare time he organized Ream and other young people to plant vegetables to supply the whole unit.

Ream had been trained for two months to learn the performance, farming and fighting methods by her relative Voeun Neary, and two male teachers namely Chek and Vuth. After the training, Ream and a group of 50 to 60 artists were assigned to perform at parties celebrated to encourage the soldiers and meetings attended by Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and Thuch (Kuy Thuon), chief of Zone 304 (North Zone) in different areas such as Banteay Srei district and Kulen Mountain of Siem Reap province, and Kampong Thom province. Ream met some challenges when there was no car to take the group to the performances because of all their equipment such as the stage and clothes. For example, Ream and her group spent two days traveling to Kulen Mountain sleeping in villagers’ houses or the village chief’s house on the way to a performance. The artists usually performed at night guarded by Khmer Rouge soldiers and photographed by a regional photographer. The photos were then sent to Ream’s unit. Ream and her group always spent a month performing in different areas, and then returned to her office.

In 1973 Ream was taking many photos at Banteay Srei temple when she performed for villagers and soldiers there (the photo inserted in A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), page 38, the second from the left). Nonetheless, all those photos were destroyed during the war in 1980s.

After five years of staying in the Regional Artistic Unit, Ream, female Comrade Leang from the singing group, Yav, Ren and another person from the music group were selected to be trained more in 304 Zone (North Zone) situated in Chamkar Leu district of Kampong Cham province. There, Ream was trained with approximately 100 members of the Zone Artistic Unit, supervised by Comrade Thuch, chief of the unit, Comrade Chantrea, a deputy, Comrade Thi, a member of the unit, and other teachers. Sometimes, Thuch came around to see the performance of the group, and told the artists to be gentle so the audience would trust the party. In addition to studying the performance, Ream was ordered to dig and find potatoes. Shortly after that, Ream was appointed to perform at a meeting and a party opening congress at different places in Kampong Cham province.

Two years later, Ream was appointed to return to the Region 35 Artistic Office and was responsible for selecting and teaching 90 artistic students ages 10 to 15. When teaching, it was hard to teach students how to follow rhythms of the music because they were too young. Besides teaching, Ream was also ordered to perform in other areas. Occasionally, Ream and her performance group were given lotion, powder, clothes and other materials from the audiences.

When the Khmer Rouge army defeated the government in April 1975, Ream’s performance group was assigned to perform all day and night for a week at in front of the Angkor Wat temple to celebrate the victory in front of Chinese and Japanese audiences, presided over by Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and other important figures.

Ten days later, chief of Region 35 chose 10 performers (5 females and 5 females) to work for Central Artistic Office located in Steung Meanchey of Phnom Penh city (today National Radio Station), controlled by Hou Nim. The five female performers were Ran, Leang, Rin, Rem and Ream, while the male performers were Aun, Rin and another three. At the Central Artistic Office, there were around 100 artists, most of who had been selected from Zone 304. Later the artists were divided into different groups—singing, music, performing, and radio. Ream worked for the performance group. In the singing group, Ream knew female Comrades Pech and Mai and another male Comrade Vat. Pech had dark skin and was short; she came from Kampong Thom province. She was the one who sang the song entitled “17 April Wish”. Mai was a singer of a song Couple Dove (a song from the previous regime), and Female Salt Field (when Thuch or Kuy Thuon was in Zone 304, he always went out with Mai).

Female Comrade Tha, a deputy of the Artistic Office from Kampong Cham province, and Comrade Trea, a performance organizer, led Ream’s performance group to perform at Oympic Stadium, and to perform Wishing Dance for King Norodom Sihanouk, Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Hou Nim and other Khmer Rouge leaders at a theatre (today Chaktomuk Hall). Though Ream’s performance group did not have enough materials such as crowns and other make-up, King Norodom Sihanouk sometimes came see Ream’s performances. Additionally, Ream performed for foreigners from China, Japan, Africa and some white skin people. Later, Ream performed at Kampong Som, Kampong Cham and Takeo province and many other places.

After performing, Ream and other artists were permitted to relax. Ream, however, was obligated to arrange food for Hou Nim’s family. One day at 6 in the morning in 1977, Ream called Hou Nim to have porridge as usual, but he refused and stated that “I do not feel like eating; from now on, I may not be able to see you.” In fact, he just received a telephone call informing him that Angkar was going to arrest him. Although Hou Nim had known the news in advance, he did not try to escape because he had not committed any wrong doing against Angkar and the staff in Ministry of Central Arts supported and loved him. Not long after, Ream saw a car stop at the Ministry of Central Arts, and then she saw three guards shackled Hou Nim and drive him away. His wife and children could only cry. A week later, the Khmer Rouge soldiers came and arrested Hou Nim’s mother, wife, two children and another female.

After arresting Hou Nim’s family, Angkar assigned a woman (unknown) from the Southwest Zone to continue his work. The new chief forced Ream and all artists to rehearse the performance everyday even if they were ill. Later some members of the Artistic Unit disappeared whereas the others were arrested one by one including Ream’s cousin, Som Long aka Long and her husband Lin and a daughter aged 8, who were accused of betraying Angkar. A week after arresting Lin’s family, Khmer Rouge cadres drove Ream who had been ill from fever to Wat Sleng re-education camp (west of Phnom Penh), controlled by Ta Ky. Meanwhile, Yut Yat (Son Sen’s wife), who had known and taught Ream about the theory of indoctrination, sent her messenger to meet her. After Yut Yat knew about the arrest of Ream, she called a guard to stop the truck driving Ream, and then brought her to receive treatment at her house near Olympic stadium.

After being cured by Yun Yat, Ream was sent to Wat Sleng reeducation office. First, the Khmer Rouge cadres asked Ream about her mistake and her educators who had ordered her to hind herself in the Artistic Unit. Because no mistake of Ream’s was discovered, Ta Ky sent her to cook rice for 1000 prisoners, most of whom came from the Ministry of Central Arts. Everyday prisoners were ordered to plough and harvest rice. Later, Ta Ky assigned some of them to build a railway while the others were sent to Battambang province.

Ream stayed at Wat Sleng re-education camp until Vietnamese troops liberated Cambodia. Then she escaped to meet the army of Khmer rouge forces at the Khmer-Thai border in Battambang province, controlled by Ta Chiem. There, the Khmer Rouge soldiers selected Ream to work in the Female Transportation Unit, responsible for carrying injured soldiers to be cured. Her unit was moved to many different places such as Kamrieng, Ampil Praidaem, Phnom Koy, Phnom Traing, and last to Malai. Staying there for a short time, Ream was selected by Ieng Sary to look after children at a Th-100 camp located in Chanbory province of Thailand, controlled by Minh (Ieng Sary’s daughter). Ream was responsible for looking after 10 children when their parents went on diplomatic missions in Korea and the US. There, Ream saw Khieu Samphan and other leaders staying and holding meetings.

Later, Ream got a serious fever that left her in bed for a week. Luckily, after obtaining treatment from a doctor, Chuon Choeun, she recovered. In 1982, Ream asked permission from Ieng Sary to live with her friends at Malai. At Malai, Comrade Thun, a chief of publisher, and Comrade Choun, a chief of making prints of photographs, asked Ream to help their work. But this time the request was refused by Ieng Sary. She then was appointed her to work at the Artistic Unit, controlled by Vin. Later, Ream became a performance teacher.

In 1985, Ream asked the permission from her Chief to move to a Transportation Unit. Not long after, Ream married with a Khmer Rouge soldier from Khlar Ngap barrack in Malai district. Three months later, when Vietnamese soldiers captured the Khlar Ngap, Ream and her husband fled to Th-85 camp in Aranh Prathet district, a place that the Democratic Kampuchea Government had bought from the Thai Government. There, she gave birth to her son whose legs could not move later because of a lack of vitamins. Her husband was assign to fight.

After Vietnam soldiers withdrew from Cambodia in 1989, Ream and her son built a house in what is presently called Wat Chas village, Malai commune, Malai district. At that time, Ream was granted small amount of supplies from the Military Unit. Ream had a second son. Due to family’s increased needs, her husband went log trees in the forest. Unfortunately he was shot by a robber. Later she farmed in her village and in Thailand.

Today, Ream owns a small grocery for raising her disabled sons. Ream’s stories demonstrate a struggling of Cambodian women protecting her life and her family with great efforts during and after the civil war. These experiences happened to many women because they had to face the same dangerous and miserable sufferings after the Khmer Rouge regime collapsed. However, the problem that needs to be tackled now is to find out how they feel when they lost loves and supporters.

“...a society cannot know itself if it does not have an accurate memory of its own history.”

Inauguration of Anti-Genocide Memorial

2011-02-13T19:06:00.001-08:00

Santhor Mok High School, Phnom Penh, January 25, 2011 (please also see PDF file attached)

The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) has been authorized by the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports to install anti-genocide memorials in all high schools—over 1000—across the country for the purpose of promoting forgiveness, tolerance, education and reconciliation. The slogans acknowledge the memories of victims and survivors who lived through the Khmer Rouge regime and encourage support for the upcoming trial of the four surviving senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge. The two slogans say (1) "Talking about experiences during the Khmer Rouge regime promotes reconciliation and educates children about forgiveness and tolerance," and (2) "Learning about the history of Democratic Kampuchea helps prevent genocide."

DC-Cam will hold an inauguration ceremony of an anti-genocide memorial at Santhor Mok High School on January 25, 2011, at 8 AM. Her Excellency Chumteav Ton Sa-Im, Undersecretary of State of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport and Mr. Chea Cheat, Head of Phnom Penh´s Municipal Office of Education, will be the guests of honor for this ceremony. Santhor Mok High School is the sixth location to hold a memorial inauguration ceremony after Indra Devi, Russey Keo, Preah Sisowath, Hun Sen Ang Snuol and Tuol Tum Pong High Schools.

Santhor Mok Primary school was built in 1960 and dedicated to Grandfather Santhor Mok due to his reputation as a famous poet during the colonial period, the reign of King Norodom. Santhor Mok was a child of a poor farmer; he was ordained as a monk to study literature and Buddhist theology. Due to his reputation, he was honored by King Norodom. When the Khmer Rouge took power in 1975, Santhor Mok primary school was closed. The Khmer Rouge turned the school into warehouse. After the collapse of the Khmer Rouge, the school was reopened on September 24, 1979, and renamed Santhor Mok grade 1-2-3. In 1993, the school’s name was changed to Santhor Mok High School. In 2008, it was changed again to Chea Sim-Santhor Mok High School. Today it has 7,430 students, of whom 3,432 are girls.

During the inauguration, DC-Cam will distribute 300 copies of the textbook “A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979),” the monthly magazine Searching for the Truth, and anti-genocide posters to students and teachers in order to broaden their understanding of the Democratic Kampuchea period and the work of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. Her Excellency Chumteav Ton Sa-Im will speak about the significance of the slogans, which have an important role in educating students and survivors about reconciliation, forgiveness and tolerance.

The slogans are being mounted with financial support from DC-Cam staff members and their friends who were former students of Chea Sim-Santhor Mok High School. Apart from the important objective of mounting the Anti-Genocide slogans, this ceremony is also an opportunity for former students to meet with each other to discuss the need to prevent genocide. DC-Cam will encourage its staff members to continue making efforts to mount slogans in their former high schools and all high schools across Cambodia. Banners cost only 40 USD and concrete and wood-designed memorials cost 400 USD. We are seeking seed funding for the design.

For additional information, please contact:

§ Ms. Ly Sokchamroeun; 012 69 16 13; truthchamroeun.l@dccam.org
§ Ms. Kry Suyhieng, 089 80 01 36; truthhieng@dccam.org
§ Mr. Mam Sovann; 012 48 34 24; truthsovann@dccam.org
§ Mr. Meak Chhoreaksmey, Santhor Mok School Principal; 012 85 64 63

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

The Scope of Victim Participation Before the ICC and the ECCC

2011-02-13T19:05:00.000-08:00

The Scope of Victim Participation Before the ICC and the ECCC
by Charline Yim
Harvard Law School 2011
DC-Cam Legal Associate January 2011

Both the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)[1] and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) have been viewed as significant advances in the protection and recognition of victims’ rights. The establishing laws and governing rules of both courts reflect recognition of the importance of victims as participants in criminal proceedings and as key stakeholders in the justice process. Consequently, both courts, acknowledging that victims must be provided a meaningful part, have offered victims the opportunity to play an active role in their criminal proceedings. The ICC provides that individuals and organizations can apply to be victim “participants” in the Court’s proceedings, while the ECCC allows victims the opportunity to participate as “Civil Parties.” While the application process to become a victim participant or Civil Party poses a number of challenges, victim participants and Civil Parties also face procedural limitations and hurdles once the respective court has granted status to participate in a criminal proceeding. As a result of the minimal guidance provided by the governing documents of the ICC and the ECCC, the Chambers of both courts have exercised broad discretion when interpreting the provisions and defining the modalities of victim participation during proceedings.

This Article provides a comparison of the current status of participation rights granted to victim participants in the ICC and Civil Parties in the ECCC. Generally, commentators have considered that, as “parties” to the proceedings, Civil Parties at the ECCC exercise more substantive rights than victim participants at the ICC. The general limitation for the exercise of victim participation rights before the ICC is the requirement that each procedural act must be authorized by the Chamber and is subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the Chamber. Beyond this general limitation, if the Chambers of the ICC so determines, the rights of victim participants before the ICC in practice appear to be strikingly similar to that of Civil Parties before the ECCC. Furthermore, recent rule changes at the ECCC and current trends in the jurisprudence of both the ICC and ECCC suggests that modalities of participation granted to victim participants before the ICC can, at times, even surpass the rights of the ECCC’s Civil Parties.

1. The Provisions: Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute of the ICC and Internal Rule 23 of the Internal Rules of the ECCC
Article 68(3) of the ICC’s Rome Statute (“Statute”) provides that the legal representatives of victims are able to present their “views and concerns” to the Court where the victims’ “personal interests” are affected. The Court determines what stage of the proceedings and the manner in which such views are given so as not to be prejudicial or inconsistent with the rights of the Accused.

Internal Rule 23 to 23quinquies of the ECCC’s Internal Rules (“IRs”) address the general principles of victim participation, the application process to become a Civil Party, the representation of Civil Parties, Victims Associations, and Civil Party claims. IR 23 states that the Civil Party participates in criminal proceedings “by supporting the prosecution” and seeking “collective and moral reparations.” Successive amendments of the rules have increasingly restricted Civil Party participation in an effort to address perceived weaknesses in the system during the Court’s first case and the large number of Civil Parties who will be participating in upcoming Case 002.

2. Legal Representation
Both courts limit the ability of victim participants or Civil Parties to choose their own legal representation. In the ICC, the Chamber may, for the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the proceedings, request that victims or a group of victims choose a common legal representative, or may appoint a legal representative to the victims if the interests of justice so require. The Chamber and Registry is directed to take all reasonable steps necessary to ensure that the selection of the common representative is done in light of the distinct interests of the victims and to avoid conflicts of interests, as well as give consideration to the views of the victims and respect local traditions. A victim or groups of victims who cannot pay for a common legal representative chosen by the Court can receive assistance from the Registry including financial assistance.

Similarly, before the ECCC, an individual Civil Party may be directed by the Chamber to join an existing civil party group and share a common lawyer. When organizing common legal representation, the ECCC is required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the interests of the distinct parties are represented and conflicts of interest are avoided. A group of victims can also organize as members of a Victims Association and are thus represented by the Association’s lawyers. Civil Parties who lack the necessary means to pay for legal representation can seek assistance from the Office of Administration.

IR12ter describes the new role of the “Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer” within the ECCC: representing the interests of the single, consolidated group of Civil Parties at the trial stage of the proceedings. The core functions of the Lead Co-Lawyers are to protect the interest of the consolidated group of Civil Parties, and to shoulder the “ultimate responsibility to the court for the overall advocacy, strategy, and in-court presentation of the interests of the consolidated group of Civil Parties during the trial stage and beyond.” It is not clear if there will be an attorney-client relationship between Civil Parties and the Lead Co-Lawyers or if instead the Lead-Co-Lawyers will function as general victims’ advocates for the group as a whole.

With the most recent revision of the IRs on September 17, 2010 (Revision 6), it appears that after the Co-Investigating Judges’ issuing of a “Closing Order” ending the investigation phase, all Civil Parties are both required and entitled to representation by a lawyer. Rule 23ter(1) requires that after the issuing of the Closing Order, the Civil Party must be represented by a Civil Party lawyer in order to participate in the proceedings. In addition to this requirement, IR 22 provides that any person “entitled to” a lawyer under the IRs has the right to the assistance of a lawyer of their own choosing. Consequently, while no IR explicitly provides that a Civil Party is entitled to a lawyer, this is one possible interpretation of the recent revisions to the IRs. While this would appear to be a potential advance in the legal representation rights of Civil Parties at trial, it remains unclear what the sixth revision of the IR will mean in practice. Additionally, the creation of the role of Lead Co-Lawyers and the establishment of a pyramid scheme for Civil Party representation before the tribunal raises immediate concerns regarding the diminishing role that any individual Civil Party or Civil Party group plays in the proceedings.

3. Participation in the Pre-Trial Stage
Both Courts provide victims limited opportunities to participate in the Investigation and Pre-Trial stages of the proceedings. While the victim participants before the ICC do not have the right to intervene during the Prosecutor’s investigation, victims have been granted the right to actively participate during the confirmation hearing (of which there is no similar proceeding in the ECCC) if permitted by the Chamber. While during the investigation the ECCC grants Civil Parties the right to request that Co-Investigating Judges take specific investigative actions, such requests can be denied—particularly if the request is determined by the Co-Investigating Judges to exceed the scope of the Co-Prosecutor’s Introductory and Supplementary Submissions. The Co-Investigating Judges’ rejection of an investigation request can be appealed by the Civil Party, and the Civil Party has the right to participate in proceedings related to the appeals of other parties in this investigatory phase.

4. Participation in the Trial Stage
During the Trial, the ICC may allow victim participants to attend and exercise procedural rights in the specific proceeding for which the application was approved, subject to conditions set by the Chamber regarding the form and manner of participation. Before the ECCC, Civil Parties are granted a general right to participate in criminal proceedings, though the exercise of this general right has been limited by the Chamber in practice. Significantly, it remains to be seen to what extent recent revisions of the IRs vest the exercise of procedural rights only in Co-Lead Lawyers or if Civil Party lawyers retain the power to advance the interests of their clients at trial. Because the Co-Lead Lawyers have only an obligation to “seek the views” of and “endeavour to reach consensus” with Civil Party lawyers regarding overall advocacy, strategy, and in-court presentation, in practice the ability of individual Civil Parties to exercise their rights through their Civil Party lawyers may be substantially restricted.

The Chambers of the ICC has allowed victim participants the opportunity to make opening and closing statements. While Civil Parties in the ECCC have the right to make a closing statement, the Civil Parties do not have the right to make an opening statement, and appear to be specifically excluded from that opportunity.

Legal representatives of victims before the ICC have been granted access to both the public and confidential record. The lawyers of the Civil Parties in the ECCC have the right to access and obtain copies of the case file.

The ICC allows legal representatives of victims to submit applications to the Court to question witnesses including the Accused. While the ECCC provides that Civil Parties “shall” be able to ask questions, the permission of the President of the Chambers is required. Whether the “permission” requirement poses a substantive hurdle to the Civil Parties ability to exercise this right is unclear. Before the ICC, if the application of the legal representatives is granted, the Chamber may limit the manner and form of the questions posed by the legal representative. Similarly, the Chamber of the ECCC determines the order that it hears Civil Parties, witnesses, and experts, and also determines the order in which the judges and parties have the right to ask questions. Victim participants in the ICC, if permitted by the Chamber, can be both victim participants and witnesses in the same case. Civil Parties before the ECCC can no longer be questioned as a simple witness in the same case.

The right of victim participants or Civil Parties to offer, lead, and examine evidence has proven to be a controversial issue before both Courts. The Chambers of the ICC has determined that victim participants may submit and examine evidence (including exculpatory and incriminating evidence) as well as call witnesses if the Chamber determines that such actions are (1) necessary for the determination of the truth and (2) the issues addressed involve the victims’ personal interests. While the ECCC grants Civil Parties the explicit right to submit evidence, the ECCC has prohibited Civil Parties from submitting/examining evidence in relation to issues of sentencing and the character of the Accused, finding that the interest of Civil Parties is primarily the determination of reparations. The ICC has yet to address the issue explicitly, but appears to have left open the possibility that victim participants can lead, offer, and examine evidence regarding the sentencing and the character of the Accused. In the future, the ICC’s determination of this issue will rest on a finding of whether the “personal interest” of the victim is engaged by issues related to the sentencing and character of the Accused, and whether the evidence proposed by the victim participant accords with the Court’s general interest in the determination of truth.

In regards to the final judgment on the merits, victim participants before the ICC can only appeal an order of reparations. Civil Parties before the ECCC have the additional opportunity to appeal the verdict, but only when the Co-Prosecutor’s have also appealed. Neither victim participants before the ICC nor Civil Parties before the ECCC can appeal the sentence.

In regards to the substance of a reparations order, the ECCC is more limited than the ICC when determining reparations. While the ICC has the authority to order individual reparations, the ECCC has the power to grant only collective and moral reparations. As noted above, both victim participants and Civil Parties can appeal an order of reparations in their respective courts.

5. Trends
While a comparison of the substantive rights of victim participants in the ICC and Civil Parties before the ECCC has rested generally on the difference in meaning between the terms “participant” and “party,” developing jurisprudence before the respective court demonstrates that, in practice, there are numerous areas of similarities and convergence. Contrary to what has commonly been noted when comparing the rights of victims before the two courts, if recent trends in the form of participation rights granted to victim participants and Civil Parties continue, it appears that there may be instances in the future where the rights exercised by victim participants before the ICC during certain proceedings surpass those exercised by Civil Parties before the ECCC.

For a full report, click: http://www.dccam.org/Tribunal/Analysis/pdf/ECCC_ICC_Victim_Participation_C_Yim.pdf

[1] The International Criminal Court, established by the Rome Statute, is a permanent international criminal tribunal located in Den Haag, Netherlands. The jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to crimes occurring on or after July 1, 2002.

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTIC

The Khmer Rouge National Army: Order of Battle, January 1976

2011-02-13T19:04:00.000-08:00

Ben Kiernan
Yale University

This set of tables from the archives of the Santebal, the Khmer Rouge national-level security forces, reveals the order of battle of the national Khmer Rouge army, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. The first table reveals that the total number of Khmer Rouge regular forces was 72,248 troops, in nine divisions [kong pul] and four regiments [kong voreachsena thom]. The commanders of each division and regiment are named along with commanders of other units. (For a summary of the Democratic Kampuchea military chain of command, see Ben Kiernan, Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia, p. 15, Table 2.) The second table shows the amount of rice estimated to be harvested in 1976 by the soldiers of each of a number of the army's divisions. Note that the "Chinese comrades" are estimated to harvest 5000 thang of rice, approximately 125 tons.

It is important to remember that these forces are only the regular troops [thoap sruoch] under the direct command of the Khmer Rouge national general staff. Each of the seven Zones of Democratic Kampuchea also had its own general staff. The Zone military commands, their thirty or more component Regions, and over one hundred districts, commanded additional, regional forces [thoap damban]. There were also militia units [chhlop] in each of the country's sub-districts and also in each village.

The final tables describe the January 1976 order of battle and internal structure of the 170th Division, which was to be decimated by Santebal purges in the months that followed. The 170th was the former 1st Eastern Zone Division, commanded by Chan Chakrey (alias Mean) until 1975. It came under direct Center control in July of that year. On 9 October 1975, Pol Pot had remarked to a secret meeting of the Standing committee of the ruling Communist Party of Kampuchea that Chakrey's 170th Division was "the strongest of all" but that Chakrey owed his rank to Vietnam: "We must pay attention to what he says, to see [whether] he is a traitor who will deprive himself of any future." With Chakrey's deputy, Phan, too, "we must be totally silent. . . . We must watch their activities." Pol Pot removed Chakrey from his division command and brought him under close Center supervision as deputy chief of the general staff. (For sources on the purge of Chakrey, see Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp. 101, 321-5.) The January 1976 report to the Santebal on the Division's order of battle was part of its process of planning a purge. Chakrey was demoted in April and arrested on May 19th, 1976, his wife on September 19th. By November, 241 serving and former members of the 170th had been sent to Tuol Sleng prison.

The author of these documents, Ke San alias Sok, who replaced Chakrey as the 170th Division's political commissar, was himself arrested by the Santebal on March 4th 1978.

DCCAM ARCHIVES:

Documentation Center of Cambodia Archives number N0001069 (02 bbk)
Title: Rice Consumption Plan, 1976

Documentation Center of Cambodia Archives number N0001070 (02 bbk)
Title: Amount of rice harvest, 1976 ------ Number Unit number Estimate of rice harvest

Documentation Center of Cambodia Archives number N0001075 (02 bbk)
Title: 170th Division

To the staff committee with respect,

[I’d] like to report the weapons and forces and bases, as noted in the table below:

1. Table of weapons required [for combat readiness], from sections up to divisions.

2. Weapons that [we] have for combat readiness, shortages, and spares.

3. Table of plans to establish bases and to work.

- Total: 6,627 people.
- Able to work: 5,556 people.
- Cannot work: 1,071 people.
- Do easy work: study, cham pa lo (dredge ponds), absent, in training = 379 people.
- Cannot work: sick, injured, in hospital = 732 people.

Best wishes for success
Written on 6-1-76
(Signature)
Comrade Sok

---------------------

Comments on that aspect of the Pre-trial Chamber's ruling regarding the "nexus-to-armed conflict" issue:

Regarding the Pre-trial Chamber’s determination that the “nexus-to-armed-conflict” criteria for the prosecution of crimes against humanity would be applied to Trial 02.

Two related arguments have been put forth in support for the contention that the bulk of the Khmer Rouge regime’s atrocities against Cambodians cannot be held to have been connected with war crimes perpetrated by the regime in its international conflicts with neighboring Vietnam and, at least arguably, Thailand. These arguments are that the atrocities in question were committed prior to the commencement of Cambodia’s armed conflict with Vietnam, and/or were committed in places too far removed geographically from that conflict to be considered as having been connected with it. A careful reading of documentary evidence does not support either of these arguments.

Rather, as I attempted to demonstrate in a paper prepared for the Documentation Center of Cambodia in 1999, documentary evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the Khmer Rouge regime’s internal war against political opponents throughout Cambodia was both intimately connected in theory and practice with its international war of aggression against external enemies, and that the international armed conflict(s) in question, including cross-border raids resulting in the razing of entire villages and the slaughter of their populations, were ongoing from nearly the inception of Democratic Kampuchea.

Document after document routinely prepared within the Khmer Rouge political-military hierarchy set forth the regime’s standard operating procedure of identifying and targeting “internal enemies” as agents of Vietnam and Thailand. Numerous documents show clearly that the destruction of these “internal enemies” was an integral part of the Khmer Rouge leadership’s planning and execution of its armed conflicts with Vietnam, and arguably with Thailand, in which conflicts war crimes were routinely committed against foreign civilian populations. Even without a finding that the Khmer Rouge regime had been engaged in an ongoing conflict with Thailand, the documents demonstrate that executions of “internal enemies” and other crimes against humanity committed far from the Vietnam border were an essential aspect of the regime’s strategy to defeat Vietnam.

Furthermore, should the argument be made that this association in the minds of the Khmer Rouge leadership of its “internal enemies” with the regime’s foreign enemies was mere fancy without basis in fact, one need only note that the core of the Cambodian leadership which took power under the post-Khmer Rouge Vietnamese occupation were themselves refugees from Democratic Kampuchea’s war against its internal enemies.

While this is clearly a matter for the ECCC to determine, it is submitted that the required nexus between the Khmer Rouge leadership’s commission of crimes against humanity respecting its own citizens and war crimes committed by the regime in international armed conflict is irrefutable. As such, the “nexus to armed conflict” requirement should present no bar to a prosecution of the Khmer Rouge leadership for their crimes against humanity against the people of Cambodia.

Ray.

---------------

13 January 2011

ECCC PRESS RELEASE

CASE 002 SENT FOR TRIAL

Today, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has confirmed and partially amended the indictments against the Accused Persons Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea. The Pre-Trial Chamber has ordered the Accused Persons to be sent for trial and to continue to be held in provisional detention until they are brought before the Trial Chamber. The indictments include charges of crimes against humanity, genocide, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and murder, torture and religious persecution as defined by the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code.

The Co-Investigating Judges issued a Closing Order with the initial indictments of the Accused Persons on 15 September 2010. All four Accused Persons filed appeals against the Closing Order to the Pre-Trial Chamber.

The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the appeal filed by Khieu Samphan was inadmissible, whereas the appeals filed by Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Nuon Chea were found to be admissible in part. Of the admissible parts, the Pre-Trial Chamber dismissed all the grounds of appeal with two exceptions. First, the Pre-Trial Chamber ordered that the Closing Order be amended with a specification for the requirement of the existence of a link between the underlying acts of crimes against humanity and an armed conflict.

Secondly, the Pre-Trial Chamber also found that rape did not exist as a crime against humanity in its own right in the period 1975-1979, but that rape could be considered as “other inhumane acts” within the legal definition of crimes against humanity. The Closing Order was amended accordingly. The Pre-Trial Chamber will issue reasoned decisions on the appeals at a later date.

For further information, please contact:
Lars Olsen
Legal Communications Officer, ECCC
Mobile: +855 (0) 12 488 023
Land line: +855 (0) 23 219 814 ext. 6169
Email: olsenl@un.org

Reach Sambath
Chief of Public Affairs, ECCC
Mobile: +855 (0) 12 488 156
Land line: +855 (0) 23 219 814 6064
Email: reach.sambath@eccc.gov.kh

------------

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Comments on that aspect of the Pre-trial Chamber's ruling regarding the "nexus-to-armed conflict" issue:

2011-02-13T19:03:00.002-08:00

Regarding the Pre-trial Chamber’s determination that the “nexus-to-armed-conflict” criteria for the prosecution of crimes against humanity would be applied to Trial 02.

Two related arguments have been put forth in support for the contention that the bulk of the Khmer Rouge regime’s atrocities against Cambodians cannot be held to have been connected with war crimes perpetrated by the regime in its international conflicts with neighboring Vietnam and, at least arguably, Thailand. These arguments are that the atrocities in question were committed prior to the commencement of Cambodia’s armed conflict with Vietnam, and/or were committed in places too far removed geographically from that conflict to be considered as having been connected with it. A careful reading of documentary evidence does not support either of these arguments.

Rather, as I attempted to demonstrate in a paper prepared for the Documentation Center of Cambodia in 1999, documentary evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the Khmer Rouge regime’s internal war against political opponents throughout Cambodia was both intimately connected in theory and practice with its international war of aggression against external enemies, and that the international armed conflict(s) in question, including cross-border raids resulting in the razing of entire villages and the slaughter of their populations, were ongoing from nearly the inception of Democratic Kampuchea.

Document after document routinely prepared within the Khmer Rouge political-military hierarchy set forth the regime’s standard operating procedure of identifying and targeting “internal enemies” as agents of Vietnam and Thailand. Numerous documents show clearly that the destruction of these “internal enemies” was an integral part of the Khmer Rouge leadership’s planning and execution of its armed conflicts with Vietnam, and arguably with Thailand, in which conflicts war crimes were routinely committed against foreign civilian populations. Even without a finding that the Khmer Rouge regime had been engaged in an ongoing conflict with Thailand, the documents demonstrate that executions of “internal enemies” and other crimes against humanity committed far from the Vietnam border were an essential aspect of the regime’s strategy to defeat Vietnam.

Furthermore, should the argument be made that this association in the minds of the Khmer Rouge leadership of its “internal enemies” with the regime’s foreign enemies was mere fancy without basis in fact, one need only note that the core of the Cambodian leadership which took power under the post-Khmer Rouge Vietnamese occupation were themselves refugees from Democratic Kampuchea’s war against its internal enemies.

While this is clearly a matter for the ECCC to determine, it is submitted that the required nexus between the Khmer Rouge leadership’s commission of crimes against humanity respecting its own citizens and war crimes committed by the regime in international armed conflict is irrefutable. As such, the “nexus to armed conflict” requirement should present no bar to a prosecution of the Khmer Rouge leadership for their crimes against humanity against the people of Cambodia.

Ray.

---------------

13 January 2011

ECCC PRESS RELEASE

CASE 002 SENT FOR TRIAL

Today, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has confirmed and partially amended the indictments against the Accused Persons Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea. The Pre-Trial Chamber has ordered the Accused Persons to be sent for trial and to continue to be held in provisional detention until they are brought before the Trial Chamber. The indictments include charges of crimes against humanity, genocide, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and murder, torture and religious persecution as defined by the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code.

The Co-Investigating Judges issued a Closing Order with the initial indictments of the Accused Persons on 15 September 2010. All four Accused Persons filed appeals against the Closing Order to the Pre-Trial Chamber.

The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the appeal filed by Khieu Samphan was inadmissible, whereas the appeals filed by Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Nuon Chea were found to be admissible in part. Of the admissible parts, the Pre-Trial Chamber dismissed all the grounds of appeal with two exceptions. First, the Pre-Trial Chamber ordered that the Closing Order be amended with a specification for the requirement of the existence of a link between the underlying acts of crimes against humanity and an armed conflict.

Secondly, the Pre-Trial Chamber also found that rape did not exist as a crime against humanity in its own right in the period 1975-1979, but that rape could be considered as “other inhumane acts” within the legal definition of crimes against humanity. The Closing Order was amended accordingly. The Pre-Trial Chamber will issue reasoned decisions on the appeals at a later date.

For further information, please contact:
Lars Olsen
Legal Communications Officer, ECCC
Mobile: +855 (0) 12 488 023
Land line: +855 (0) 23 219 814 ext. 6169
Email: olsenl@un.org

Reach Sambath
Chief of Public Affairs, ECCC
Mobile: +855 (0) 12 488 156
Land line: +855 (0) 23 219 814 6064
Email: reach.sambath@eccc.gov.kh

------------

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

“Responding to Genocide”

2011-02-13T19:03:00.001-08:00

by Ashley Cooper
University of Massachusetts Lowell
Department of Cultural Studies

“A society cannot heal itself if it does not have an accurate account of its own history,” (Documentation Center of Cambodia).

On April 17, 1975, Cambodians greeted the Khmer Rouge in the streets of Phnom Penh with cheering and excitement. Cambodians foresaw a brighter future under the leadership of this new government. What they received, however, was a brutal genocide that ravaged the lives and spirits of every remaining Cambodian citizen and killed more than twenty percent of their population. In less than four years, the leaders of the Democratic Kampuchea purged Cambodia of much more than its monks, its intellectuals, and its Muslim Chams; the DK purged the Cambodian survivor’s trust in the goodness of mankind and each other. Since the genocide officially ended in 1979, survivors have been reeling in their private hells of nightmares with little hope of closure or healing. The responses of their own broken down nation and the world at large has left the majority of survivors in a limbo between past and present that the Documentation Center of Cambodia and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have begun to alleviate.

The various political players acting in response to the Cambodian genocide did little to initiate the immediate healing process of the survivors. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia began in December 1978, driving the Khmer Rouge (CPK) out and occupying Phnom Penh by January 7, 1979.[1] The People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) came into power backed by the Vietnamese government and army. Though the PRK claimed to be seeking the liberation of the oppressed Cambodians, it in fact aggravated divisions through out the 1980s and inflamed civil and border disputes with competing factions.[2] Politically, PRK portrayed the genocide through the lenses of Vietnamese heroes, wholly neglecting the needs of the Genocide’s survivors.

On January 8, 1979, Vietnamese photojournalists discovered the site of Tuol Sleng, the premier torture camp of the Cambodian Genocide that witnessed the interrogation, torture, and murder of at least fourteen thousand men and women.[3] Tuol Sleng, also referred to as S-21, was shut down as the Vietnamese sensed “the historical importance and the propaganda value of their discovery”; it was reopened by the end of the month to journalists from socialist countries in celebration of the installation of PRK.[4] Contrasting the horrific violence of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) era with the “open” invitation of foreigners into PRK, the Vietnamese presented themselves as sympathetic liberators in order to establish their presence as not only legitimate, but wholly welcome and necessary. By doing so, the PRK hoped to win the United Nations seat that continued to be held by the Khmer Rouge leadership for years to come.

In March 1979, Vietnamese colonel Mai Lam was put in charge of organizing and archiving the thousands of prison documents that had been left behind in Tuol Sleng and of turning Tuol Sleng into a genocide memorial. In her essay, Burcu Munyas says, “genocide memorialization refers to a society’s public display of its interpretation of the genocide,”[5] but this was not the Cambodian society’s interpretation as Mai Lam attempted to make people believe with Cambodian puppet curator and S-21 survivor Ung Pech. Tuol Sleng features all of the brutality and terror that it encompassed, but with little contextual information, making it into what Nancy Scheper-Hughes calls a “pornography of violence [which] subverts empathetic viewing.”[6] Instead of educating the Cambodian population about the atrocities they suffered and memorializing the victims respectfully, Mai Lam recreated their fear and terror by portraying the skulls, torture tools, and blood stains left behind by their murdered country men. The PRK kept alive the overwhelming terror Cambodian citizens felt towards the Khmer Rouge in their memorialization of their suffering in another attempt to legitimize their authority in the eyes of the populace.

Though the PRK claimed they were honoring the dead and protecting the living, they neglected to respect the cultural customs of Cambodia and, in effect, reinforced what Richard Rechtman labels the CPK’s rhetoric of extermination[7]. In Cambodia, it is customary to cremate the deceased so that they may reenter to the Buddhist cycle of rebirth; this liberation is denied when a person suffers a violent death and is not given proper rites. Rechtman explains the “survivor’s paradox” as the victims’ “interiorization” of this rhetoric and the hesitance to abandon their kin without a symbolic resting place. As a result, the dead continue to haunt the living as khmocs, or evil spirits.[8] The display of so many murdered in Tuol Sleng, in addition to the millions lost in mass graves, keeps these spirits roaming the countryside and torturing the daily lives and nightly dreams of survivors and the generations that follow.

Further cementing the present with the past, the Vietnamese implemented “Hate Day” on April 17, the anniversary of the Khmer Rouge’s evacuation of Phnom Penh. “Hate Day” translates in Khmer as “The Day to Remain Tied in Anger” and featured anti-Pol Pot demonstrations for school children, PRK officials’ condemnation of the DK, and survivor speeches about their horrific experiences.[9] Again, this propaganda did little to alleviate pain or find understanding, but instead opened existing wounds to pour salt on them and inflame antagonistic hatred. Fortunately, since the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991, the day evolved to become a day for remembrance for survivors and their families and serve as a time for healing.[10]

The Vietnamese may have forced the KR out temporarily, but their presence remained strong within Cambodian borders. International governments chose sides and civil war raged to displace an additional half million Cambodians. During the CPK reign, about eighty percent of school teachers were murdered and nearly ninety percent of the country’s schools had been destroyed; the education system had to be organized from scratch.[11] Political propaganda from both the CPK and PRK infiltrated education and “all sides manipulated history to instill in youth hatred of ‘the other’ as whomever and however each side defined it.”[12] This ranks as perhaps one of the worst political responses to the Genocide which had already eliminated the intellectual and educated individuals in the first round of purges in 1975. Children were rarely taught to read and write and instead were trained to hate the enemy and fear invasion, perpetrating not only ignorance, fear and violence, but also poverty. After this, text books cycled through a steady deletion and reinsertion of historical information as its respective government manipulated facts as it saw fit, sometimes deleting the genocide altogether to encourage reconciliation.[13]

Even today’s teachers, who sometimes have no more than a third grade education, are so poorly paid they demand bribes from their students at the start of each school day and sell the answers to exams. As a result of their families’ poverty, only 11.5 percent of children who begin school (which is only seventy-five percent of all children) continue on to high school; diplomas are rarely respected as academic achievements.[14] Instead of rebuilding a society, political propaganda and internal corruption further degraded it and continue to hinder Cambodian individuals from establishing and maintaining any sort of personal identity or collective memory.

On the other hand, Tuol Sleng, Santebal- another torture camp, and the enormous volumes of documents found there and elsewhere catalyzed a commendable historical response to the Cambodian Genocide. The unearthing and documentation of historically accurate information is an integral part of survivor healing, validating the experience of the victims and affirming their innocence. From the beginning, PRK encouraged the academic study of the archival information found at Tuol Sleng and Santebal. Of course, their motivation in doing so was to earn legitimacy in the eyes of the international community as the saviors and leaders of Cambodia. David Hawk, a human rights activist, “assembled a daunting collection of materials from Tuol Sleng that provided ample evidence of the extrajudicial crimes of the DK regime” in the 1980s and, from 1991 through 1993, Cornell University created two sets of microfilms which cover 210 reels of film containing every confession found there.[15]

A very encouraging historical response has been the Cambodian Genocide Project’s creation of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) which works to accurately document the history of Cambodia. Its objective is to educate the Cambodian population in order to propagate healing. DC-Cam works with two objectives to serve memory and justice, stating that “a society cannot know itself if it does not have an accurate memory of its own history.”[16] In March 2007, the group’s team leader Khamboly Dy completed A History of Democratic Kampuchea which the Cambodian Ministry of Education has officially approved as the historical text to be implemented in public schools. This, of course, is a huge step in the process of establishing a collective memory and a future for Cambodia’s children.

The undeterred documentation and international protection of prisoner confessions and history of Democratic Kampuchea has kept the truth of this period from disappearing. This scholarly commitment, which has catalogued approximately 155,000 pages of KR documents and six-thousand photographs,[17] aids in the healing of survivors who wish to see this period recognized for the horrific genocide that it was. For survivors, sharing their history not only affirms their own suffering, but also pays homage to the victims who were killed at the hands of the CPK. DC-Cam is a not-for-profit “independent and nonpartisan institute in Cambodia [that] disseminate[s] information on the Khmer Rouge regime based on impartial inquiry” and is operated entirely by Cambodians and aided by scholars of Europe, Asia, and the United States.[18] DC-Cam’s integrity is greatly respected in the international community and at home which increases the reputability and validity of the information it presents.

Historical documentation also plays the most important role in what many genocide victims see as the most important condition for reconciliation: legal justice and punitive proceedings. The archive at Santebal “is considered the most valuable find of any set of documents from the DK period [which] record the regime’s military and security activities throughout the country and may well connect individual top leaders to specific crimes.”[19] In his interviews with survivors of the Rwandan Genocide, Kasaija Phillip Apuuli found that survivors saw punishment of the perpetrators as the most important means of establishing reconciliation.[20] These victims wanted the top authorities in charge during the genocides to ask for forgiveness, to be punished, and to be forgiven by the survivors themselves, as opposed to a government institution.[21]

In August 1979, the PRK conducted the trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, CPK’s , prime minister and deputy prime minister for foreign affairs respectively. The PRK invited international lawyers, journalists, and dignitaries to sit in on and participate in the criminal proceedings. The five-day trial, which tried the defendents in absentia, included the testimonies of twenty-two victims and forty pages of well documented evidence that attested to the atrocities that the Khmer Rouge inflicted upon the Khmer people. Unfortunately for the Khmers, the United States and China refused to recognize the trials as anything more than a Vietnamese show to gain UN political support. While the trials systematically and elaborately proved the guilt of the KR leadership in crimes against humanity and genocide, the world acquitted them and essentially discredited the stories of the victims. During the CPK reign, the suffering and murders of the Khmer people were largely ignored by the international community due to a heavy veil of secrecy maintained by the CPK leadership. However, when the truth was uncovered but invariably unpunished due to greater political agendas, the Khmer people were left in pain and despair, undoubtedly losing faith in the judicial and government systems that were supposed to protect and defend them.

In October 2010, Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch and warden of Tuol Sleng, was brought to trial and found guilty for crimes against humanity and war crimes by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Certainly a step in the right direction, the delay of legal proceedings nonetheless directly delayed the healing of Cambodian Genocide survivors. A culture of silent obedience, Cambodian survivors had been stuck between past and present for over thirty years knowing that their persecutors were living freely while they languished in nightmares, terror, civil war, and refugee camps. Even Duch’s trial proved wanting and left many Cambodians unsatisfied with a mere 35 year imprisonment sentence, including time already served, which was then brought under reconsideration for an extended life sentence. The chamber issued no ruling on the domestic charges because of a failure to reach a supermajority decision on the expiration of the statute of limitations[22] which seems like a trivial and small minded approach considering the political dissent that waged throughout that twenty year period. Despite their initial reaction, the ECCC detailed its decision for the victims who began accepting the trial “as a meaningful step forward for their, and the nation’s healing.”[23]

Over 30,000 Cambodians attended at least a portion of the proceedings in person while the public radio and television broadcasting of the trial and hearing reached millions of Cambodians to successfully break through a national silence to begin an open dialogue between Cambodians about their shared experiences.[24] Most importantly, however, was that Duch’s trial confirmed beyond all reasonable doubt that the atrocities of the KR actually did occur to the extent that they did, he took responsibility as an authority, he apologized for his crimes against humanity, and he confirmed the existence of the KR hierarchy and specific persons and their roles in the Cambodian genocide. Duch was the first authority figure to do so, creating an opportunity for affirmation and the most important step towards survivor healing.

In the case against Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and Ieng Thirith- all members of the Khmer Rouge senior leadership- there are 3,993 civil party applicants that will be represented as a group. The Victim Support Section (VSS) has a “mandate to provide general information to victims (especially civil parties), assist and support civil parties in attending proceedings, undertake outreach activities […] and to provide non-judicial remedies for victims” and there are steps being taken to provide greater reparations for victims.[25] However delayed, the legal responses by the ECCC provided the greatest leaps for survivor healing.

Literature, along with advocacy, is perhaps the only channel through which survivors actively seek their own healing. It is through the act of writing that many authors and poets begin to sort out and affirm their experiences. When nothing was being done in their defense, a few Cambodian writers took to the pen in order to bear witness to the atrocities inflicted on their people and affirm their innocence. Poets such as Ok Kork, Trung Huy Kim and Sath Bunrith share their pain and burden with their readers, acting as a conduit for their people and also asking for responses from other victims.[26] Poetry written in the Cambodian meter and language serves to preserve the cultural literary tradition that was severely threatened with the purge of the genocides.

In their poetry, most authors are not merely seeking to establish the facts of the genocide, but are seeking the recognition of their human suffering. In “Cambodian People’s Lament,” Sath Bunrith speaks for his ancestors, “they should be pitied/ And deeply mourned,” in attempt to pay homage and respect to his lost countrymen and perhaps lay their souls to rest. These poets more importantly address the survivors who remain. Bunrith uses his poetry to advocate for his country, “Our people have suffered and suffered again/ Now it is the Vietnamese/ Who come to rob our country […] Is there a place/ Where they can take shelter/ For even a short while? […] the relief money for education/ is not enough.”[27] Through advocacy, victims find empowerment and purpose and attend to not only their own healing, but the healing of others.

Ok Kork developed a strong poetic voice that looks not only to work through his own pain to reach healing and understanding, but reaches out to other survivors. He is bearing witness to the loss of life, tradition, and hope, but he is also calling out to his country men to take responsibility; he is attempting to push life and vigor back into those who have been silenced, “The Cambodian nightmare must be stopped!/ We must put an end to this wickedness/ That is running over our children.”[28] Ok Kork uses his poetry as a way to grieve, cycling through many of the processes in print. He says, “I’m telling this story/Out of a rage/That never relents,”[29] and he expresses a deep emotion that refuses to be silenced by political intimidation. Ok Kork calls out for a shared grief, telling other survivors that they are not alone, that he feels their pain and they deserve to be angry. Towards the end of the poem, he appeals to this countrymen to speak for their lost ones, “You must try/ To help me think this through […] Don’et let what has happened/ Just pass unnoticed/ By our brothers and sisters./ Please write it down/ So it can be told.” The victim is not writing solely for his own benefit, but to record what the pain of the Cambodians means in the hearts and souls of human beings. He invites other survivors to add to his lines, to join him in an open conversation that will allow the Khmer people to develop a collective narrative, something which no culture can survive without.
Loung Ung, author of “First They Killed My Father”, intimated in an email with George Chigas that it was through the act of writing and advocacy that she began healing. She wrote, “being an activist has healed me more than all my work with therapists and counselors. As an activist, I'm no longer invisible, weak, alone, powerless or voiceless. I think you understand the POWER in action against injustice. The KR tried to take my power, my voice and it took me years to find it again.” In her book, she was able to express through vivid imagery and open expression the personal story of her family and her own suffering. Loung Ung provided faces and hearts, aspirations and fears for the Genocide’s statistics and facts; she was able to reach a place of shared humanity on an international level. While the Khmer Institute saw her account decidedly fictitious and harmful to the historical accuracy of Cambodia’s genocide[30], Loung Ung found healing through her testimony and provided a voice for those who could not raise their own. The Khmer Institute undoubtedly has a responsibility to portray the facts accurately and by responding to literary works they uphold their said duty. However, by sensationalizing their own response to her account and offering contradictory facts, the Khmer Institute not only discredits Luong Ung’s account, but also the literature that they themselves deem credible. It is important that they remain unemotional and stay true to their mission in order for their credibility and the stories they support to remain in tact. Otherwise, the Khmer Institute threatens to detract from the healing of those they are attempting to help.

In order for a survivor to heal, a multi-faceted approach is necessary. It is important that the political, historical, legal, and literary responses to crimes against humanity are taken seriously by the domestic and international communities. While political dissention remains in Cambodia, the obedient silence that pervaded the lives of survivors has been broken. The story of the Cambodian Genocide has been historically recorded in accurate details and preserved in the archives of international libraries so that it can never rightfully be denied, and it has been expounded by the personal voices of survivors in preserving not only their own stories, but those of the nearly two million Cambodians killed. What is most important now is that the expediency of the legal proceedings and punishment of the remaining top officials for their crimes against humanity so that survivors may live in a world where evil is not tolerated.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip, “Journal of Genocide Research; (Mar2009, Vol. 11 Issue 1)

Brinkley, J.. “Cambodia’s Curse.” Foreign Affairs 88.2 (2009): 111-122. ABI/INFORM Global, ProQuest. Web.

Chandler, David, Chandler, David, Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison (University of California Press, Ltd)

Chigas, George, Cambodia’s Lament. Review of Asian Literature, 1991

Chigas, George, Class Lecture notes: “The Evidence” 2010

DC-Cam webpage dccam.org

Decision on the Defence Preliminary Objection Concerning the Statute of Limitations of Domestic Crimes, July 26, 2010 at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/637/20100726_Preliminary_Objection_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf

Hor, Soneath, Sody Lay & Grantham Quinn, “First They Killed Her Sister: A Definitive Analysis” at http://www.khmcrinstitute.org/

Munya, Burcu, “Journal of Genocide Research” (Sep2008, Vol. 10 Issue 3)

Open Society Justice Intiative, “Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: September 2010 Update” p. 2 at http:/www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/sub_listing

Rechtman, Richard. "The Survivor's Paradox: Psychological Consequences of the Khmer Rouge Rhetoric of Extermination." Anthropology & Medicine 13.1 (2006): 1-11. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 10 Nov. 2010.

[1] Chandler, David, Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison (University of California Press, Ltd) p. 1
[2] Munyas, Burcu, “Journal of Genocide Research” (Sep2008, Vol. 10 Issue 3) p. 424
[3] Chandler, David, Chandler, David, Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison (University of California Press, Ltd) p. 6
[4] Ibid, p. 4
[5] Munyas, Burcu, “Journal of Genocide Research” (Sep2008, Vol. 10 Issue 3) p. 430
[6] Ibid.
[7] As referenced in Richard Rechtman’s article "The Survivor's Paradox: Psychological Consequences of the Khmer Rouge Rhetoric of Extermination." This refers to the language mass murderers use in order to dehumanize their victims and link the fate of survivors with “only that of dead bodies,” (p. 3)
[8] Ibid, p. 9.
[9] Chandler, David, Chandler, David, Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison (University of California Press, Ltd) p. 10
[10] Munya, Burcu, “Journal of Genocide Research” (Sep2008, Vol. 10 Issue 3) p. 431
[11] Brinkley, J.. “Cambodia’s Curse.” Foreign Affairs 88.2 (2009): 111-122. ABI/INFORM Global, ProQuest. Web.
[12] Munya, Burcu, “Journal of Genocide Research” (Sep2008, Vol. 10 Issue 3) p. 424

[13] Ibid.
[14] Brinkley, J.. “Cambodia’s Curse.” Foreign Affairs 88.2 (2009): 111-122. ABI/INFORM Global, ProQuest. Web.
[15] Chandler, David, Chandler, David, Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison (University of California Press, Ltd) p. 11
[16] DC-Cam home page (dccam.org)
[17] Ibid.
[18] DC-Cam home page (dccam.org)
[19] Chigas, George, Class Lecture notes: “The Evidence” 2010. p. 8
[20] Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip, “Journal of Genocide Research; (Mar2009, Vol. 11 Issue 1) p. 130
[21] Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip, “Journal of Genocide Research; (Mar2009, Vol. 11 Issue 1) p. 134
[22] Decision on the Defence Preliminary Objection Concerning the Statute of Limitations of Domestic Crimes, July 26, 2010 at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/637/20100726_Preliminary_Objection_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf
[23] Open Society Justice Intiative, “Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: September 2010 Update” p. 2 at http:/www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/sub_listing
[24] Ibid, pp.1&7
[25] Ibid, pp. 10,12&14
[26] Chigas, George, Cambodia’s Lament. Review of Asian Literature, 1991.
[27] Bunrith, Sath, “Cambodian People’s Lament” pp. 55-61.
[28] Kork, Ok, “It’s Time We Knew Ourselves,” p. 27.
[29] Kork, Ok, “Could We Ever Forget?” p. 41.
[30] Hor, Soneath, Sody Lay & Grantham Quinn, “First They Killed Her Sister: A Definitive Analysis” at http://www.khmcrinstitute.org/

Independently Searching for the Truth since 1997.
MEMORY & JUSTICE

Geographic Education as Genocidal Policy under the Khmer Rouge

2011-01-12T20:47:00.002-08:00

James A. Tyner, Professor of Geography, Kent State University

It is well-established that the Khmer Rouge, upon assuming power in 1975, set out to destroy the existing societal infrastructure: health, education, commerce, religion, family. However, what is less discussed is that the Khmer Rouge intended to construct an entirely new state and society. The objective of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and other leaders of the CPK was to make an entirely new, modern, and productive communal society. This goal of the Khmer Rouge was in fact two-fold: to first erase all vestiges of the previous society and, second, to erect an entirely new, socialist-based society. It was with this understanding that Cambodia ceased to exist, replaced by Democratic Kampuchea (as the country was renamed by the Khmer Rouge). Indeed, it was Pol Pot who declared, “There are no schools, faculties or universities in the traditional sense, although they did exist in our country prior to liberation, because we wish to do away with all vestiges of the past.”[1]
In this chapter I suggest that organized mass political violence―genocide―was explicitly adopted by the Khmer Rouge as an instrument of post-conflict political construction. Furthermore, I maintain that a geographic-based education, as manifest in a political textbook[2] produced by the Khmer Rouge, was a key to the CPK’s post-war project. As such I provide a needed corrective to our understanding of both post-conflict societies and the ‘causes’ of genocide.

Genocide as Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Although the close association between ‘war’ and ‘genocide’ is well-documented, the form of this relationship remains open to debate. Genocides, for example, frequently occur during, or in the immediate aftermath, of war. This is clearly seen in the Armenian genocide of 1915, the Nazi-perpetrated Holocaust of the Second World War, and in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Scholars assert that the upheavals and uncertainties associated with war contribute to the conditions that make possible the targeting of ‘enemy’ civilians. The common understand is that genocide is extension of war. However, there remains the possibility that genocide may be approached as a political instrument of post-conflict (re)construction. In the case of Cambodia, genocide was perpetrated during a period in which the war was believed over. Indeed, for the Khmer Rouge, the date of their military victory marked ‘year zero’―a tangible clue that signaled their understanding of war’s end. The Cambodian genocide followed in the wake of civil war; the termination of conflict however did not bring about peace as this concept is normally understood.
On April 17, 1975, thousands of war-hardened Khmer Rouge soldiers poured into the streets of Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s capital city. Coinciding with the cessation of the broader Indochina War that engulfed neighboring Vietnam and Laos, the Cambodian Civil War (1970-1975) was over. In five bloody years, the Khmer Rouge had defeated the US-supported Republican forces of the Lon Nol government. In the process, tens of thousands of people had died; many hundreds of thousands found themselves refugees in their own land—what we would now describe by the innocuous term ‘internally displaced persons.’ But for the majority of Cambodians, post-war society was anything but peaceful.
The victory of the Khmer Rouge would mark the termination of years of military conflict but not the end of widespread violence. In the weeks and months that followed, the cities and towns of Cambodia were evacuated, their inhabitants forced onto agricultural collectives in the countryside. Hospitals, factories and schools were closed; money and wages were abolished, and monasteries were emptied.
Upon assuming power, the Communist Party of Kampuchea sought to transform Cambodia into a modern, communal utopia. As such, Party members attempted to replace what they saw as impediments to national autonomy and social justice with revolutionary energy and incentives. In their attempt to create—not recreate—a utopian society, the leadership of the Khmer Rouge embarked on a massive program of social and spatial engineering.
Rather than reconstructing a war-devastated society, the Khmer Rouge explicitly attempted to erase time and space to construct (in their minds) a new and pure communal society. This is seen most clearly in the Khmer Rouge’s decision to forcibly evacuate Phnom Penh and all other urban areas of Cambodia. But it is also seen in the justifications for the mass violence of all facets of daily life—including the promotion of education.

(Geographic) Educational Policies of the Khmer Rouge

The Khmer Rouge understood the importance of education in their post-conflict construction of Democratic Kampuchea. Indeed, education was vital to their revolutionary project in that it would provide support and legitimacy for associated political and economic programs. When the Khmer Rouge stood victorious on the streets of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, they constituted neither a centralized, efficient political party nor military force. Having achieved ‘military victory’, the Khmer leadership understood that they would have to centralize power and ‘build socialism’.
With such a tentative hold on the populace―and its own political power―the Khmer Rouge leadership sought to solidify their position through various means. On the one hand, the Khmer Rouge utilized a practice of state-terror. Within Democratic Kampuchea, for example, the public display of torture and execution served to reify the authority of the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, the systematic violence and the killing of its own populace were understood by the Khmer Rouge as a prelude to the construction of a moral and properly ordered post-war society.
On the other hand, the Khmer Rouge turned to education―generally considered a ‘positive’ peace building exercise―as a means of establishing both legitimacy and political control. However, education under the Khmer Rouge included both destructive and constructive practices (see Clayton 1998). First, and in conformance with other practices, the Khmer Rouge sought to dismantle the pre-existing educational infrastructure. Prior to the Khmer Rouge’s rise to power, for example, Cambodia was home to 5,275 primary schools, 146 secondary schools, and 9 institutes of higher education (see Clayton 1998: 5).
Under the direction of the CPK, however, this infrastructure was literally ‘smashed’ or demolished. Teachers were ‘smashed’, as anywhere from 75 percent to 90 percent of all teachers at all levels were killed during the genocide. Most school buildings were destroyed; libraries were emptied and books were burned. Those buildings left standing were often converted to other uses. The Royal University was turned into a farm. Perhaps most symbolic, a former high school (Tuol Svay Prey) was converted into a detention and torture facility; at this site, now known as Tuol Sleng prison, approximately 14,000 people were detained, tortured, and eventually killed.
Along side these destructive practices, the Khmer Rouge forwarded a number of (in their view) constructive practices. This marked the second phase of the CPK’s educational agenda: the construction of Democratic Kampuchea. Simply stated, the Khmer Rouge leadership proposed a new educational system, one that was intended to promote a national political consciousness and in turn provide legitimacy to Khmer Rouge rule. In fact, the Khmer Rouge explicitly sought to justify their political and economic programs through education.
Education in general, but geographic education specifically, is far from a neutral activity. Indeed, with respect to the latter, it is now well-understand that the teaching of geography is important in the development of a political consciousness. Geographic instruction, firstly, provides students with basic knowledge about people and places: the ‘facts-and-figures’ of geography, or the traditional ‘capes-and-bays’ form of knowledge that appear on maps and in text-books. However, there is also a ‘hidden curriculum’ (or subtext) in the teaching of geography. Indeed, geographic education may facilitate the construction of ‘national identities.’ This is seen, for example, in the re-drawing of political maps following war. And, in fact, following the victory of the CPK, a new map appeared, one that symbolically spoke to the new state of Democratic Kampuchea. The Khmer Rouge’s map portrays the administrative divisions of Democratic Kampuchea. At the broadest scale, Democratic Kampuchea was divided into seven geographic zones, identified by cardinal compass directions: North, Northeast, East, Southwest, West, Northwest, and Center. These zones were apparently derived from military designations established by the Khmer Rouge during the war (1970-1975). These zones, significantly, did not conform to any pre-existing political division of Cambodia. The Northeast, East, and Southwest zones, for example, included the former eastern portion of Stung Treng province and the provinces of Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, eastern Kompong Cham, Kandal, southern Kompong Speu, and Kampot.
The political geography of Democratic Kampuchea as delineated on the map is very significant. Certainly, one sees evidence of the militarized society promoted by the Khmer Rouge. The fact that political divisions, for example, were derived from military necessity is certainly important. However, the map also reveals how the Khmer Rouge sought to erase previous regional identities, to be replaced by an imaginative geography that suppressed regionalism and provincialism in favor of a broader nationalism. The entire political geographic organization of Democratic Kampuchea was based on an abstract system composed of cardinal direction points and numbers and, in the process, the Khmer Rouge’s cartography signified ‘egalitarianism’ in that all regions were identical; there was nothing to distinguish one zone from the other.
The production of geographic knowledge, whether in the form of maps or school texts, thus assumes a primary place in post-conflict construction. State schooling practices, serve to establish and reinforce specific ideologies of nationalism. In turn, these practices may be used to justify and legitimate political processes and practices—including mass violence and genocide.

Political Geography under the Khmer Rouge
Apart from agricultural and industrial development, education was seen by the CPK to be of prime importance in the building of Democratic Kampuchea. In part, the importance of education is related to the place of children within the new society. A traditional saying in Cambodia holds that ‘clay is molded while it is soft.’ According to Henri Locard, this slogan was often used to signify that only young children could be selected by the CPK to become loyal servants of Angkar. This idea, in fact, was developed by Pol Pot, who said of the young: “Those, among our comrades, who are young, must make a great effort to re-educate themselves. They must never allow themselves to lose sight of this goal. You have to be, and remain, faithful to the revolution. People age quickly. Being young, you are at the most receptive age, and capable to assimilate what the revolution stands for, better than anyone else.”[3]
Given that education within Democratic Kampuchea was so important for the cultivation of a political consciousness, it is not surprising that the Khmer Rouge produced school texts. Text-books for the CPK imparted an authority to which students were expected to respect without question, and thus complemented the role performed by the secretive ‘Angkar’. In Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge was known to have published at least three text-books, including two books on geography.[4] The first, a general geography text, was intended for first-grade use; the second, a text on political geography, was designed for second-grade use. It is the latter text that occupies my focus for the remainder of this paper.
In 1977 the Ministry of Education published a second-grade text entitled “Political Geography of Democratic Kampuchea.” Numbering 72 pages in length, the text is composed of twelve ‘lessons’ or chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the nation and people of Democratic Kampuchea; the second chapter details the organizational structure of Democratic Kampuchea, including its provinces, regions, zones, and districts. Lessons three through eleven cover the various provinces of Democratic Kampuchea. Between 1975 and 1979, the state of Democratic Kampuchea (as administered by the Khmer Rouge) was composed of 19 provinces; these were further divided into 112 districts, 1,160 communes, and innumerable villages. These provinces were also aggregated for administrative purposes into larger regions and zones.
The text, in effect, constitutes a fairly traditional regional geography of Democratic Kampuchea. Lessons Three through Eleven are identical in structure. Each lesson begins with a brief summary of the province(s), followed by a (repetitive) lesson summary and series of questions. Lesson four, for example, identifies Kandal Province as being “situated around the intersection of … four rivers” and having Takhmao as its provincial town” (page 21). These brief summaries give further elaboration on neighboring provinces and/or physical features. In short, each lesson begins with the basic ‘site-and-situation’ of the province. Next, the text informs students of the various districts which compose the provinces, along with specific communes. Stung Treng Province, for example, consists of four districts, including Siem Bok; this latter district is further composed of three communes. Lesson chapters are illustrated with photographs. As a regional geography, however, the text is far from idiographic; rather, it is normative in approach, commanding students to learn not only the political (i.e., administrative) divisions of the country, but also the politics behind the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea.
Having established the basic political boundaries of each province, lessons subsequently inform students of the relevancy of each location to the overall revolution. Thus, with respect to Kandal Province, students learn that Democratic Kampuchea’s “poor peasants at all revolutionary strongholds in Kandal Province stood up to struggle against the secret agents, soldiers, police, and the exploitative class of all forms, who infiltrated, repressed, and slaughtered our brothers and sisters” (page 22). Likewise, students learn that for both Siem Reap Province and Oddar Meanchey Province, “our people … [but] particularly the poor peasant farmers, joined the rest of the people in the country in the revolutionary struggles against the American imperialist, its puppets, and the traitorous Lon Nol clique with bursting energy and enthusiasm” (page 53). Chapters conclude with ‘lesson summaries’, in which the main points of the preceding relevancy sections are repeated, followed by ‘suggested’ questions for discussion. One question, for example, asks students: “During the period of over five years of revolutionary war, how did our people in Preah Vihear province participate in the struggles?” (page 62).
Lessons are brief, direct, and repetitive. They entail basic geographic concepts (i.e., site and situation), followed by political lessons designed to promote a particular geographic imaginary of both the revolutionary struggle and the contemporary state of Democratic Kampuchea.
Significantly, these lessons provide insight into the establishment of citizenry for Democratic Kampuchea. Students learn who was to be included within the state, and for what reasons; likewise, students learned who was to be excluded—or ‘smashed’. Consequently, these lessons could be applied in the students’ everyday lives, as a means of providing justification and legitimacy to other Khmer Rouge practices, such as detentions, forced labors, and executions.
The Khmer Rouge understood the construction of Democratic Kampuchea’s ‘new’ geography from its ‘old’. As indicated in the political geography text book:
“Over the past two thousand years under the administration of the feudal and capitalist class and the iron yoke of the old and new colonialists and the foreign imperialists, our Kampuchean nation has nothing remained but an empty shell and a mere label. The true nature and essence of the national unit were entirely shattered. For the nation suffered territorial losses and the country and people became subservient to foreigners. Furthermore, everything associated with the national identity from politics, economics, culture, arts, literature, and traditions to social order, attitude and behavior, language, clothing fashion, and so on were foreign imports or were transformed by foreign influences” (page 2).

Lesson One, therefore, is quite clear as to whom was to be included (and thus allowed to live) in Democratic Kampuchea. The lesson explains that the “people of Kampuchea are Kampucheans of all ethnic origins, including the Khmers and all ethnic minorities who are based in regional localities and other areas throughout the country and who were born and have earned their livelihood from farming in the territory of the Democratic Kampuchea since a long time ago” (page 3). However, the text also notes that the ‘nation’ consists of “people of all ethnic backgrounds who are collective laborers and peasants who have a long history of audacious struggles against the oppression and exploitation of the feudal and capitalist reactionaries and the invasion of foreign imperialists and colonialists of the old and new kinds” (page 1). According to this ‘second-grade’ text book, here is a clear political statement as to who was to be included or excluded from Democratic Kampuchea. In other words, we may view the political geography text as providing a lesson in citizenship.
The lesson is brutally self-evident. The Khmer Rouge ideologues were not content with reconstructing Cambodia, but rather in construction a new Democratic Kampuchea. The CPK believed itself to be justified in its planned and deliberate actions, through the use of genocide as a post-war political tool of construction. The transformation of Cambodia into Democratic Kampuchea was, from the perspective of the CPK, literally to ‘smash’ all pre-existing histories, geographies, and societies.
Citizens—as students were taught—were to be economically and/or politically useful; citizens were to live only for the state. The Khmer Rouge saying ‘If you live there is no gain. If you die, there is no loss’, approaches this conception of the sovereign’s right over life and death. This is the lesson that was taught in the second-grade text-book.
The killings that were sanctioned and justified by the Khmer Rouge were designed, in part, to centralize authority; likewise, the tortures, forced confessions, and executions were enacted to justify and legitimize the sovereignty of the CPK. Hence we see in Democratic Kampuchea, that genocide had a clear and distinct post-conflict purpose: a systematic eradication of persons who did not conform with the imagined geographies of a sovereign Democratic Kampuchea.

Conclusions
When fighting ceases, it is often assumed, peace is at hand, and a process of reconstruction begins. Unfortunately, the reality is decidedly more complex. Through an examination of a second-grade political geography text-book produced by the Khmer Rouge, I have argued that the Khmer Rouge used genocidal policies in order to construct a new nation-state following the termination of war. The Khmer Rouge justified their actions and condoned the death of millions of their own citizens. These deaths occurred via both direct violence (e.g., murder and execution) and structural violence (e.g., starvation, inadequate health facilities).
In the aftermath of war, the Khmer Rouge proposed and implemented a geographic-based pedagogy, an educational curricula designed to formulate a specific geographical imagination and political consciousness. I maintain that the political geography text-book, while traditional in orientation with an emphasis on regional geography, was explicit in forwarding the Khmer Rouge’s justification and legitimacy of both its political rule and organized mass violence. In other words, the text-book itself is an admission on behalf of the Khmer Rouge that it acknowledged, recognized, and condoned the brutal practices that led to the death of approximately two-million people.

END.

[1] Quoted in T. Clayton (1998) “Building the New Cambodia: Educational Destruction and Construction Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979,” History of Education Quarterly 38(1): 1-16; at 3.
[2] The text is entitled Political Geography of Democratic Kampuchea and was published in 1977 by the Ministry of Education, Democratic Kampuchea. I sincerely thank Mr. Youk Chhang for making this document available and Mr. Bou Lim for his exceptional translation work. A longer version of this paper appears as J. Tyner, (2010) “Genocide as Reconstruction: The Political Geography of Democratic Kampuchea,” in Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Geographies, edited by Scott Kirsch and Colin Flint (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate).
[3] H. Locard (2004) Pol Pot’s Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books)
[4] A math text was also produced.

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MEMORY & JUSTICE

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